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ABSTRACT
Keywords: transnational, public policy research institutes, cooperation, European 
Union (EU), Russia, foreign politics, security politics 
The purpose of this research project is to analyse the opportunities and challenges that the 
foreign and security policy research institutes face in transnational cooperation across 
wider Europe. By specifically examining the capacities of non- and quasi-governmental 
actors to operate and cooperate at transnational level, the research informs the choices 
presented by the ongoing restructuring of the foreign and security policy sphere. 
The increasing deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues calls for 
transnational or multinational approaches to resolve them. As nation states fall short of the 
appropriate capacities, it is of interest to investigate how non- and quasi-governmental 
actors can contribute to transnational interaction. Therefore, their tools and capacities to 
operate and cooperate in the transnational sphere need to be established in the first place. 
In this context a broader geographical focus is chosen in order to study a more 
differentiated situation, instead of the already relatively integrated case of the European 
Union. The thesis first studies cooperation among research institutes in broader terms 
under consideration of their socio-political environment. It outlines differences in their 
organic development dependent on the geographic affiliation of the institutes, and 
identifies their tools as well as several defining characteristics. This is followed by an 
analysis of the fieldwork, discussing processes, opportunities and challenges in 
transnational cooperation as perceived by staff in research institutes. Subsequently, the 
thesis takes a more detailed look at applied cooperation among research institutes. Here it 
traces patterns and formats of interaction, and then delves into a case study on project-
based cooperation that provides functional insights regarding research institutes’ 
cooperation across borders. In studying cooperation among research institutes from 
various perspectives, the research enables to investigate the integration among the 
different narratives. 
The study integrates a range of issues and concepts in an original manner, therefore it 
contributes to several significant debates. On the face of it, the thesis adds to the 
identification of a role for non- and quasi-governmental actors in an increasingly 
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deterritorialised foreign and security policy sphere, using the example of research 
institutes. To address this aspect, the study considers both the broader implications of 
socio-political and economic interrelations for cooperation, as well as the detailed 
functional level of interaction. Moreover, based on the choice of geographical focus, the 
research project contributes to the literature on EU-Russia relations. Herein it adds to the 
extant literature by offering a perspective which acknowledges the implications of high 
politics but emphasises the role of non- and quasi-governmental actors. Beyond that, the 
thesis contributes to the theoretical debate on foreign and security policy in choosing a 
non-traditional approach to examine a non-traditional issue. Post-structuralism serves to 
facilitate a critical review of the construction of cooperation among Russian and EU-based 
public policy research institutes. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Initiation of the Research Project
Under the working title ‘A Transnational Proposition: Exploring Cross-Border Cooperation 
among Research Institutes in foreign and security policy across Wider Europe’, this thesis 
examines the capacities of public policy research institutes to act and interact in the 
transnational sphere.  1
The thesis considers the increased deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues 
in wider Europe, and the resulting political space for non- and quasi-governmental actors 
to influence governance processes (Cross, 2013, p.139; Sending & Neumann, 2006, p.
194; Goldstein & Peevehouse, 2008, p.16). In this regard, it questions how research 
institutes make use of this deterritorialisation to spread their narratives and influence the 
wider political processes. The thesis considers research institutes’ abilities and tools to 
adapt to an increasingly transnational environment. Thereby, it does not primarily focus to 
enlarge on an elitist or pluralist understanding of their role - both of which represent 
different readings of the state of integration and participation of research institutes in policy 
processes. Instead it enquires about underlying institutional and functional aspects 
including a discussion on mandates, resources and strategic choices (Abelson, 2009, p.
49f). This means that the thesis goes beyond the simple incentive of understanding policy 
impact. To do so, their organic development is established and their way of working is 
investigated, whereby different types of research institutes are distinguished (Ullrich, 2004, 
p.54). Beyond that the nature and dynamics of cross-border cooperation among research 
institutes are identified in order to understand which tools and channels they can avail 
themselves of to deal with operating and cooperating in the transnational sphere. The 
thesis accomplishes this through interviews with key practitioners working for research 
institutes, a review of conducted initiatives in cooperation, and an analysis of a case study 
on project-based cooperation, all backed up by a review of academic and practitioner 
literature emanating from a range of disciplines. 
Cooperation in foreign and security policy governance is a contested space. Contested in 
so far as it is an area of core national sovereignty, and touches upon tense geopolitical 
 For a full definition of public policy research institutes see Chapter two. To ensure brevity they are hereafter 1
referred to as ‘research institutes’.
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boundaries. Therefore, even though this is a policy area in which we may find cooperation 
it is likely that we also find competition based on the geopolitical nuances (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2008; Aalberts & Werner, 2011). This sectoral and geographical competition 
narrative is key to the research. However, considering the increasing transnationalisation 
of foreign and security policy challenges, a comprehensive response requires cooperation 
among several states. This indicates the recognition that single nation states do not have 
the capacity to deal with transnational threats in a comprehensive manner (Aydinly, 2010, 
p.18). Those shortcomings trigger the question, how far other actors or institutions may 
complement nation states in cross-border interaction. While this thesis recognises the 
work of regional and international organisations, as well as the work of the nation states, it 
deviates from the norm and looks to establish a more original contribution. A closer look at 
the transnational understanding that is used to describe the current type of challenges, 
brings to notice its inherent recognition of non- and quasi-governmental actors in the policy 
environment (Nye & Keohane, 1971; Evangelista, 1995; Keohane & Nye, 2000; Baker, 
2009). Therefore, it focuses at the contribution of non-and quasi-governmental actors in 
the form of expertise. In a world where territory and power no longer necessarily align, a 
reordering of power takes place that increases the opportunities for non- and quasi-
governmental actors to redefine their role and apply their abilities in a broader space. They 
work to establish influence on the dominant political discourse by utilising expertise and 
thus impacting the norms in the policy field (Cross, 2013 p.159). 
On this basis the research establishes the need to look at emerging actors that are not 
solely guided in their profession by government policies and political quests. This 
introduces the idea that research institutes may interact with peers across borders 
whereby discussion can be focused on ideas and expertise, and include a lesser degree of 
political drive that governmental organisations imply. In this manner they may find common 
ground towards an issue and promote this to their political contacts, although the 
expansion of issues and solution-finding to the transnational sphere provides for more 
competition as the numbers of the involved national institutes add up. But more 
importantly, institutes with similar narratives across various countries can use transnational 
cooperation to increase the impact of their narratives. Therein, a shared project gains 
impact in various states through the legitimisation that each national institute has in their 
domestic environment. Moreover shared projects also strengthen the opportunities to 
influence agenda-setting in a regional or international sphere (Adler & Haas, 1992). 
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This research uses public policy research institutes as a prominent example of non- and 
quasi-governmental actors. They are defined as organisations that perform policy relevant 
research and thereby contribute the soft power of research, analysis, advice, translation, 
education and lobbying to the ongoing socio-political discourse. In institutional terms, they 
are organised as continuous structures and might be affiliated to the government, political 
parties, universities, interest groups, the private sector, or be non-governmental 
organisations (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.14). Moreover they are acknowledged in the 
political structures to conduct research and provide expertise, which imparts them with an 
authoritative claim to knowledge. However, they must not be seen in a depoliticised way. 
Instead they aim to position themselves among the actors in the policy making sphere 
(between research, academia, media, and policy-makers). Among these they look to 
spread and implement their narratives (Stone 2003, p.146). The thesis uses the broad 
term public policy research institutes to allow for an exploratory research that involves a 
differentiation of various types of research institutes. This is necessary as these entities 
widely vary in structure, goals, tasks, staff, resources, and policy access. The differences 
increase even more when looking at transnational cooperation, as institutes have evolved 
in different political, economic and socio-cultural environments. 
The study is geographically restricted in order to contain the choice of the sample in the 
research project. In terms of the geographical scope the project is set out to look at wider 
Europe. Therein, it takes away the focus from a solely EU-based study. The EU is as such 
a transnational entity, which makes it a possible choice for the geographic limit to the 
sample of units of analysis in this research. However, it is an established regional entity 
with advanced levels of economic and political integration. In order not to limit the empirics 
in this research to a special case that is characterised by long-term interaction, the 
geographical scope is expanded beyond the EU. In the literature on pan-Europe 
specifically EU-Russia relations are emphasised as a prominent partnership to stabilise 
the European continent (Wagnsson, 2012; Lukyanow, 2009; Allison, Light & White, 2006). 
Thus by investigating cooperation among research institutes based in Russia and in the 
EU Member States (MSs) the study reflects on transnational cooperation among partners 
whose relation is essential but by far not as integrated as the EU in itself. Foreign and 
security political relations between Russia and the EU have been based on phases of 
reinforced interaction intermitted with phases of reduced engagement, respectively 
encouraged through complementary as well as opposing opinions towards a variety of 
given situations. Commonly the discussion on the contrasting normative and pragmatic 
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discourses is highlighted in reviews of their interaction. Though more recent research 
questions how far the normative discourse can be assigned to the EU and the pragmatic 
discourse to Russia. Importantly, since 2008 a decline in the degree of importance of the 
foreign and security political relation between the EU and Russia could be perceived. 
Beyond that, the relation has cooled down significantly since the start of the Ukraine crisis. 
(See pp.65ff for an in depth review of EU and Russian foreign and security policy as well 
as EU-Russia cooperation in foreign and security politics.) 
Since the drop of the bipolar international power structure with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the adopted understanding of a multilevel international environment highlights a 
particular need to consider the emerging space for diverse types of actors therein. The 
interaction among research institutes based in the EU and Russia represents a format that 
looks to contribute a new perspective by focusing on an easily disregarded form of 
cooperation. 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To investigate transnational cooperation among Russian and EU-based research institutes 
working in the foreign and security policy sphere comprehensively, the study deploys a set 
of interlinked research questions. This set consists of the main question and four 
complementary sub-questions. The main research question explores the nature and 
functionality of cross-border cooperation among public policy research institutes in foreign 
and security policy across wider Europe. This triggers a study about their capacities and 
tools to operate and cooperate in the transnational sphere, while differentiating among the 
assets of different types of research institutes. The goal of the question is to inform the 
choices that increased transnationalisation offers in the political infrastructure. In this 
context it is of interest how cooperation among the institutes is enacted, and how far they 
are able to deal with operating and cooperating in the transnational sphere. To do so, it is 
relevant to determine the internal and external factors that shape the presence and the 
capacities of public policy research institutes.  
The main question is complemented by four sub-questions which identify more detailed 
sections and goals of the project. The first sub-question explores the political space 
available to research institutes and their ability to the influence the dominant political 
discourse. This causes a discussion on increased international integration and identifies 
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political space for non-and quasi-governmental actors. Moreover the question introduces a 
debate on the power of knowledge which refers to the essence of the structure/agency 
nexus in order to understand how a political narrative may be generated and changed. 
Thereby the first sub-question establishes the theoretical context underlying the thesis 
(see Chapter 3).  
The second sub-question concerns the current nature and dynamics of foreign and 
security policy cooperation across wider Europe. This serves to establish the context for 
the research, in summarising the narrative of EU-Russia cooperation in formalised high 
politics, as well as the developments that led to this status quo (see Chapter 3). Thereby 
the thesis establishes the component of its contribution to the literature on EU-Russia 
relations from a perspective that considers the interaction of research institutes. The third 
sub-question explores what types of public policy research institutes with a foreign and 
security policy focus exist in wider Europe. This question triggers a description of the 
organic development of research institutes in Russia as well as in the EU. Subsequently, 
based on findings from the interviews and the literature, crucial variables that define the 
institutes are outlined (see Chapter Four). The fourth sub-question enquires what the 
opportunities, processes and challenges of transnational cooperation among public policy 
research institutes are in the exemplified context. This is addressed through an account of 
researchers’ perceptions regarding research institutes’ activities in cross-border 
cooperation, as well as through an analysis of implemented cross-border cooperation (see 
Chapters Four and Five). Significantly, this enables the juxtaposition of the two narratives 
in the subsequent discussion. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis consists of three parts, which together display a coherent and comprehensive 
research project that outlines the study, conducts an analysis, and discusses the outcomes 
and their implications. The introductory section comprises the first three chapters of 
introduction, research framework, and research context. This is followed by an empirical 
section that includes a chapter on the field work characterising and categorising research 
institutes in wider Europe, as well as a chapter comprising a specific case study of 
transnational cross-border cooperation. Subsequently, a critical discussion of the project 
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and its findings is provided, and a reflective conclusion illustrates resulting future research 
opportunities.  
In Chapter Two the research framework is delineated, carving out and explaining the 
methodological, and empirical choices underlying the research project. To start with a 
definition of the unit of analysis is provided, namely public policy research institutes. Their 
growing numbers and acknowledged rise in significance in national and international 
governance processes have led scholars to examine their structural influence to shape the 
prominent narrative regarding a specific policy issue (Boucher et al., 2004, p.10; McGann, 
2011, p.14f; Pautz, 2011). This project takes a step back and analyses the capacities 
available to European and Russian research institutes in order to face the opportunities 
and challenges, specifically when engaging in transnational research cooperation on 
foreign and security policy. The definition and conceptualisation prepare for an exploration 
and categorisation of actors in the scope of this project, wherein the according origins, 
affiliations and tasks are distinguished.  This is complemented by an identification of the 2
units of observation, namely individual staff members of public policy research institutes 
(Babbie, 2012, p.101f). They represent a primary source in the data-collection process 
specifically for the empirical part of the thesis including Chapters Four and Five. 
Differentiating the units of analysis and the units of observation, it is important to consider 
their respective agency in interplay with surrounding structural powers, and how this 
influences their narrative in each cooperative activity. Subsequently the research questions 
and the goals of the project are introduced. The main research question explores ‘the 
nature and functionality of cross-border cooperation among public policy research 
institutes in foreign and security policy across wider Europe’. This is followed by an 
account of the research methods applied in the project, highlighting in particular the use of 
interviews to gain insights into the workings of various research institutes. Thereby the role 
of researchers in their institutes, as well as the role of research institutes in the domestic 
and transnational sphere is established. Beyond that, the case study for project-based 
transnational cooperation and its selection process are outlined. The case is the 
multinational ‘Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security 
Community’ (IDEAS) (IDEAS, 2012). As findings in Chapters Four and Five demonstrate, 
the limited use of project-based cooperation in comparison to general acts of cooperation, 
have restricted the sample of cases suited for this analysis. 
 A categorisation of different types of research institutes in wider Europe is provided in Chapter Four. 2
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In Chapter Three the contextual frame of the research project is outlined, conceptually by 
determining its transnational focus, and empirically by introducing EU-Russian foreign and 
security policy relations. This encourages an understanding of inherent topical issues that 
are vital in conducting the research (especially the fieldwork). These topical issues provide 
the foundation for the empirical work which in turn is the essence of the thesis and makes 
it a stimulating contribution to the literature. The chapter commences by highlighting the 
increased deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues in wider Europe and the 
related recognition of interdependence among countries in addressing these issues 
(Mansfield & Pollins 2006, p.2f; Sending & Neumann, 2006, p.194). Therein it also 
identifies opportunities for non- and quasi-governmental actors to make use of the 
transnational sphere, generated through increased transnational security governance, 
regionalism, and multi-level governance. As knowledge represents a major asset for non-
and quasi-governmental actors the subsequent section discusses the relation of 
knowledge and power. It discusses the significance of possessing structural power to 
transfer knowledge to others and also implement it in the field. Integrated within this is a 
reference to the meta-theory of the structure/agency nexus that serves to establish that 
this thesis respects Bourdieu’s understanding of a continuous interplay of structure and 
agency as the inherent strength of the two (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170; Wacquant, 2004, p.
318). 
After clarifying conceptual and epistemological choices on the basis of the social setting of 
the project, the chapter goes on to outline the foreign and security policy development of 
the EU and Russia as well as their interaction in this field, considering the time since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union (SU). Thereby it establishes common interests as well as 
characteristic differences among the EU’s and Russia’s foreign and security policies. While 
the thesis moves on to analyse non- and quasi-governmental actors it is of essence to 
consider underlying debates in high politics. These serve as first indicators for inherent 
problems in cooperation that reflect at various governance levels, as is validated in the 
empirical research. All in all Chapter Three serves to identify what has been researched so 
far and where gaps exist when considering the rise of transnational cooperation, regional 
integration and multilevel governance in wider Europe. This is done both in theoretical 
terms as well as in empirical terms.  
Chapter Four examines research institutes’ opportunities, processes and challenges to 
engage in transnational research cooperation. Along the context of the thesis, it focuses on 
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foreign and security policy research institutes in the EU and Russia. The chapter begins by 
portraying the organic development of research institutes focusing on foreign and security 
policy across wider Europe, presenting causes for commonalities and differences in the 
organic development as well as the current existence. These findings do not serve as a 
comparison of research institutes based on geographical spheres, but they serve to 
establish possible challenges to cooperation among institutes that have been set up in 
different domestic circumstances. This section draws on a comprehensive survey of the 
literature as well as interviews with members of staff of several institutes.  Subsequently, 3
the chapter establishes different types of expert organisations involved in foreign and 
security policy across Russia and the EU. This is complemented by a table seeking to 
categorise these different types of organisations on the basis of three variables 
(governance level, affiliation and output) which have become apparent in the interviews 
(Ullrich, 2004, p.53f). The table provides an abstract understanding, a mind map in fact, to 
structure thinking about research institutes and grasp their different channels and tools.  
In the following the chapter discusses a range of opportunities, processes and challenges 
occurring in transnational cooperation among research institutes in wider Europe. These 
have been identified in the semi-structured interviews with staff of research institutes that 
generate knowledge on foreign and security policy. The section specifically emphasises 
the opportunities and difficulties added by the transnational sphere in the multi-level 
governance environment. Throughout all this, it is considered that the EU is already a 
transnational entity in itself, and that many institutes cooperating with Russian institutes 
are set up at the nation state level primarily serving a domestic audience. In broader 
terms, the analysis in this chapter relates to the line of thought that transnational issues 
are likely to be best met with transnational measures. It just takes a step back and 
examines the extent to which research institutes can engage in transnational research 
cooperation. It prioritises the investigation of research institutes’ opportunities, processes 
and challenges to interact across borders in the exemplified context. 
Building upon the discussion in Chapter Four, Chapter Five serves to analyse the 
procedures of cross-border cooperation among European and Russian research institutes. 
The function of the chapter is to examine the functional and organisational terms of cross-
border cooperation in a bi- or multinational setting. This constitutes a move away from the 
previous chapter that examined cooperative practices based on inter-relational factors, 
 A list of questions structuring the semi-structured interviews as well as a list of interviewees are provided in 3
the annex and the references respectively.
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informed by simultaneous developments of political, economic and societal aspects. This 
additional analytical layer enriches the subsequent discussion (provided in Chapter Six) as 
it enables a comparison of the opportunities, processes and challenges to cross-border 
cooperation.  
Starting in a broader realm, the chapter begins by highlighting that general acts of 
cooperation are considerably more common than specifically initiated transnational 
projects. In this context the first section is dedicated to outlining commonly occurring 
practices in transnational research cooperation. The practical activities are distinguished 
and their functions are examined. Consequently, the second section turns to study the 
comparatively rarely occurring transnationally initiated projects. The multinational project 
selected as case study is the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 
Security Community (IDEAS) (IDEAS, 2012). It is rooted both in the pan-European 
integration process promoted by the OSCE (specifically the Astana Declaration from 
2010), as well as in the German-Russian-Polish trialogue which was initiated in 2009 
(OSCE, 2010; Das Auswärtige Amt, 2011). After illustrating the case, the process of 
interaction is analysed in detailed steps. From the example case as well as the previous 
discussion on general acts of cooperation, a variety of inferences are drawn that enrich our 
understanding of the functional and operational factors involved in transnational 
cooperation. Significantly, the findings do not complement all the findings from Chapter 
Four, which proposes a diversion between the perceived and the implemented 
opportunities and challenges to transnational cooperation.  
Chapter Six serves as the discussion of the thesis, integrating the preceding descriptive 
and analytical parts. The findings generated throughout the thesis propose four areas in 
which the research produces implications. The first debate concerns the role of research 
institutes in the transnational sphere. It discusses the capacities and constraints of 
research institutes to engage in transnational cooperation as established in the study. The 
second part discusses the differences among perceived and implemented transnational 
cooperation of research institutes in the exemplified field. It considers how far the 
differences have implications for the limited abilities among research institutes and staff to 
engage in the transnational research sphere. The third section debates opportunities and 
challenges using a non-traditional approach to study a foreign and security policy issue. In 
this regard it analyses how drawing on the critical perspective offered by post-structuralism 
shapes and benefits the completion of this project (Foucault, 1972, p.283). The final 
section investigates the thesis’ contribution to EU-Russia studies, which is for a good part 
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based on its original interviews. It discusses how far the analysis of cooperation among 
non- and quasi-governmental actors has added a new perspective to understanding EU-
Russia relations. All four debates in this discussion chapter illustrate the original 
contributions that the thesis makes to both the theoretical and the applied literature. 
Subsequently, Chapter Six closes by answering the main research question, pointing out 
the opportunities and shortcomings of transnational cooperation among research institutes 
working on foreign and security policy across wider Europe. It considers the limits in its 
current formats and purposes, but also recognises that there is a need for the current set-
up, and in addition identifies first steps beyond the format of cooperation. 
The final chapter provides conclusive thoughts and introduces further research potential 
following on from this project. It starts by briefly illustrating the underlying idea and 
initiation of the project, as well as reviewing the findings and their implications for the 
research. This is followed by a discussion of opportunities for further research, drawing 
from the current project. Choosing from a range of suitable ways to move forward with the 
study, two debates are identified as essential next steps. The first debate is empirical in 
nature and focuses on expanding the current research project through additional case 
studies. While the sample of suitable project-based case studies is highly limited, early 
2014 saw the launch of the European Identity, Cultural Diversity and Political Change 
(EUinDepth) project. This project is of particular interest for the analysis of transnational 
cooperation among research institutes across wider Europe, as it has been established 
with the aim to conduct a truly transnational undertaking (RIC, 2013). As the project is still 
under way, it is of high interest to follow its development and to examine its conduction and 
stimulation of cross-border cooperation, moving transnational interaction among research 
institutes to a new level.  
The second debate is theoretical in nature, emphasising the links of the research to the 
debate on global civil society. This relates to the research project in so far, as it is 
concerned with the participation of non- and quasi-governmental actors in foreign and 
security policy governance. Like the literature on global civil society, this project specifically 
discusses the opportunities, processes and challenges of cooperation beyond the nation 
state. To link the two, the follow-up research mobilises the particular concept of 
transnational civil society building. This concept specifically focuses on cross-border 
cooperation among civil society actors and considers their complementary qualities to 
governments’ transnational activities (Florini, 2000 & 2013). Significantly, this second 
proposition for further research has to engage with an in-depth discussion about the 
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attributes of actors. It has to consider how far research institutes can be related to civil 
society.  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
This research constitutes an original project in several respects by linking theoretical 
approaches and topical foci in an innovative manner. It examines three broad areas: 
transnational cooperation in foreign and security policy, public policy research institutes, 
and EU-Russia relations. 
First and foremost the thesis links a transnational research approach with foreign and 
security policy. Like the majority of work conducted in the foreign and security policy field, 
transnationalism acknowledges nation states, however it moves further and prioritises a 
focus on non-and quasi-governmental actors. By definition transnationalism acknowledges 
the importance of non-governmental actors in policy processes, and thereby emphasises 
that interaction does not only take place between states but also at sub-state level (Nye & 
Keohane, 1971, p.332). Transnationalist approaches have so far mainly been applied in 
the scope of studies on culture, as well as economy, and subsequently for interrelated 
themes such as environment and anti-globalisation. However, based on the rising 
recognition of the transnational scope of current foreign and security policy threats causing 
integration, and the simultaneous restructuring of the security political sphere by means of 
redefinition of underlying concepts such as power and security, as well as the related 
increase of involved actors in a multilevel governance system, a strong need develops to 
examine these changes.  
Secondly, the project also analyses the contribution of research institutes as non-and 
quasi-governmental actors in the foreign and security policy sphere across wider Europe, 
thereby contributing to broader literature on the role of research institutes (McGann & 
Sabatini 2011; Ladi, 2011; Stone, 2007 & 2013; Pautz, 2011; Steffen & Linder, 2006; 
Bertelli & Wenger, 2008; Struyk, 2000). Whilst primary sovereignty still lies with nation 
states, this study investigates the potential for research institutes to make a contribution to 
governance processes, mainly based on expertise and their authoritative claim to 
knowledge. It does not want to explicitly diminish nation states, instead it aims to 
proactively consider the development of a political society that is able to deal with the 
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challenges posed currently and in the near future. The rise of regional and international 
organisations promotes space for the generation of ideas, knowledge and activities that 
are not necessarily limited by territorial and sovereignty claims. In addition sub-state 
organisations may choose to interact across borders and use the transnational space to 
develop comprehensive data and understanding for a common problem (Goldstein & 
Peevehouse, 2008, p.16).  
Linked to this, the thesis contributes to the literature on European Studies, and especially 
European foreign and security studies, as it examines the political space for non- and 
quasi-governmental experts in European foreign and security governance processes. 
Therein it seeks to understand the challenges and opportunities of multilevel governance 
and considers the variety of interest and tools that the different actors avail themselves of 
(Enderlein, Wälti & Zürn 2010, p.2f). In the same context it adds to literature of 
International Relations (IR) concerned with transnational governance and regional 
integration. It does so by investigating the development of cross-border interaction through 
non- and quasi-governmental actors, with a specific focus on the area of foreign and 
security policy. Research on transnational interaction is usually limited to interaction 
among governments and governmental organisations (Mansfield & Pollins 2006, p.2f). 
Thus, the explicit focus on research institutes works towards the recognition of an easily 
overlooked type of actor in today’s multilevel governance processes.  
Finally, the focus on wider Europe also means it contributes to the understanding of EU-
Russia relations. The restructuring of the foreign and security policy sphere since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in an increasingly multilevel international 
environment. In turn, this emphasises the need to reconsider EU-Russian foreign and 
security policy relations and therein also the participation of new types of actors. The 
thesis examines the ‘status quo’ of EU-Russia relations in formalised politics, by analysing 
interests, organic characteristics and strategies in the EU’s and Russia’s foreign and 
security policy (Nugent, 2003; Kaunert & Zwolski, 2013; European External Action Service 
(EEAS), 2014; Schroeder, 2009; Fernandes, 2014; Monaghan, 2013; Russian Foreign 
Ministry, 2013). Afterwards, it moves on to investigate how far this translates into relations 
between research institutes across wider Europe, or whether the institutes develop their 
own dynamics of cooperation. Such institutions are not working within a policy vacuum, 
and - as the thesis demonstrates - are part of a broader political discourse which 
incorporates both high- and low- politics (see Chapter Four). Additionally, the thesis’ use of 
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interviews with key practitioners assists in illustrating these points, and thereby add an 
original, contemporary contribution to the field.  
The thesis’ contribution to the literature provided at such a diversified range is reaffirmed 
and specified in depth in the discussion displayed in Chapter Six. As such, the thesis is 
constructed of three differing fields which have been interconnected in the research: 
transnational cooperation, public policy research institutes, and foreign and security policy 
across wider Europe. The conclusion outlines two specific aspects for further research that 
have been identified throughout the conduct of the thesis. 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CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Before entering into the empirical research, Chapter Two introduces the methodological 
and empirical choices underlying the project. It outlines inherent conceptual, structural and 
practical terms for the research to follow. To begin with, the chapter provides a definition of 
the unit of analysis, namely public policy research institutes. Herein it considers the 
increasing political space for non-governmental institutions and makes the case to analyse 
research institutes. The definition is complemented by a section specifically discussing the 
concept of experts (which research institutes primarily consist of) as well as a section 
considering intra- and inter-group dynamics. Both of these sections cover significant 
implications for the choice of studying research institutes, and have to be considered 
throughout the various phases of the study.  
Thereafter the research questions and goals are outlined, representing the structural core 
of the thesis, indicating in which areas contributions are made. They highlight the aim of 
the study to understand about integration beyond the nation state. This is followed by an 
account of the research methods applied in the project as well as a critical consideration of 
the case study and its selection process. The structure, concepts and methods outlined 
here, provide the groundwork for the research project. 
DEFINING & CONCEPTUALISING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS: PUBLIC 
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES
Trends towards increased transnational and regional interaction, which consolidate a 
framework of multilevel governance, necessitate a consideration of cooperative activities 
acted out by public policy research institutes (Boucher et al., 2004, p.10; Stone, 2003, p.
26). While cooperation and integration are ongoing processes of our current socio-political 
environment concomitant with the progressive division of labour, it becomes more difficult 
for actors to gain structured information and knowledge about the context of policy issues. 
Sub-state actors provide advice, translate research into policy options, and raise attention 
to aspects which are neglected in the socio-political dialogue (McGann, 2011, p.4; Fischer, 
Miller & Sidney, 2007, p.xix).  
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Essentially, a growing number of public policy research institutes strive to establish 
transnational, regional or global cooperation with other actors of their kind to enrich 
communication, information and policy analysis (McGann, 2011, p.14f). Their influence in 
the transnational sphere is exacerbated by challenges towards state sovereignty and the 
simultaneous ascendency of generally institutionalised regional and global cooperation 
(Stone, 2007b, p.153). But, considering the broader governance processes, all this is 
ultimately reliant on a reciprocal cycle, in so far as the respective political systems provide 
varying degrees of space to act for research institutes. At the same time the research 
institutes (alongside other actors) aim to use this space in order to justify, establish, and 
stretch the given space (Interviewee K). Thus, the system enables them to be part of it to a 
varying degree, which in turn provides them with possibilities to make use of the space in 
the system. In a general understanding one could say that their participation is based on 
the influence of the competing actors within the existing structure. This thesis takes a step 
beyond and brings to mind that the system as it is, is held up by a constructed dominant 
dialogue. There is no unitary structure in place, as much as there is no unrestricted dispute 
among a wide range of agents without the impact of existent structures. Instead the 
current dominant political discourse provides a framework in which agents seek to exert 
influence on persisting structures and pursue to spread their narrative. Thus the dominant 
political discourse is the space in which the unifying principles of structures (put in place by 
those who are currently in power) are challenged by agents who try to spread their 
subjective principles. This thesis adopts the point of view that the interplay amongst the 
two is what drives governance processes. 
The remarks above clarify the contents of the main objective of the thesis from a different 
perspective, namely to understand how far research institutes are able operate and 
cooperate in the transnational sphere. It demonstrates that understanding interaction 
among research institutes is about comprehending their incentives and abilities to develop 
common objectives which they reach by establishing similar narratives that rely on similar 
symbols. The term similar is used here, as research institutes partnering-up transnationally 
are set in different political environments which need different treatment to pierce the 
surface. These differences are explored and outlined further in the thesis, by outlining the 
organic development of research institutes across wider Europe (see Chapter Four, pp.
86ff). This draws on the specific circumstances that shaped the institutes respectively for 
those institutes based in the EU and those based in Russia. The section starts very basic, 
by looking at the roots of the concept of research institutes, and then moves on to see how 
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they have been up, run and shaped over time, taking into account the respective socio-
political frame. 
  
The transnational approach to governance first introduced by Nye and Keohane (1971) 
highlights the importance of non- and quasi-governmental actors in governance 
processes. While the literature has at first been involved with identifying institutes in this 
range and clarifying their history, more recent literature has been predominantly involved in 
determining institutes impact on policy making (Pautz, 2011; Steffen & Linder, 2006; 
Bertelli & Wenger, 2008; Struyk, 2000). Therefore the debate has been driven by 
discussions on influence and power, often considering that institutes need to find influential 
or powerful partners that can link them to the policy-making sphere. In this regard, 
scholars argue that a contribution by or interaction among non- and quasi-governmental 
actors does not add to governance processes. This is attributed to the fact that these 
organisations are seen as ineffective and unaccountable, and thus unable to democratise, 
strengthen and legitimise multinational governance processes (Ottaway, 2001, p.266). 
Some go further and depict evolving international multilevel governance structures to grow 
more privatised and develop strong hierarchies, and in this sense undermining democracy 
(Cerny, 1999, p.13; Stone, 2013, p.64). However, other research on international 
cooperation proves differently. As Doidge shows in empirical research on (inter-)regional 
cooperation, success in cooperation is not necessarily provided by strong parties, instead 
actors with varying strength and capacities may complement each other and form stronger 
positions (Doidge, 2011, p.109). In this regard, understanding the opportunities and 
challenges of participating in a policy sphere stands as the centre of this project.  
The dispute about the contribution of non-and quasi-governmental actors to policy-making 
is to some degree based on the fact that they involve a wide range of institutes and it is 
difficult to establish clear cut definitions (Ableson, 2014, p.127). When looking at groups of 
policy experts that contribute through research, policy advice, and lobbying the extant 
literature most commonly refers to think tanks. While they initially represent research cells 
set up by governments for expert military-advisers in the Second World War, by the 1960s 
they have been coined as term in the political science jargon (McGann and Weaver 2002, 
p.42). McGann and Weaver describe them as ‘non-profit, non-partisan organisations 
involved in the study of public policy’, whereby their resemblance with other non-
governmental organisations grows increasingly as tasks adjust over time (McGann and 
Weaver 2002, p.38). Abelson highlights the same defining features for think tanks, but 
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clearly states that a ‘nostalgic vision’ in which think tanks serve as ‘idea factories’ that fight 
the troubles for civil society are not suitable for contemporary studies (Abelson, 2009, p.
8f). Instead he raises the thought that they cannot be seen as depoliticised entities, and as 
such cannot be understood as entities set up to represent the criticism of fractions of civil 
society in the policy making sphere. 
Later definitions stand out in so far as they overcome a previously prevalent focus on 
specifically independent institutes. ‘We define think tanks as organisations that (1) produce 
research products, which inform decision making on specific policy issues and (2) aim to 
influence policy content. We include in our analysis policy research centres associated 
with academic institutions and research focused non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
as well as party and state-affiliated institutes’ (UNDP Governance Centre, 2009, p.4). In 
addition, contemporary research on think tanks and non- and quasi-governmental 
organisations commonly draws attention to an increasing privatisation and 
commercialisation of institutes. Following Stone’s definition in her latest book, ‘think tanks 
do research, analysis and communication for policy development within local communities, 
national governments and global institutions in both the public and the private 
domains’ (Stone, 2013, p.64). Following the points made by Abelson and Stone, this thesis 
acknowledges the politicisation as well as the commercialisation of research institutes (for 
the adopted definition see pp.28f). 
Another common topic of debate regarding research institutes is not only their connection 
to the policy world, but also their relation to the public sphere. A frequent predicate used in 
descriptions of their role is their representation of a link between the academic sphere and 
the policy sphere, or even the public sphere (McGann & Johnson, 2005, p.7) In a later 
volume McGann and Sabatini argue that research institutes serve ‘[…] in the public 
interest as an independent voice that translates applied and basic research into a 
language and form that is understandable, reliable, and accessible for policy makers and 
the public’ (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.14). Therein, they highlight specifically the link 
between science and governance processes with the production and reproduction of 
knowledge as the good that links them. In contrast, Stone takes a much more critical view.  
First of all, she argues that research institutes, some of which relate themselves to civil 
society, are generally neither embedded in nor highly interactive with civil society. Instead 
they are much more embedded in the policy sphere among other actors that work in the 
same policy field or on the same issue (Stone, 2007, p.14). That leads to the consideration 
that the link between research institutes and the public must be treated cautiously and 
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must not be overestimated to represent an essential asset of research institutes’ work. 
However, beyond this, Stone also criticises the repeated analogy bridging academia or 
science with the policy making sphere. She emphasises the danger of depoliticising 
research institutes, their members and their output. Indeed the link between power and 
knowledge is likely to be undermined on the basis of definitions that propose a plain 
exchange of goods (Stone 2003, p.146). In this sense, linking science and policy 
processes should not only consider plain knowledge transfer, but also uncover the ‘politics’ 
of research institutes acting in the policy-making sphere. Again, this thesis adopts the point 
of view that research institutes are actors predominantly embedded in the policy-making 
sphere. In that sense, their activities must be understood in the light of their politics. 
However, the case of research institutes working for the public good is not to be dismissed 
completely as the policy sphere and its involved actors do not exist in a vacuum (for the 
adopted definition see pp.28f). 
Importantly, the term think tank is often used interchangeably with the term research 
institute (Mendizabal, 2011). This is due to the fact that the two concepts share a lot of 
variables: both terms represent a heterogenous group of entities, both types of actors 
conduct research and analysis regarding policy areas (some more specific than others), 
provide expertise and advice to policy makers and the general public, in constitutional 
forms they are either NGOs, quasi-governmental, linked to political parties or corporate. 
Based on their resources of expertise, they are linking research and academia with policy 
making. Thus in more general terms the differentiation among those types of institutes has 
decreased over time, as interdependence increases and they appear in a common space 
in the policy sphere (Ladi, 2011, p.213f). However, what developed as a specific asset to 
think tanks is their explicit advocacy work in the policy sphere. Thus, over time they have 
picked up the skills of interest and advocacy groups, which is related to their growing 
number and their increased independence in comparison to times when they first evolved 
as governments’ idea factories. Therein, they distinguish themselves very slightly from 
research institutes which are still primarily focused on conducting quality research, 
including data collection and the generation of expertise (Mendizabal, 2011; Stone, 2007, 
p.6). Some argue that the label ‘think tank’ optimises institutes external perception, as the 
term indicates the affiliation to an environment of acknowledged expertise and research-
informed analysis (Medvetz, 2008, p.1). However, in contrast to this assumption, what 
stands out in the extant literature is that the term ‘think tank’ is highly ambiguous and at the 
same time comes with a preconceived meaning that carries a certain legacy. Therefore, 
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using the concept of think tanks generally leads to more questions than answers, a range 
of expectations, and does not prove useful for this exploratory research project. 
In this thesis therefore, the units of analysis are defined as ‘public policy research 
institutes’. This term specifically constitutes a broad definition of the units of analysis to 
comply with its exploratory character. It represents an objective term that does not carry 
any legacies or preconceived meanings, as does the concept of think tanks. Based on the 
arguments presented above, research institutes are broadly defined as organisations that 
generate, establish and spread policy relevant expertise and thereby contribute the soft 
powers of research, analysis, advice, translation, education, and lobbying to the ongoing 
socio-political dialogue. By positioning themselves among the policy sphere, academia 
and the research sphere they look to establish and spread narratives among those actors 
involved in policy processes. In this regard, they are not isolated in between the spheres 
but inhabit a shared collaborative space, within which staff are known to swap positions 
between research and policy-making institutes throughout their careers. Therein, research 
institutes seek to contribute to governance processes at the local, national and 
international level. They are organised as continuous structures and may be affiliated to 
the government, political parties, universities, interest groups, the private sector, or be 
NGOs. In practical terms the definition relates to the tasks that have been established by 
McGann and Sabatini for think tanks (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.14). However, it moves 
away from the understanding that research institutes are independent entities and 
acknowledges their politicised nature. It does not understand them primarily as link 
between civil society and politics, but sees them as entities that are embedded in among 
many others in the policy-making processes. Importantly, the adopted definition explicitly 
emphasises to consider a broad range of institutes, in order to facilitate exploration of 
institutes present in the field. In the following, it is part of the research to explore what 
types of research institutes are taking part in transnational cooperation on foreign and 
security policy across wider Europe, and how they conduct interaction. In this way, the 
definition allows us to explore and differentiate among the broader heterogeneous group of 
research institutes. This exploration is needed to gain underlying insights in governance 
processes, while considering the increasingly blurred lines among a variety of institutes 
that share a common political space. 
The concept of experts is crucial within the definition of public policy research institutes, as 
it sets a boundary to the sample. It establishes that this research does not engage in a 
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review about every group that is involved in the selected policy area, but studies 
specifically groups with a claim to knowledge based authority (Richardson, 2012, p.92). 
This authoritative claim to knowledge is not solely based on education or affiliation. Instead 
what Stone describes as codified and exclusive communication methods (like peer-
reviewed journals or projects) is what facilitates the recognition of certain knowledge 
above others (Stone, 2001, p.16). This authority, however, is not to be seen as providing 
them with the sovereignty to shape policy making to their liking. Ideally it can be used to 
shape a narrative within a dialogue among a plurality of actors (governmental as well as 
non- and quasi-governmental) in a specific policy field. This highlights the differentiation 
between those that run the current dominant discourse with their narrative, and those that 
try to contribute to a dialogue which may alter the inherent discourse. The former are 
understood in this thesis as those that are acknowledged in power at a certain time and in 
a certain space, while the latter are understood to possess an in/direct capacity to exert 
influence on the constructed discourse that keeps the former in power (De Lange, 2011, p.
118). Therefore, being an expert within a specific subject area, is by itself not sufficient to 
spread a narrative. Instead, structural positioning is crucial in order to promote the 
recognition of a narrative. This differentiation provides an explanation for the adopted 
understanding of the units of analysis as well as the units of observation. At this point it 
highlights the role of the asset of knowledge and raises the inability to directly transfer 
knowledge into power. On that basis the idea of the thesis develops, not to look at the 
policy impact of research institutes but to take a step back and explore cooperation among 
fellow institutes (see pp.58f referring to Sending and Neuman, 2006). The concept of 
experts and their asset of knowledge is further integrated into the research when 
establishing the theoretical context, through the discussion on the power of knowledge and 
the inherent distinction between power and influence (see p.60).  
This depicts a development away from a purely state-governed understanding of policy 
making. As Brint finds in the early 1990s, in order to exert influence on the policy 
environment experts rely on the delegation of state power, or its informal capture (Brint, 
1990, p.376). However, already a few years later the impact of research and its formulation 
in narratives is accepted. Krause Hansen et al. highlight research institutes’ contribution to 
transnational discourses, emphasising their networked boundary transcending qualities 
between different levels of governance (Krause Hansen et al., 2002, pp.108f). In that 
regard, it is highly significant that actors understand governance processes and their own 
political space within, to enable them to position themselves in order to spread their 
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narrative among peers and push for its recognition and its implementation in the field. The 
debate on the power of knowledge is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.  
As the short discussion above indicates, it is difficult to produce a clear-cut definition of 
public policy research institutes. In practical terms, this research project embraces the 
indefinite nature of the concept by consciously integrating it. The scope of the concept 
emphasises the exploratory nature of the research. Enabling a number of differing actors 
to match the definition allows for an unbiased exploration of the actors working in the 
relevant field for this study, as well as their tools and their purposes. Beyond that it also 
allows for a critical examination of the politics that underlie the construction of their 
identities, the construction of their status within the governance processes, as well as the 
construction of the consequential dialogue among the actors. This links in with the 
structure/agency debate and the adopted position that both structure and agency do not 
cancel each other out, but gain strength form their interaction (see Chapter Three). In this 
manner, the definition offers the possibility to categorise the involved actors at a later stage 
and draw more refined conclusions regarding the significance of specific types of actors 
(see Chapter Four). 
INTRA- AND INTER-GROUP DYNAMICS 
Aiming to understand the dynamics and the working nature of public policy research 
institutes, particularly in the transnational sphere, underlines the importance of researching 
their cooperation with other actors to develop and spread ideas (Stone & Denham, 2004, 
p.13). In available research various types of groups have been conceptualised which 
experts can affiliate with in order to conduct cooperative activities which may cause an 
ambiguous degree of policy influence. The groups include amongst others policy 
communities, epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, and practice coalitions. In more 
general terms, they are summarised as policy networks, which are loosely understood as 
governance processes including governmental, non-and quasi-governmental actors, 
assisting policy formulation and implementation (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.84). This 
conceptualisation allows one to attribute certain characteristics and capacities to groups, 
when examining them in empirical research. 
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While acknowledging the wide recognition and use of the above mentioned concepts in 
order to structure an analysis on cooperative activities of research institutes, this research 
project does not make use of it. This is due to the fact that the research project does not 
study research institutes’ impact on policy making. Thus it also does not need to discuss 
the broad concepts that have been set up to grasp policy cooperation among a range of 
actors who try to exert influence. Instead the project sees it of primary significance to gain 
a more basic and detailed understanding of cooperation by reference to intra-group 
cooperation. This links in to the specific case study, that examines interaction qualitatively 
instead of quantitatively (see Chapter 5). And it also raises awareness for another nuance 
of the structure/agency nexus, referred to in this thesis as understood by Bourdieu (see 
Chapter Three). While the debate on intra-group cooperation is not the main focus of the 
study, it is an underlying subject matter that raises awareness for aspects to consider in 
the empirical analysis to come.  
Cross-border interaction in a multinational environment based on multi-tier governance 
encompasses both inter-group and intra-group cooperation. By nature of the set-up, the 
participants in one group are also always interrelated to another group. This means that 
they are embedded in several settings at the same time. In this regard, the current socio-
political environment that grows increasingly interdependent exacerbates the distinction 
between inter-group and intra-group cooperation. As Dovidio, Saguy, and Schnabel argue 
the structuralisation of groups enhances their capacity to conduct common activities as 
well as address common challenges. However, that very same structure implies a 
hierarchical system which easily dictates the discourse within a group or among different 
groups. Therein the group(s) (members) driving the discourse are generally more willing to 
hold on to the status quo of the hierarchy, in contrast to those group(s) (members) who 
oppose the status quo of the hierarchy. Strikingly they both generally follow the same 
underlying incentives in the given circumstances (Dovidio, Saguy, and Schnabel, 2009, p.
431ff). This debate about the advantages and disadvantages of structuring groups is 
reflected in discussions of group-behaviour from an IR perspective. In his post-structuralist 
criticism on communitarian theories Linklater argues that the emphasis on integration and 
community always also generates exclusion. This occurs at the nation state level, as well 
as through transnational and international groupings (Linklater, 2008, p.555). Cooperation 
is easily based on the perception of commonalities, and exclusion on the perception of 
otherness which may be boosted through stereotypes. 
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A further point that the authors raise is that they do not perceive cooperation as positive 
and competition as negative. Instead they recognise both of them as valuable processes 
which both contribute to a further development of inter-relations within and among groups 
(Dovidio, Saguy & Schnabel, 2009, p.436). While this research follows their opinion up to 
some degree, cooperation is perceived to drive integration further beyond a certain 
benchmark. This is the case as it initiates further dialogue when competition has broken 
the framework for dialogue at some point. However, one needs to be cautious about 
drawing inferences regarding the relative value of cooperation. Although cooperative 
activities are considered as underlying measures to establish trust and mutual treatment, 
they do not automatically confirm a higher degree of policy influence (Stone & Denham, 
2004, p.14). In turn, it can only emphasise a potential for capacity to establish measures 
which may add to contrive and spread ideas. There is no simple causal relation in 
existence, and although interactive activities are often a necessity underlying the way 
towards political influence they are not sufficient measures. Thus, how far cooperation is 
advantageous is relative to its conduction and the related perceptions of benefits. 
Beyond that, the argument is raised that groups that care for the needs of their members 
and recognise their different understandings and goals, are more successful in responding 
to disputes within and among their groups (Dovidio, Saguy & Schnabel, 2009, p.438f). This 
means that cognitive abilities, a lessons-learned mentality, and clear perception of goals 
are essential assets in interaction. Thus, the recognition of conflict resolution practices and 
compromises at the heart of intra- and inter-group relations provides for an increased 
ability to prevent and address conflicts. This is an important point for the thesis, as it 
contains a case study that integrates actors which have developed within differing socio-
political circumstances and based on this still have a varied reading of certain issues or 
circumstances.  
A final aspect of interest in intra- and inter-group relations concerns the mobilisation of 
fellow groups and partners. This mobilisation serves to gain support in more general 
terms, but is as such also used to deal with intra- and inter-group differences by expanding 
the conflict. Importantly this mobilisation is put into place more successfully by adopting a 
predefined narrative. Thus, groups involve the public while promoting a specific story 
based on predefined terms and symbols that help to justify a problem, its cause and its 
solution. On the very same basis groups can also opt to involve an even broader public 
(moving from the national to the transnational level) or a higher instance of decision 
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making (like the EU or the UN for example) (Birkland, 2007, p.67f). In both ways, they aim 
to attract other groups or actors which may consider to support their point of view. By using 
a defined narrative (including an issue, its cause and its solution) groups are more likely to 
gain support and to spread their narrative wholesomely. Through growing external support 
regarding a specific narrative, internal differences regarding the issue can also be settled.  
When we turn this around, it is questionable how far groups and policy networks can 
hinder challenges towards the dominant political dialogue. Stone and Denham have 
described this as a potential threat to erode political accountability (Stone & Denham, 
2004, p.13). Following a post-structuralist point of view, the dominant political discourse is 
constructed by an interplay of various actors with different tools and capacities, and the 
structures that they are set up within. Therein leading actors who might possess more 
privileged capacities and are able to control communication channels leading to policy 
formulation, and thus lead the dominant discourse. Birkland outlines this on the basis of 
Schattschneider’s theories of issue expansion, that explains how dominant actors work to 
keep issues low on the agenda, or instead avoid the emergence of alternatives. He argues 
that dominant groups can exert their influence by using terms and symbols that help to 
create a problem, cause and solution that benefits them most. Moreover, they can seek to 
keep other groups and actors unaware of either problems or alternative solutions 
(Birkland, 2007, p.67f).  
These underlying thoughts on intra- and inter-group relations provide a new and well 
applicable perspective to the research concept of the thesis. They enable a structured 
analysis that considers the dynamics of cooperation among research institutes. In this 
regard they allow one to take a step back, away from elitist and pluralist comprehensions 
of the contribution of research institutes in policy making. Instead it looks at inherent 
institutional and functional patterns, and thus enables the examination of research 
institutes’ dynamics and capacities to involve and act in the transnational sphere. 
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Figure 1: Definition of Research Institutes
THE UNITS OF OBSERVATION
Public policy research institutes are a growing group of actors who are accepted to varying 
degrees in the different political environments (be it within all the different types of national 
systems, or the international system). Transnational, regional and global politics are driven 
at multiples levels which increase the amount of access-points for research institutes. 
Therefore, they can try to establish more channels through which to exert influence on the 
dominant political discourse (Boucher et al., 2004, p.10). While one could say that the 
involvement of experts might increase the impartial voices towards a policy issue, true 
impartiality is hard to reach. However, it is not only questionable on what bases experts 
base their ideas and advice; when spreading their ideas and advice to the outside world 
they are faced with an editing process by their institute as well as their network. Beyond 
that, the post-structuralist approach does ultimately also lead to question the dynamics 
and appearance of the current political system, as it is engrained in a cycle of guiding the 
dominant political discourse as well as being structurally affected by it at the same time. In 
this regard, the case study of this thesis represents a vital part of the project, as it enables 
one to see how far these theoretical doubts are re-enforced in the empirics. Thus, when 
examining the case study, particular attention is paid to the structure-agency dynamics 
displayed in the activities of the single public policy research institutes as well as in their 
interactive projects.  
While the public policy research institutes defined above constitute the units of analysis in 
this thesis, the units of observation are individual staff members of the research institutes. 
These two concepts need to be distinguished, as the former represent the entities towards 
whom the analysis is conducted, whereby the latter represent the entities that enable data 
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Public Policy Research institutes: 
-  generate, establish and spread policy related expertise 
-  soft power: research, analysis, advice, translation, education, lobbying 
-  seek to contribute their narrative to the ongoing socio-political dialogue 
-  include NGOs, quasi-governmental, university affiliated, corporate, or affiliated to 
political parties
collection (Babbie, 2012, p.101f). The units of observation play a vital part in the empirical 
research for the project. Although, it is established that there is a gap between the 
structure of the examined research institutes and the agency of the single research fellows 
who serve as interviewees, the gap needs to be considered most carefully as the 
interviews represent a vital part of the data collection (Yin, 2009, p.88f). The units of 
observation contribute to the primary literature directly as interviewees, providing specific 
knowledge and insights regarding the research institutes’ ways of thinking and ways of 
working. And they contribute to the secondary literature by providing further advice and 
access to materials, as well as validating or questioning ideas that have been established 
when surveying secondary literature previously.  
The interviewees have been invaluable for the project, illustrating the dynamics within the 
institutes and their specific projects, as well as elucidating processes and difficulties in the 
interaction among institutes and their partners. The awareness of the gap between the 
structure of the organisation and the agency of its members strengthens the research in 
two manners. On the one hand, it enables one to consider and discuss the structure/
agency issues inherent to the case study. Beyond that it allows one to examine and verify 
an underlying position of this thesis, namely that the resolution of the structure/agency 
nexus is not required, as their continuous interplay ultimately constitutes their strengths. As 
outlined in Chapter Three, all debates that seek to approach and explain the structure/
agency nexus are limited in their capacities to work out the final ties. However, they 
provide a variety of criticisms and ideas that promote the thought that structure and 
agency should not be separated, but that they need to be understood within their 
relationship. The explanations above illustrate how engrained aspects of social theory 
research are in the methodology of a project that is ultimately analysing issues in the field 
of international relations. The thesis shows how vital social-political approaches are for 
understanding political processes. In addition, it also highlights the interdisciplinary drive of 
international relations research. In these terms, the thesis contributes to a certain degree 
to the linkage between social theory and international relations as a research field. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND GOALS
This research is an exploratory project that focuses on investigating the capacities of 
public policy research institutes to operate and cooperate at transnational level. It is 
specifically focused on the sphere of foreign and security policy, an area which lies 
traditionally under the auspices of governmental actors. This research does not study the 
impact of research institutes on policy making. This would imply the measurability of a 
direct transfer of power from non-state actors to policy makers. And in addition it would 
imply a causal diffusion of political authority away from the state towards non-state actors 
(Sending & Neumann, 2006, p.653f). Both of these cannot be proven in a valid and reliable 
manner. Therefore this research establishes more basic foundations in the first place. 
Instead of discussing the interplay with policy making, it first explores the tools and 
capacities that non- and quasi-governmental actors possess to operate in the transnational 
sphere. Without understanding their tools and capacities in this developing interdependent 
space in the first place, we cannot go further to discuss or theorise about matters of 
interaction across the multi-tier governance system. 
Drawing on these underlying thoughts, the main research question ‘explores the nature 
and functionality of cross-border cooperation among public policy research institutes in 
foreign and security policy across wider Europe.’ This primarily triggers a review of their 
capacities and tools to operate and cooperate in the transnational sphere, differentiating 
among the varying assets of different types of research institutes. Therein the exploratory 
character of the research project is emphasised, asking for an investigation of the tools 
and capacities of research institutes in the given circumstances. Furthermore, enquiring 
about their ‘capacities’ triggers a comparative analysis between both opportunities and 
challenges as perceived by the interviewees, as well as the opportunities and challenges 
implemented in the field. Moreover the question determines the units of analysis for the 
research and emphasises the macro-regional scope of the research. 
Four sub-questions serve to guide a detailed investigation throughout the thesis. The first 
sub-question ‘explores the political space available to research institutes and their ability to 
influence the dominant political discourse’. This question guides the construction of the 
theoretical context for the thesis. It is first addressed by a discussion on the increasing 
deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues and the simultaneously growing 
need for increased interaction and political integration. On that basis, the thesis makes the 
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case for the need to study the transnational sphere and research institutes capacities and 
tools to operate within that developing environment. Building on this, it is discussed how 
far research institutes possess the ability to spread their narrative. Therefore, a 
differentiation of the terms power and influence is provided to identify at a conceptual level 
in what manner research institutes can spread their respective narrative. This is 
complemented by the introduction of the poststructuralist perspective that navigates the 
interplay between objective and subjective perceptions and helps to understand how a 
narrative is generated. 
The second sub-question concerns ‘the current nature and dynamics of foreign and 
security policy cooperation across wider Europe’. This serves to establish the empirical 
foundation for the research and summarises the status quo of current EU-Russia 
cooperation. Moreover it allows for a description of the development that led to the existing 
status quo. Thereby it permits to determine the gaps and challenges in current foreign and 
security policy cooperation. These gaps and challenges are of strong significance for the 
analyses throughout the further project, as they may be reflected in the co-operative efforts 
among Russian and European research institutes. 
The third sub-question enquires ‘what types of public policy research institutes exist in 
wider Europe working in the broader field of foreign and security policy’. This question 
firstly triggers a description of the organic development of research institutes, which 
enables one to outline their changed positioning in political governance structures. 
Moreover it enables one to distinguish a variety of types of research institutes across wider 
Europe. Therein the political, cultural, historical and social background in which the 
institutes are based are taken into account. This is complemented with a typology (see 
Chapter Four) which provides a useful abstract account of the types of institutes based on 
a number of recurring characteristics. 
The fourth sub-question explores ‘what processes of transnational cooperation take place 
among public policy research institutes working on foreign and security policy across wider 
Europe’. This question prompts two types of analysis on research institutes. First the 
opportunities and challenges towards cooperation as perceived by the interviewees are 
outlined. Second an in depth empirical study of general acts of cooperation as well as 
specific project based cooperation is conducted. This allows for a comparison among 
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perceived and actual opportunities and especially challenges. It triggers the thought to 
what extent the interviewees understand the debilitating effects of all these problems. 
Figure 2. Research Questions 
The goals of this thesis are closely related to the research questions outlined above. 
Throughout, the main goal of this thesis is to explore cross-border cooperation among 
research institutes in wider Europe in the foreign and security policy environment. The 
research investigates the nature and functionality of increased integration among a group 
actors that is easily overlooked in a policy field which is characterised by the 
predominance of nation states’ sovereignty. On that basis, it enables one to inform the 
choices that increased transnationalisation offers actors in the evolving political 
infrastructure. In this context it is of interest how transnational cooperation among the 
institutes is enacted, and how they deal with operating and cooperating in the transnational 
sphere. Apart from the practicalities of transnational cooperation, it is also of interest to 
comprehend the opportunities and challenges for research institutes to develop a similar 
narrative regarding cooperation. This also includes a discussion on the abilities of research 
institutes to spread and implement their narratives. To do so, it is relevant to determine 
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Research Question: What are the nature and functionality of cross-border cooperation 
among public policy research institutes in foreign and security policy across wider 
Europe? 
1. How can the political space available to research institutes, as well as their ability to 
influence the dominant political discourse be described? 
2. What are the current nature and dynamics of foreign and security policy cooperation 
across wider Europe? 
3. What types of public policy research institutes exist in wider Europe working in the 
broader field of foreign and security policy?  
4. What processes of transnational cooperation take place among public policy 
research institutes working on foreign and security policy across wider Europe?
their abilities and tools while considering both internal and external factors that shape the 
characteristics and the capacities of public policy research institutes. This is addressed in 
the research in a threefold manner. First by generating an understanding for their abilities 
to spread their narrative at a theoretical level. Second, by identifying their tools and 
measures on the basis of their organic development. Third, by examining how they 
perceive their own narrative of cooperation among EU-based and Russian research 
institutes, and comparing this to the actual conduction of cooperation. As research 
institutes are not homogeneous entities it is of particular interest to differentiate different 
types and define their varying characteristics on the basis of inherent variables. 
Within this overarching goal several complementary objectives become visible. An 
important target for this project is to clarify how far research institutes are able to spread 
and implement their narratives. Therefore, the research discusses at first increased 
interdependence as well as the role of non-and quasi-governmental actors in foreign and 
security policy. After identifying political space for research institutes in the policy field, the 
project then considers the influence that research institutes can exert in order to spread 
their narratives, referring to knowledge as a key asset. This objective highlights the 
attention that the thesis pays to increased interdependence and political integration, and 
the implications for a wider range of actors. It also enables to draw satisfactory attention to 
the ground that the project aims to cover in between International Relations and social 
theory.  
In this context, a further goal of the research is to investigate the suitability of non-
traditional approaches in the foreign and security policy debate. While foreign and 
especially security politics are commonly acknowledged as policy areas in which 
governmental sovereignty has predominance, the increasing deterritorialisation of issues 
leaves states falling short of a comprehensive response (Aydinly, 2010, p.18). This thesis 
follows the train of thought that to control transnational issues, transnational considerations 
for countermeasures are equally necessary, implying a need for cooperation. As the thesis 
investigates how research institutes cooperate at the transnational level, the important 
question to be answered is how to study and comprehend cooperation. The project applies 
a post-structuralist approach which engages with the construction of narratives, drawing 
on the interplay between objective and subjective perceptions of truth. In this regard, it 
induces a discussion about the significance of possessing power or influence to transfer 
knowledge to others and also implement it in the field. This suits the thesis which 
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specifically studies the tools and capacities non- and quasi-governmental experts to 
operate in the transnational sphere.  
Furthermore, it is the goal of the thesis to provide fresh insights into the research on EU/
Russia relations by adopting a perspective driven by the interactions between public policy 
research institutes. This work seeks to expand on existing research on EU/Russia 
relations, which primarily focuses on tracing and understanding the development of 
formalised cooperation in high politics (Drent, 2012; Danilov, 2012; Averre, 2009; 
Fernandes, 2014). The limitations of focusing purely on high politics is that a number of 
prominent debates are recurrently discussed, and clashing political principles are 
commonly illustrated as their source (Light, 2008; Stent, 2008). Therefore, this study is 
specifically constructed to investigate the interaction among non- or quasi-governmental 
actors. On that basis it examines how far a varied perspective can either strengthen 
previous findings or offer new insights. 
Figure 3. Research Aims
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1. Demonstrate the political space available to research institutes and their ability to 
influence the dominant political discourse. 
2. Establish the suitability of a non-traditional approach to study- and security-politics. 
2. Define the different approaches to foreign and security policy among the concerned 
countries, and explain their interrelations. 
3. Highlight the challenges and opportunities that emerge due to multilevel governance 
as well as increased interdependence. 
4. Grasp the tools and capacities of research institutes to operate and cooperate in the 
foreign and security policy transnational environment, and therewith inform the choices 
that the re-ordering of power and the re-shaping of the international political 
infrastructure offer. 
5. Differentiate different types of research institutes to highlight their specific 
characteristics.
RESEARCH METHODS
Following the structure which underpins the research questions, the thesis generates data 
in three main fields that build upon each other. First it examines the status quo of pan-
European foreign and security political cooperation, outlining the narrative in high politics 
as perceived by Russia and the EU. Subsequently it outlines the nature and dynamics of 
public policy research organisations across wider Europe and provides a sense for their 
role in policy processes. Finally it analyses the opportunities and challenges of 
transnational cooperation among the research institutes in perceived and actual manner. 
Thereby it enables two comparisons, on the one hand between the narrative of 
cooperation in high politics and that of cooperation among non- and quasi-governmental 
organisations. On the other hand, it allows one to compare the two narratives of 
cooperation among research institutes, both as perceived and as implemented.  
The three fields of data collection comprise qualitative values which can be perceived 
differently by anyone conducting this very same project. Deploying a triangulation of data 
sources enables one to address the topic with more accuracy and to strengthen the 
construct validity of the project (Yin, 2009, p.115ff). In terms of research methods, the 
thesis is based on a survey of the pertinent literature, a series of semi-structured 
interviews with staff from research institutes (Kvale, 1996, p.177), and a case study 
concerning project-based transnational interaction among research institutes. This allows 
to address the main research question under consideration of the complexity of 
multinational and multilevel interaction. Moreover, it also considers the difference among 
the narratives provided by the literature, the perceptions of the interviewees, and the 
actual conduction of transnational cooperation.  
The literature considered for this project (academic books, academic articles, policy 
reports and policy documents) covers the three underlying subject areas of the study: 
public policy research institutes, foreign and security policy in wider Europe, and post-
structuralism. For the discussion of public policy research institutes the literature 
specifically covers the organic development of Russian research institutes and EU-based 
research institutes (differentiating the EU and its MSs). This is in line with the previous 
discussion of the cooperative narrative in high politics across the wider European region, 
which also prioritises EU-Russia relations. The identification of the literature concerning 
research institutes has provided challenges, due to the relatively restricted availability of 
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literature on the EU-based and Russian institutes. The primary body of literature covers 
research institutes from the US and to some degree institutes from Britain. However, 
scholars have only started in the 1990s to produce a more comprehensive body of 
literature on the development of research institutes in the rest of the world (including 
Europe and Russia). Moreover the range of scholars covering the topic remains restricted. 
In this sense Stone and McGann represent some of the main sources, complemented by 
area specific researchers like Thunert for German institutes (Thunert, 2004 & 2006). 
However, while literature on American institutes is considered to a small degree, it is 
largely ill-suited for the project at hand as American institutes are found to take a different 
position in governance processes in comparison to European and Russian institutes 
(Braml, 2006; Abelson 2002 & 2009; Medvetz, 2012). 
Regarding foreign and security policy in wider Europe the literature has been primarily 
restricted to encompass EU-Russia relations, while taking into account the EU MSs as 
well. This is based on the fact that literature on wider Europe often prioritises EU-Russia 
relations, as those two represent important actors in the wider European region 
(Wagnsson, 2012; Lukyanow, 2009; Allison, Light & White, 2006). The literature in this 
realm is manifold covering both policy documents and academic contributions. For the 
research on policy documents this thesis primarily uses governmental websites of Russia, 
the EU and EU MSs (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European 
Union, 2013; EUROPA, 2010; Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). They represent the 
most comprehensive spaces which provide the necessary policy documents. These are 
commonly arranged along a timeline reflects developments. In this sense it also offers the 
possibility to identify gaps in coverage or development. An issue occurring in this realm is 
the language barrier for the researcher regarding Russian documents. However most 
important documents that concern cooperation are available in officially translated form. 
For the academic discussion of the topic, journal articles prove most suitable to investigate 
foreign and security policy among the EU and Russia. These articles commonly provide 
good insights from both the Russian and the European perspective (for example Light, 
2008; Kratochvíl, 2008; Averre, 2009; Drent, 2012; Casier, 2013). They have been 
complemented by a range of academic books that discuss respectively Russian or 
European foreign and security policy. 
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INTERVIEWS
The qualitative interviews represent an original and significant contribution to the research. 
Interviewing staff in research institutes based in Russia and the EU provides the research 
with insights that are not available as such in the extant literature. Primarily used to 
contribute to the empirical research (see Chapters Four and Five), they help to address 
the third sub-question concerning the different types of public policy research institutes, as 
well as the fourth sub-question regarding processes of transnational interaction with fellow 
institutes. In addition, they also generated information regarding the second sub-question 
on the dynamics of foreign and security political cooperation across wider Europe.  
For the identification and selection of the interviewees a three-pronged approach has been 
adopted. In the first place internet research has been conducted to determine experts on 
EU-Russia relations and Russian foreign and security politics, in the United Kingdom and 
other EU MSs as well as Russia. This, together with the review of research institutes 
working on foreign and security politics across wider Europe completed for this thesis, 
brought two important trends to light. On the one hand, it clarified that in several EU MSs 
the research interests for EU-Russia relations are considerably stronger - most 
prominently Germany, the United Kingdom, Finland, Poland. On the other hand, it showed 
that the number of Russian institutes working on security across wider Europe is 
manageable. This was reconfirmed throughout the data collection process and helped to 
focus the research in limiting the sample. As a second method to identify interviewees, 
several area studies experts at higher education institutes in the United Kingdom have 
been consulted, and have provided a pool of direct contacts for interviewees specifically in 
Russia. Beyond the provision of contacts, the wealth of experience in research in Russia 
has also contributed ideas for more sources for interviewees. Third, on the basis of the 
snowball method, interviewees have provided advice and contacts for further peers 
suitable to be interviewed. Using the three ways to identify interviewees proved successful 
for the research project as it widely diversified the sources. Moreover it was of particular 
help in the field research in Russia, where conducting internet research has sometimes 
been hampered by the language barrier. Engaging in an in-depth search for interviewees 
also helped to identify further literature by a broad range of experts, even if they could not 
be interviewed. 
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Difficulties occurred due to the fact that the case study on counter-terrorism chosen in the 
first place turned out to not be a workable case for the research at hand (see below in the 
section on Case Study for further explanation, pp.47ff). This means that a first range of 
interviews conducted with scholars from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Belgium have only been partially useful to the research. While they provided information 
on research institutes in the EU MSs and cooperation among research institutes across 
the EU, the data collected regarding the topical focus of counter-terrorism could not be 
used further within this specific project. The nature of the research project and the time 
and resources available for it did not allow for much further data collection on the basis of 
interviews, at the time when the change in topical focus had to be conducted. This lead to 
a predominant use of the interviews with Russian experts. However, this is not completely 
harmful to the project, as the interviews with the Russian experts represent a source of 
outstanding value that could have not been replaced otherwise. Instead, regarding the 
research institutes in the EU the extant literature is broader, and their presence and output 
is more accessible for the researcher of this project. Therefore it was possible to cover it 
sufficiently through few interviews and a survey of the literature (academic articles, 
documents by research institutes, websites). Still further interviews on a much more 
encompassing scale would have undoubtedly benefited the project. This represents a step 
to follow up on the project and expand it. 
In practical terms, the interviews were conducted face-to-face as well as by telephone, in a 
semi-structured manner (Robson, 2002, p.270). They have been conducted in the 
timeframe between March 2012 and June 2013. Interviewees were contacted through 
email, both in English and Russian language (with the help of a translator). 
Communication took place in English which represents the second language for most 
interviewees. All interviewees have agreed to this and prefer not to have a translator in 
place. A range of questions were sent beforehand, so participants could prepare for the 
meeting. Throughout the text the interviewees are kept anonymous, but a list of the 
interviewees used for this thesis is provided in the section on references. This choice was 
made as one interviewee preferred to stay anonymous and this way ensured an easy 
solution to protect the identity.  
While the interviews were conducted with the staff of research institutes, these represent 
the units of observation but not the unit of analysis. Thus, the questions were designed 
and introduced to interviewees emphasising that inferences would be drawn regarding the 
units of analysis and not regarding the staff. The difficulty was to collect data that provide 
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information regarding the units of analysis, and do not solely represent the interviewees 
agency (Babbie, 2007, p.342). Therefore, on the one hand the breadth of interviews 
enables one to grasp congruities, and on the other hand the triangulation of data sources 
enables one to confirm data from various perspectives. 
The output of the interviews concerns the unit of analysis for this project, namely public 
policy research institutes in Europe and Russia which collect data, generate expertise and 
spread knowledge in the field of EU-Russian relations, EU foreign and security policy, and 
Russian foreign and security policy. Adding to the exploratory character of this project, that 
also includes the set-up of a typology of research institutes (see Chapter Four), the 
interviews enabled one to explicitly distinguish specific types of research institutes 
including their dynamics, goals and tools. In addition they enabled one to specify the type 
and level of cooperation taking place regarding thematic cases. In this sense, the primary 
sources were used to rectify data from secondary sources, and to complement the 
secondary sources with in depth empirical data. 
The interviews were conducted in a formal semi-structured format complementing the data 
collection within the broader frame of the exploratory research design. Using semi-
structured interviews enabled to balance control and flexibility throughout them (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2012, p.31). It lead the interviews to include three areas of interest: the interviewee, 
the research environment, and transnational cooperation.  The first range of question 4
concerned the interviewee and the organisation s/he works with. They allowed to gain 
insights regarding the interviewees’ agencies, as well as the structure and agency of the 
respective research institute, as perceived by the interviewees. 
The second area of interest encompassed the role of research institutes and experts in 
their domestic research environment. This provided an understanding of the topical scope 
that the research of an institute covers. In addition it allowed an identification of the various 
tasks the research institute conducts, and what tools and channel it has at its availability. 
Moreover, it facilitated a discussion about the entities who the research institute and its 
staff prepare their research for. On that basis it generally referred to a discussion about the 
possible contributions of institutes and experts to the policy cycle, and whether the 
contributions are generally requested or promoted on own initiative.  
 A guide on the questions for the semi-structured interviews is provided in the Annex (Annex 1).4
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A third area of interest has been to explore cross-border cooperation of institutes. First of 
all, this allowed to identify overlapping interests in research areas or very specific issues, 
not only on a topical basis, but also with regard to the narrative that has been adopted for 
the specific research area or issue. Furthermore, questions in this third category enabled 
to define different types of transnational cooperation on the basis of examples, each 
involving a varying range of governmental and/or non-governmental actors. In addition, the 
interviewees provided an overview of channels and tools available to them in order to 
engage in cross-border cooperation and how these tools are integrated in their work. 
Moreover, the interviewees determined what they consider as important for successful 
cooperation, and contributed examples of more or less successful cooperation. This 
allowed to gain an understanding for opportunities and challenges in cross-border 
cooperation.  
As the interviews were held with academic and policy experts alike across various fields of 
expertise, specifics aspects had to be considered throughout the preparation and the 
conduct. The knowledge of the experts usually contributes to only one specific part of the 
project, but about this part they have in-depth knowledge. Therefore, questions needed to 
be designed carefully in a manner that focused on the particular field of knowledge of the 
expert, but still allowed an integration of the response into the broader project. This 
represented a challenge in particular with regard to the broad geographical scope of the 
research covering a variety of countries and a variety of research institutes. In addition the 
units of observation do not necessarily concur (in every detail) with the approaches of the 
units of analysis. In this context, knowing from the review of literature and documents 
about deviations, allowed for a careful integration of debates on differences in the 
interviews. 
CASE STUDY
As part of the empirical research for the thesis a case study has been conducted which 
enables one to exemplify the thematic research on the nature and functionality of cross 
border cooperation among public policy research institutes in foreign and security policy 
cooperation in wider Europe. At the same time the case study also serves to restrict the 
sample of units of analysis, concentrating the research on a specific topic area. It adds to 
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the empirical work in Chapters Four and Five which analyse transnational cooperation 
Russian and EU-based among research institutes in more general terms. First, by 
investigating the opportunities, processes and challenges of cooperation as perceived by 
staff of research institutes. Subsequently, by examining trends in applied interaction, based 
on the cooperative activities conducted by a range of Russian and European research 
institutes over the last four to five years. After providing more generally applicable findings 
from the literature at first, it is subsequently of importance to test those findings using 
carefully and justifiably selected examples. This does not only complement and test the 
uniquely assembled literature through empirical data, but beyond that a comparison 
between the various empirical foci of data collection is facilitated. In this regard, the case 
study adds to the research, as it offers the possibility to test specific causal mechanisms. 
Although case studies cause trade-offs regarding methodological correctness, it is 
necessary to use them in order to relate straight methodology with the multifaceted reality 
of our world (Kacowicz, 2004, p.120).  
The case study follows a single-case embedded design (Yin, 2009, p.46f). The decision to 
use a single case study to address the research question is primarily based on the limited 
sample of cases. Moreover, in this project the case study adds to a range of empirical data 
which have been identified outside the case study. Therefore it acts as one of a few 
empirical data sources. The design for the research at hand is holistic in nature in so far as 
it focuses on studying one unit of analysis (Yin, 2009, p.50). However, the unit of analysis 
is recognised to encompass a range of slightly varying actors. Public policy research 
institutes are the units of analysis, however by definition they may be NGOs, quasi-
governmental, university affiliated, corporate, or affiliated to political parties. These 
differences are considered in the study, as well as the cumulative impact for research 
institutes as a whole. Thereby the holistic approach is complemented by a consideration of 
the usefulness of an embedded design.  
The function of the case study is to clarify specifically the practical conduction of 
cooperation among research institutes in a bi- or multi-national frame. Thus, the emphasis 
is set specifically on the basic functional and operational activities. This constitutes a move 
away from the more commonly examined cooperative practices based on inter-relational 
factors, informed by simultaneous developments of political, economic and societal 
aspects. It must be noted that these previous thoughts are not eliminated when processing 
the information in the case study. However, by turning the attention to the functional and 
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operational level of transnational cooperation another analytical layer is added to the 
research which provides depth to the arguments. This enriches the subsequent discussion 
(see Chapter Six) that integrates both the findings based on the examination of the inter-
relational conditions, as well as the findings drawn from the analysis of the functional level. 
The field research has shown clear structural and functional limits to cross-border 
interaction among EU-based and Russian public policy research institutes. These 
limitations have a strong direct impact on the selection of the case study in this thesis. 
Before entering into the field research, the plan was established to specifically examine the 
interaction of European and Russian research institutes with regard to counter-terrorism. 
This topical focus has been selected on the basis that counter-terrorism has been 
recognised by political leaders from the EU and Russia as common threat. In this context 
plans have been developed by political leaders to establish closer ties in fighting terrorism 
(EU-Russia Summit, 2012). The recognition of the significance of the topic both in Russia 
and the EU led to the author’s assumption that there would also be a strong exchange in 
this regard among experts in research institutes. This assumption was at first affirmed 
when starting field research on a number of European public policy research institutes. It 
was fed by the findings of a strongly developed scholarship and debate of the politics, law 
and economics related to counter-terrorism. The community of scholars working on the 
topic has both national presence as well as established transnational ties. However, when 
continuing the research and interviews in Russia this was not reflected in the same way. 
While the research community in Russia harbours a wealth of scholarship, the debate on 
counter-terrorism is relatively limited in public policy research and does not take place in 
such a public realm. This has several reasons concerning primarily a different organisation 
of the political sphere and hence a different structure of the public sector. Thus the lack of 
overlap of research activity among the EU and Russian research institutes invalidated 
counter-terrorism as a topical focus for the research. 
Moreover, the interviews showed that cooperation among Russian and European research 
institutes often deals with a lot more fundamental issues. This highlights the fact that work 
at the transnational level between Russia and the EU currently comprises other tasks and 
tools. While there are successful examples of cooperation, the effort invested in building 
and upholding ties should not be underestimated. What this section demonstrates is the 
need to take a step back and work with the empirical presence, and thus available data. It 
justifies a look at cooperation among European and Russian research institutes in a more 
 50
fundamental manner, and to take account of it while it is being shaped. This portrays how 
the power of the empirical environment can have a strong impact on the conduct of the 
envisaged research project. However, it does not weaken the project, instead, at the 
methodological level this occurrence illustrates the impact of empirical circumstances and 
the importance of adequate resources. At an empirical level it indicates that there are limits 
to transnational cooperation between the EU and Russia, and even more clear limits to the 
research of this. To provide for a more comprehensive study, the conduction of two case 
studies would have allowed to add comparative value. However, due to a limit in time and 
resources caused by the change in topical focus away from counter-terrorism it has not 
fitted as part of this thesis. A second case study is not essential for the thesis, but the 
advantages have been recognised and on that basis a proposal for a follow up study has 
been put forward (see Chapter Seven, pp.49ff). 
As general acts of cooperation prove considerably more common than specifically initiated 
transnational projects (see Chapter Five), the range of selection for a multi-national project 
has been rather limited. Based on careful consideration of the examples given in 
interviews and the consultation of the literature, the choice fell on the Initiative for the 
Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) (IDEAS report, 
2012, p.3ff). Although the number of possible case studies is not very high, this specific 
research project has been selected as it fulfils all the basic needs and beyond that is still 
timely while already being completed. First and foremost the project is picked as it 
concerns specifically cooperation among public policy research institutes. That means that 
it does not directly involve governments among the very basic participants. However, it 
must be highlighted that governmental funding has been provided and government officials 
participate in the broader workshops amongst other guests. Furthermore, the project is 
selected based on its thematic focus on foreign and security policy integration in wider 
Europe. Beyond that, it is picked due to its multinational nature and due to its geographical 
scope that includes Russian and European research Institutes. Thereby it covers the 
aspects of this research and fulfils all the basic necessities to be utilised as a case study in 
this research. 
The IDEAS project finds its roots in the long-term pan-European integration process that 
has been intermittently promoted in the realm of the OSCE. This debate has been 
intensified over the last decade in particular through the Corfu Process and the Astana 
Declaration (see pp.139ff for a description of the case study). On that background, 
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research fellows from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the 
University of Hamburg (IFSH) proposed a project similar to the previously conducted Euro-
Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) , though emphasising the involvement of European and 5
Russian institutes to discuss pan-European foreign and security politics. Th participants 
were selected on the basis of the groupings of the Weimar triangle and the Polish-
German-Russian trialogue, which have respectively been set up to establish cooperation 
and promote common progress across the wider European region. 
What the case study ultimately adds to the research is the use of another type of research 
method that in turn leads to the provision of another type of material for the final analysis. 
While Chapter Four is based on interviews and literature that describe general patterns 
found through development over time, the case study in Chapter Five introduces a 
stronger focus on the inherent practical mechanisms which in turn contributes to the 
understanding of the bigger picture. Thus, while the interest of the research project is to 
understand the processes and value of transnational cooperation, the case study enables 
a specific look at the mid- to micro-level of cooperative activity. This allows for a 
comparison between the narrative of perceived challenges and opportunities in 
transnational cooperation (as discussed in Chapter Four), and the narrative of challenges 
and opportunities occurring through the implementation of cooperation (as discussed in 
Chapter Five). 
 See Carnegie Endowment, 2014.5
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CHAPTER 3 – THE CONTEXT 
Before entering into the analytical part of the research the foundation is set out. As the 
project consists of a range of varying aspects which are combined in this one study they 
are outlined here respectively. Thereby the development of the project can be understood 
in more depth, and the challenges and opportunities contributed by each single aspect can 
be grasped. The four aspects that are combined within this research are political 
integration, non- and quasi-governmental actors, foreign and security policy, and wider 
Europe. Together they define the content of the thesis but each of them is a broad concept 
in itself. This chapter provides insights on how they are understood in this thesis, and 
touches upon important challenges of the concepts which might become apparent again 
throughout the further process of the research.  
The chapter first illustrates the choices for the theoretical setting of the thesis, and 
subsequently describes the empirical context of EU-Russia relations. The former 
addresses the first sub-question which explores the political space available to research 
institutes and their ability to the influence the dominant political discourse. It illustrates 
increasing political integration and consequently evolving opportunities for non-and quasi-
governmental actors. Based on that it encourages a debate about the power of knowledge 
that research institutes can avail themselves of. The empirical section of the chapter 
addresses the second sub-question which examines the current nature of foreign and 
security policy cooperation across wider Europe. It establishes an understanding for 
underlying debates in political cooperation among the EU and Russia that provide vital 
impact for the research (especially the fieldwork). These underlying debates are picked up 
again and integrated in Chapters Four and Five that are heavily based on empirical work. 
DETERRITORIALISATION OF GOVERNANCE
The deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues alongside a simultaneous rise 
of transnational cooperation increasingly cause countries to group up as partners or 
regions and coordinate their representation towards the international community (Sending 
& Neumann, 2006, p.194; also see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2008; Aalberts & Werner, 2011). 
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Although this interdependence provides for a great deal of opportunities, at the same time 
it poses challenges towards regional and global interaction (Mansfield & Pollins, 2006, p.
2f). Realist theories, as key traditional approaches to understand the structures of 
International Relations, view increased interaction critically. They consider the trade-off 
between a broader realm of influence and lower costs by securing support of a wider 
range of possible partners on the one hand, and a loss of sovereignty towards partners in 
cooperation on the other hand (Baylis, 2008, p.230ff). In contrast cosmopolitan 
approaches, tend to emphasise the opportunities and obligations that come with growing 
interconnectedness. Therefore they promote a strengthened international (or 
cosmopolitan) sphere and develop institutions beyond the nation state to serve common 
humanity. As Köhler argues, it has to be acknowledged that interdependence enforces a 
degree of loyalty and thereby strengthens accountability. The accountability of activities 
beyond the nation state relies on the acknowledgement of shared responsibility towards 
common ethical imperatives (Köhler, 1998, p.241f). Other communitarian approaches 
accept the cosmopolitan proposition of common responsibility, but at the same time 
highlight the prevailing predominance of local or national communities over integration in 
the international sphere (Linklater, 2008, p. 554). In this regard, Sutch discusses Walzer’s 
often portrayed sceptical view on the development of a sustainable regional or 
international environment in which a type of citizenship beyond the nation state can 
evolve. However while the story of the thin moral argument to coordinate policies 
regionally or internationally stands, more recent debates by Walzer consider that global 
pluralism offers opportunities for integration within certain shared areas (Sutch, 2009, p.
515). 
Post-structuralism challenges both cosmopolitanism and communitarian views. It 
emphasises that generalised claims which are applied to the international community are 
dangerous and unsustainable, as they are based on the formulation of truth by a limited 
group of people. Moreover it criticises that communitarian views that define the importance 
of groups rely heavily on an understanding that promotes inclusion and exclusion among 
the people or groups of people (Linklater, 2008, p.555). 
A fundamental issue in transnational, regional and global governance is its imposition of 
micro-macro processes. Therefore it is not built on a single organisational structure but on 
a set of differing ones (Rosenau, 1998, p.30f). Not working within unified structures does 
pose problems towards cooperation apart from the varying perspectives, at an 
organisational level. It is much more difficult to find similar channels and means for 
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interaction and implementation. But at the same time multilevel governance promotes the 
rising multiplicity of actors, channels, tools and opinions (Enderlein, Wälti & Zürn 2010, p.
2f). Therefore, transnational, regional and global governance in the wider sense and 
sustainable cooperation as part of it can only develop through ongoing cooperation that 
emerges among the involved actors (Bellamy & Castiglione, 1998, p.173). The discourse 
depends on the one hand on the differing opinions and perspectives of participants, and 
on the other hand on respective differences among their organisations. The interplay of the 
differing organising principles and the utilisation of discourse to determine terms of 
cooperation are of particular significance for this thesis in looking for a fresh approach 
towards transnational cooperation in wider Europe. In this regard it does not only 
investigate cooperation among nation states, but specifically examines non-state actors 
and their interaction beyond the nation state. 
The growing number of foreign and security policy issues which are not geographically 
limited does not only advance integration among countries. Also non-governmental actors 
are inclined to enter more cooperative partnerships across borders, supplying a growing 
audience of a broad range of actors (state and non-state) (Goldstein & Peevehouse, 2008, 
p.16). This does not imply a direct transfer of power from state to non-state level, instead it 
is an opportunity for non-governmental actors to access the political discourse and relate 
to it objectively and subjectively (Sending & Neumann, 2006, p.257f.) These trends 
towards increased transnational security governance, embedded in an international 
environment characterised by regional integration, globalisation and multilevel governance 
processes, generate opportunities for non- and quasi-governmental actors to further their 
participation in the policy-making sphere (Cerny, 2006, p.97). As Ernst Haas frames it, the 
‘vessel of sovereign statehood is leaky’ (Haas, 1990, p.181). First and foremost, 
transnational governance provides non- and quasi-governmental actors with a growing 
number of access-points, which they can use to gain and spread knowledge. Moreover, 
transnational interaction allows for compiling shared knowledge that recognises the 
circumstances of a variety of involved actors, structures, and geographical areas, while 
keeping the legitimacy of the domestic sphere (Cross, 2013, p.160). Beyond that, it 
delivers the establishment of a completely new professional sphere, that is embedded in 
levels of governance beyond the nation state. As a visible effect, public policy research 
institutes, and in related terms the professional communities which they set-up or join, 
have been heavily increasing in numbers as well as in involvement in the foreign and 
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security policy in the EU and across wider Europe during the last two decades (McGann, 
2011, p.9f). 
In this context, the European security political environment has been marked by two vital 
trends over the last two decades: diversification and integration (Irrera, 2013, p.51; Faleg, 
2012, p.167f). These are exactly the trends that provide more space for non-state actors to 
contribute to the policy field. Diversification means that a much wider range of security 
political issues has developed, and simultaneously a strong specification of the issues has 
taken place. This has made the policy sphere much more complex and it is difficult to keep 
an overview of developments and possible measures. Thus, expertise is needed that is 
often not found in politics, and at the same time knowledge gathering is often outsourced 
by state actors (Faleg, 2012, p.163). On the other hand, the simultaneous process of 
integration has caused transnational and regional cooperation on security politics to rise 
steadily. This strengthens the common professional sphere for non-state actors beyond the 
nation state level. An interesting phenomenon is that the non- and quasi-governmental 
actors who are engaged in cross-border cooperation reinforce the transnationalism they 
take part in (Cross, 2013, p.139). By using transnational interaction, encouraged by the 
opportunities it offers, they incite other actors to join them. Moreover, as cross-border 
interaction offers rising opportunities for non- and quasi-governmental actors to contribute 
to the development of the rules and norms in the international sphere, they continuously 
seek to push their boundaries and strengthen their role.  6
As a review of the literature shows, the European foreign and security policy literature still 
lacks specific analyses of the role of non-state actors in the security policy environment. 
So far it is primarily restricted to a discussion of the role of states and international 
organisations (Smith, 2008; Wagnsson et al. 2009; Wong & Hill, 2011; Kaunert & Zwoslki, 
2013). A debate considering the role of non-state actors needs to be based on a strong 
empirical fundament, founded in case studies and comparative studies. In other policy 
fields non- and quasi-governmental actors have long been integrated into research 
processes and are an established part of most projects (see Bieler et al. 2000; Kaiser & 
Starie, 2005; Zimmerli et al., 2007). In comparison, in foreign and security policy a strongly 
state centred set of research approaches prevails. Through the ongoing redefinition and 
restructuring of the field of security politics, however, there is an increasing range of actors 
 On this process in Europe, see for example Kutay, A. (2014). ‘Governance and european civil society: 6
governmentality, discourse and NGO’s.’ pp.70.
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who produce expertise and contribute to the construction of the rules and norms of the 
policy field (Cross, 2013 p.159). Examining the potential contribution of all involved actors 
and seeking to learn about their policy impact would help to identify successes and failures 
of policy making in the international security political environment. Therein it is not of sole 
importance to examine the actors’ cooperation with nation states, but in addition the vitality 
of their interaction with a wider audience, like other non- and quasi-governmental actors, 
needs to be considered (Cross, 2013, p.139). In this context, it is an essential addition to 
the literature to engage in further research in foreign and security policy that is based on 
an approach which takes the multi-tier nature of global governance into account. This 
opens up an even wider space to consider the contribution of non-state actors to 
strengthen transnational and regional interaction, and to influence developments in the 
international security political sphere. Within this thesis the gap in research concerning 
non- and quasi-governmental actors in foreign and security policy is tackled at the root. 
This means the thesis explores the capacities of research institutes to operate and 
cooperate in the transnational sphere. Therefore it identifies their incentives and tools, and 
also discusses the opportunities and challenges that cross-border cooperation offers these 
institutes. This highlights that a specific focus is set to study the practices and conventions 
of the non-state actors in the transnational sphere. An examination of the dynamics of their 
cooperative activities is provided, not focusing on governments, but on related non-state 
actors (Cross, 2013, p.139). This is based on the interest in the abilities and the will of 
experts to overcome political differences and develop a common understanding for a 
common security issue. While governments may be caught in political standpoints, experts 
may be able to see beyond the very same politics and promote a more contextual view 
that encourages cooperative measures.  
Non-state actors need to be researched, as they have long been identified as a crucial 
source of information for both the political sphere and the socio-political discourse 
(MacGann, 2011, p.8) Specific empirical research is however rather neglected in the 
foreign and security policy field, based on the above mentioned prevailing sovereignty of 
states. But it has been acknowledged that, due to a rising number of foreign and security 
policy issues which are not limited to state borders, and the simultaneous increase in 
organisational structures beyond nation states, there is an advanced need for varied 
knowledge to be applied to one issue, as well as a need for special expertise to compile 
and analyse this knowledge. These tasks are often undertaken by non- and quasi-
governmental actors like research institutes, interest groups and corporate entities. The 
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political structures have developed in a manner that many processes of knowledge 
acquisition and compilation have been outsourced, as the politicians as representatives of 
the public cannot conduct research on all developments themselves (Traub-Merz, 2011, p.
4f). Moreover the involvement and contribution of a variety of actors also adds a system of 
checks and balances which hinders policy decisions based on the preferences of one 
actor. It has become a widely defended argument that the asset of knowledge (particularly 
in context with acknowledged reputation) provides actors with the ability to exert influence. 
But as Sending and Neuman argue, this influence does not translate as directly as often 
expressed. Moreover the debate on impact leads us easily to apply governance based 
research frameworks. Sending and Neuman argue instead that, to grasp the capacities of 
non-state actors, focus needs to be on interaction among their fellow institutes (Sending & 
Neuman, 2006, p.652). In line with this argument, the thesis does however not study the 
impact of research institutes on policy making. Instead it establishes their tools and 
abilities to operate and cooperate in the transnational sphere. Throughout, the significance 
of knowledge is reciprocally encouraged by the current political sphere and is mutually 
stimulated by the actors seeking influence. This entails that the importance of knowledge 
varies among the political systems (not only states but also regional and international 
systems), and also varies from issue to issue, as well as from actor to actor. But ultimately 
the ever more interlinked international system, driven by continuous progress in 
transnational cooperation, is informed by a strong presence of knowledge and expertise, 
and the experts who generate, compile and spread it (Ullrich, 2004, p.53f; Cross, 2013, p.
140).  
THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE
The previous section has discussed evolving opportunities for non- and quasi-
governmental actors to expand their role in governance processes, on the basis of 
increasing interdependence across governance levels as well as policy areas and a 
concomitant diversification and specification of policy issues. This highlights the multilevel 
processes present at transnational level, and emphasises the need to understand 
cooperative practices before looking at the policy impact of actors. In the following 
paragraphs a theoretical lens is worked out that builds a base for the research, so we can 
further delve into understanding the role and dynamics of research institutes whose main 
assets relates to knowledge. 
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In the current European political order expertise has been acknowledged as a crucial asset 
in policy spheres, and thus as a source of influence applicable to a varying degree 
(European Commission, 2012; European Commission, 2014e; European Research 
Agency, 2014; Boucher et al., 2004, p.10). Knowledge is rooted in information, which 
represent sets of data that are gathered in our world. It becomes knowledge by 
incorporating this information into the intrinsic perceptive framework of actors and beings 
(McGann, 2010, p.30). Particularly research institutes, but also interest groups and 
corporate entities, have developed to become the foremost activists in generating, 
compiling, and spreading knowledge, all based on their according missions. In many 
cases, information gathering and context analyses are specifically outsourced to them by 
states, regional or international entities (Steffen & Linder, 2006, p.313f). This knowledge 
economy has grown heavily due to the rising interconnectedness and simultaneous 
deterritorialisation of the current international political order (Goldstein & Peevehouse, 
2008, p.16; Cross, 2013, p.140; Enderlein, Wälti & Zürn 2010, p.2f). The impact of 
knowledge is guided by the environments in which it is generated and applied, thus by the 
existing socio-political sphere and mutually by the actors or institutes seeking influence. In 
this sense, the impact of bits of knowledge differs among political systems (not only states 
but also regional and international systems), among issues, and among actors over time 
and space. Recognising knowledge as a fundamental property of research institutes to 
shape and spread narratives, this section serves to discuss its role in establishing 
narratives relevant to the dominant political discourse. Thereby it contributes to the 
broader study that investigates cooperation among EU-based and Russian research 
institutes engaging in foreign and security policy. It promotes an exploratory investigation 
on how research institutes contribute to shaping a transnational sphere of action and 
interaction. Moreover, within this, it adds the opportunity to understand how far the 
narrative of EU-Russia cooperation in high politics is translated into interaction among 
research institutes. 
In promoting the analysis of transnational governance processes the thesis acknowledges 
the difficulties concerning accountability and integration in multilevel governance. 
Therefore it highlights the importance of interaction and dialogue among the various 
systems and involved actors, all having different tools and channels available to them. 
Interaction and participation does not only allow actors to contribute their narrative to a 
policy process, but it also makes them part of a process and thus enables them to shape 
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the inherent discourse that guides this process (Haas, 1990, 9ff; Adler & Haas P. 1992). 
When looking at approaches in international relations that concern the role of knowledge, 
constructivism, post-structuralism and postmodernism stand out. They all rely on social 
theory in order to explain the emergence of preferences of actors (both groups and 
individuals). They assume that knowledge (or the perception of a reality) is constructed. 
The differentiated understanding of how knowledge is portrayed represents the defining 
difference among these approaches. Constructivists claim the historical and social 
construction of structure and as such knowledge. The ongoing interaction among actors 
forms the way in which the structure is perceived (Wendt, 1999, p.1). A criticism towards 
constructivism is, however, that while they say that knowledge is socially constructed, they 
still allow the idea of reality as a significant reference point (Pouliot, 2004, p.320). In 
contrast, postmodernists claim that all knowledge is subjective and that there is no 
universal or objective claim that can be made. The approach aims to deconstruct any 
objective notions and defy the categorisation and simplification provided by constructed 
objects (Goldstein & Peevehouse, 2008, p.96f). The assumption of knowledge being a 
completely subjective concept is not shared by the author of this thesis. Instead there is 
the belief that knowledge is guided by an interplay between subjective claims and an 
accepted dominant discourse, both of which can shape each other reciprocally. 
As such the third theoretical lens of post-structuralism does not accept a purely objective 
or a subjective truth. It does not reduce its analysis to a reliance on unifying structures as 
structuralism does. But on the other end of the scale, it also does not assume knowledge 
to be a completely subjective concept. Instead it seeks a middle way and emphasises the 
importance of understanding the interplay between the two perceptions of truth, the 
subjective and the universal (Whisnant, 2012, p.1; Agger, 1991, p.107). This interest in the 
dialectic between subjective and objective truth makes it a suitable starting point for the 
study of cooperative processes. The universal structures of cooperation are guided 
through the dominant political discourse, while individual actors retain the ability to 
participate in and shape the cooperation and its underlying discourse. In this manner, 
drawing from post-structuralism emphasises the importance of understanding the interplay 
between structure and agency, as this determines how the dominant political discourse is 
structured (Foucault, 1998, p.93; Wacquant, 2004, p.318). At this point it must be 
emphasised that post-structuralism is a broad philosophical movement which 
encompasses a broad range of understandings. This generalisation serves as a first step 
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to distinguish it from the other two movements (constructivism and postmodernism). Later 
on the focus on Bourdieu’s habitus is further outlined (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). 
By focusing on the interplay among an accepted dominant discourse and subjective 
claims, knowledge works as the main variable to intercede in the exchange among 
objective and subjective truth (Foucault, 1972, p.283). This means that knowledge, as 
described above as information that are integrated into the intrinsic perceptive framework 
of actors, is what shapes their discursive formation (and reformation). On a more practical 
level this raises the question arises how knowledge can make a contribution in the field of 
foreign and security policy. Therefore the power of knowledge is discussed at a more 
abstract level that allows us to define knowledge as an instrument. In that context, the 
thesis applies a differentiation between power and influence that does not let them be 
used interchangeably. Power is recognised as the ability to constitute and run the current 
dominant political discourse. Instead influence is understood as the in/direct capacity to 
make an impact on the structures that hold the dominant political discourse in place, in an 
attempt to alter that discourse (De Lange, 2011, p.118). Importantly, Haas has argued that 
there is no direct or causal impact of expertise on policy making, instead expertise only 
contributes to define the issues and therein the way policy makers define their interests 
towards the issue (Haas, 1990, p.9ff). Thus, following the definition provided above, in the 
first instance knowledge has only the possibility to exert influence. However, it can gain the 
predicate of power when it is used by those who are able to guide the inherent structure/
agency discourse. To grasp the interplay that establishes the dominant discourse, 
interaction does not only need to be understood in practical terms. Instead there is also a 
need to take a stance on the underlying meta-theory encompassing the structure/agency 
nexus. Only in this manner can it be attempted to gain an understanding of the power of 
knowledge. Structure is understood here as the accepted dominant political discourse 
which guides the conduction of governance processes. Agency instead is firstly 
understood as the subjective knowledge that an actor generates and looks to contribute to 
a governance process. But beyond that, as Adler and Haas have highlighted, it also 
enables them to shape the underlying discourse of the process that they participate in 
through contributing their narrative (Haas, 1990, 9ff; Adler & Haas P. 1992). 
It has been established in the literature that at a most elementary level cooperation can be 
driven either by structure or by agency. The nexus of these two depicts the primary 
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dichotomy of cooperation (Wright, 2006, p.104). In this sense, to understand the 
negotiation and the generation of a (shared) narrative or (shared) perceived knowledge we 
need to establish an understanding of the structure/agency nexus. Throughout the extant 
literature, debates concerning the structure/agency nexus do not only vary thematically 
according to the respective research areas of differing authors, but they differ in their very 
nature. Some scholars follow an integrative approach and consciously embed the 
structure/agency nexus into broader theoretical discussions of their respective research 
(Marsh, 2010, p.216). The integrative approach seems to lose sight of the structure/
agency nexus. Although it can be performed in many different ways, engaging with the 
context before taking basic ontological decisions is likely to lead the debate into a number 
of irrelevant directions, which ultimately concern the structure/agency nexus only 
peripherally. Others take a discriminative approach and recognise the importance of 
distinguishing between problems. Therein, they emphasise the need not to entangle the 
structure/agency nexus from other issues (Marsh, 2010, p.216). The third group of 
scholars take a relational approach in which they develop highly theoretical debates about 
the interrelation between structure and agency and the possible pre-dominance of either 
(Marsh, 2010, p.218f). The broad distinction of the three ways in which the structure/
agency nexus is commonly discussed illustrates that the literature lacks continuity on two 
underlying aspects, ‘how to gain knowledge on the structure/agency nexus’ and resulting 
from this ‘what the nature of the structure/agency nexus is’. 
The consideration of the different ideas and their critics provided an underlying position of 
this thesis, namely that structure and agency cannot be separated, but that the strength 
lies in their continuous interplay. Following a poststructuralist approach, the dominant 
discourse is shaped through cooperative activities and interaction, and not through 
disjointed activities and refusal. This argument is born out of the review of Foucault’s 
understanding of power. His work emphasises the significance of discourse and ideas in 
cooperative activities, also in the realm of public policy. Foucault challenges the idea that 
power is wielded by people or groups by way of ‘episodic’ or ‘sovereign’ acts of domination 
or coercion, seeing it instead as dispersed and pervasive. He shares the opinion that 
‘power is everywhere and beyond structure and agency’ (Foucault, 1998, p.93). In this 
way, it can be understood as an underlying presence that is in continuous motion and in 
continuous furtherance, while still interfusing society. Thus agency can only contribute from 
the outside to the way power proceeds to work. Knowledge, particularly scientific 
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knowledge, is what it consists of and what it is justified through (Foucault, 1972, 283). The 
assumption that the power is beyond everything is highly questionable though, as the 
perception of power can be attributed to the way people constructed it in interaction. 
Therefore one could say that people are ultimately responsible for constituting and using it 
in the way it exists. If they did not construct the concept and nourish it, it would not exist in 
its currant form. 
Foucault’s thoughts have been picked up on by Bourdieu, who also sees discourse at the 
centre of cooperative activities. However, in comparison to Foucault he says that ‘power is 
culturally and symbolically constructed’ and beyond that it is ‘constantly re-legitimised 
through an interplay of agency and structure’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). As Wacquant 
states, it refers to the ‘internalisation of externality and the externalisation of 
internality’ (Wacquant, 2004, p.318). In his attempt to address the dualism between the 
individual and the social present in society, he developed the concept of what he calls 
‘habitus’ or socialised norms or tendencies that guide behaviour and thinking. Habitus is 
neither a result of free will, nor determined by structures, but created by the interplay 
between the two over time and thus occurs unconsciously (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). In that 
sense, it is set in a historic perspective, as an accumulation of societies’ depositions that 
an actor incorporated over time as structured perceptions and tendencies (Wacquant, 
2004, p.318).  
Bourdieu’s conception of habitus has been criticised to restrict actors to a reproduction of 
the known as represented by their habitus. In that way habitus is thought of the socially 
restricted perception within which an actor lives and takes decisions. This critique 
regarding the limiting characteristics of the concept is addressed by Reay (2004). He notes 
that habitus reflects a given sum of social circumstances, however, it still encompasses the 
ability to develop new responses and thereby change the social position that habitus 
occupies thus far (Reay, 2004, p.434f). This highlights the role of agency in its interplay 
with the structured social position (Webb et al., 2002, p.36). Therein they are coherent with 
Bourdieu’s specifications that at first habitus is not a simple structure but is set up as a 
layered structure of dispositions. Moreover, habitus may not be coherent, but filled with 
tensions based on the variety of circumstances that craft it (Wacquant, 2004, p.319). 
Therefore the reaction by an actor in a certain time and place is dependent on the interplay 
between habitus and the external circumstances (Bourdieu, 1977, p.261). Reflecting on 
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possible tensions inherent within a habitus, these may generate a different reaction which 
in turn may influence the experience of the actor and thus take an impact on the habitus. 
Following Bourdieu’s argument and expressing it in a more applied manner, the 
significance of expertise in the actual policy area at a certain time and place is both 
dependent on the structure and demand by the current political environment, as well as 
the strength and resourcefulness of the actor who seek influence. Thus the impact is an 
outcome of the discourse among structure and agency, which both have the ability to 
encourage the impact of a narrative at a certain time and place. As Radaelli argues, 
‘interpretation is a central aspect, and both experts and policy entrepreneurs are extremely 
active in the political construction of policy problems’ (Radaelli, 1995, p.170). This 
description also emphasises that the significance of knowledge is different in each political 
system. This does not only concern states as a unit, but instead any type of political 
system ranging from sub-state groups to the regional and international level. Beyond that, 
those differences do not only occur among different organisations within the same system, 
but also internally to an organisation. In this regard knowledge is prone to be shaped by 
the discourse between structure and agency that establishes the dominant political 
discourse. This influences it in two ways: first the impact of knowledge is limited through 
selection or rejection; second, knowledge is bound to develop in accordance with the 
intrinsic perceptive framework of an actor. These two aspects show that knowledge is a 
subject in flux, which is utilised in and thus shaped through ongoing interaction.  
This research highlights that knowledge is not everything, but the salient point is the 
structural power of the person creating and disseminating the knowledge. Thus the way it 
is acquired and the structures within which it is acquired and spread, as well as the agency 
with which it is gained and spread for that matter, all these processes need to be 
considered. 
SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE WIDER EUROPEAN REGION
After outlining the underlying theoretical and epistemological choices of the project, the 
chapter goes on to present the empirical context. The originality of the study is not only 
characterised by its non-traditional perspective to analyse foreign and security policy. 
Added to this the empirical focus on wider Europe provides an additional pivot that both 
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sets boundaries to the scope of the project, but also introduces a range of challenges 
particularly inherent in EU/Russia relations and the related literature. Therefore this section 
outlines the foreign and security policy development of the EU and Russia as well as their 
interaction in this field. It focuses primarily on the last two and a half decades, since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. This period is characterised by the dissolution of the 
bipolar power struggle between a defined Western bloc led by the US and an Eastern bloc 
led by the SU. 
The section establishes overlapping interests as well as differing organic characteristics 
and strategies in the EU’s and Russia’s foreign and security policy. While the thesis moves 
on to analyse non- and quasi-governmental actors it is of essence to consider the 
underlying debates in high politics (Drent, 2012; Danilov, 2012; Casier, 2013; Averre, 2009; 
Fernandes, 2014). These highlight inherent challenges in EU/Russia cooperation that are 
reflected in the work of non- and quasi-governmental actors. They are far from acting in a 
vacuum, but instead are part of the broader political discourse that integrates a wide 
variety of structures and agencies. This time and space dependent discourse establishes 
not only their capacities to participate in the contribution to a policy field, but also drives 
the debates that are held in that specific policy field. In this sense, the debates and 
challenges established in the following paragraphs on high politics serve as first indicators 
and reasons for possible pivots in the analysis in Chapter Four and Five.
EUROPEAN UNION
Specifically over the last three decades the European Union has been established as the 
primary regional organisation in Europe. While at first it was an entirely economic geared 
project, its growing number of member states proceeded to spread cooperation step by 
step into further policy areas. By the mid 1980s the European Policy Cooperation which 
represented the foreign political cooperation among European Community (EC) members 
states but took place outside the extant framework of the EC, was formally recognised in 
the Single European Act (SEA). At this point, however, foreign policy cooperation has not 
been integrated into the treaties of the EC, which kept it as a voluntary process (Nugent, 
2003, p.415). Only in 1993 with the entry into force of the Treaty of the European Union, 
which established the three-pillar structure, foreign and security policy cooperation has 
been integrated into the treaties, though it must be highlighted that the strong 
intergovernmental character and the priority of domestic sovereignty prevail. Beyond that, 
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a further interesting aspect is that on the basis of the pillar structure the Maastricht Treaty 
distinguishes between internal and external foreign and security policy issues. Thus the 
internal aspects are represented by the pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA; now AFSJ) 
and external aspects by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Kaunert & 
Zwolski, 2013, p.54f).  Guidance for the activities conducted in the realm of foreign and 7
security policy is given by the Petersberg Tasks, which encompass humanitarian and 
rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking (EEAS, 2014; WEU, 1992, p.6). The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam 
contributed to facilitate cooperation on foreign and security policy, by enabling new 
decision making processes that allowed for increased cooperation among those willing. 
Moreover, it introduced the idea of the AFSJ and in that context transferred many policy 
issues of the intergovernmental JHA to the European Community pillar (Rees, 2008, p.97). 
Importantly this treaty also established the post of the CFSP High representative, whose 
tasks have been extended throughout the following decade, particularly with the Treaty of 
Lisbon. In the same way the Treaty of Nice (2001) has been used to further streamline 
instruments, with particular consideration of the upcoming ‘big bang enlargement’ (Nugent, 
2003, p.417) 
A significant observation put forward by Nugent is that most progress has so far been 
limited to foreign politics, while security and defence politics have been kept aside until 
later. A ‘breakthrough’ commonly marked in the literature is the St. Malo summit in 1998 at 
which France, Britain and Germany demonstrated an increased interest in strengthening 
security and defence cooperation by proposing a common security and defence policy 
(Nugent, 2003, p.417f). On that basis three European Council summits have stimulated 
progress in the short term, with the 1999 summit in Helsinki agreeing the establishment of 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP => now CSDP).  ‘The Common Security 8
and Defence Policy (CSDP) represents an institutionalised attempt on the part of the EU 
member states to address new challenges to European security, drawing from the 
experience of the Balkan crises in the 1990s’ (Faleg, 2012, p.162). Thereupon the EU 
member states furthered integration on security and defence under the lead of the UK, 
 Justice and Home Affairs has been renamed in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) as the Area of Freedom 7
Security and Justice (AFSJ).
 The European Security and Defence Policy has been re-named within the Lisbon Treaty (2009) as the 8
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Used as CSDP throughout the thesis.
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France and Germany, launching the European Security Strategy (2003) which still 
represents the current EU framework for foreign and security matters. The lack of a unified 
strategy among the EU member states was supposed to be overcome, which became 
highly visible in crisis situations like the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003. While the 
European Security Strategy provided a broad underlying agreement, at a more practical 
level the military (2010) as well as civilian (2008 & 2010) headline goals have been 
launched, though they have been implemented with varied success (European External 
Action Service, 2014). This highlights the EU’s understanding of the need for 
comprehensive approaches to address security issues, integrating specifically the civilian 
aspect (Rees, 2008, p.106). To date, the Lisbon Treaty has provided the latest change to 
the foreign and security-political sphere of the EU. Most significantly, it dropped the three-
pillar structure of the EU, merging them into one legal person. Moreover, it aims to 
increase integration and coordination regarding foreign and security policy by creating the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, introducing the 
concept of mutual solidarity, and transferring a number of competences for the AFSJ to the 
regional level. However at the same time it underlines the prevailing intergovernmental 
character and the importance of member states in framing foreign and security policy 
cooperation (European Parliament, 2008; Kaunert & Zwolski, 2013, p.61). 
‘In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security 
and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The 
development of a stronger international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule-based international order is our 
objective’ (European Council, 2003). 
The European Security Strategy underlines the goal of the EU to strengthen its 
neighbourhood and thereby provide for a stronger international system more generally. 
The tools at its hands to fulfil the related tasks range from confidence building measures, 
spreading good governance and providing assistance, to conditionality and trade 
measures (European Council, 2003, p.10). Thus they range from supportive measures to 
soft coercion. Rees discusses this in his article from a critical angle, recalling the concept 
of ‘externalisation of control’. ’It is evident that self-interested security measures have been 
uppermost in the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries’ (Rees, 2008, p.103ff). 
However, he doesn’t leave it at this, stating that self-interest does not represent the 
European strategy as a whole. He highlights that by encouraging dialogue, multilateralism 
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and peaceful conflict resolution the EU promotes civil behaviour and exemplifies positive 
norms and values (Rees, 2008, p.105f). 
Importantly, it must be highlighted that the EU cannot be seen as a unitary actor, but 
instead it currently consists of 28 member states which all reserve their domestic 
strategies. This is especially the case in security- and defence-politics where the member 
states retain sovereignty in the form of the Council of the European Union. The difficulties 
in negotiating foreign and security policy issues within this format have become visible in 
the long-term integration process that is far from complete, but also in each crisis situation 
in which the EU member states struggle to establish common ground (Naurin, 2010, p.
45f). These differences are based on the variation of goals that the representatives of each 
member state follow at a certain point in time. Therefore the differences also reflect in their 
handling of external affairs and foreign partners. On that basis, it is a matter of accuracy to 
highlight a few of the perspectives on foreign and security policy in more general terms.  
A brief overview of member states’ policies towards foreign and security policy shows the 
range of national priorities and interests regarding particular policy areas. Although the 
financial crisis has driven security politics slightly in the shadows, Germany remains 
committed to a multilateral European approach. Thus far, it is the only country next to 
France that took part in all military and civilian EU missions. However, its driving force for 
security cooperation is based on peaceful environment for trade as well as stronger 
European integration (Tanner et al., 2009, p.17; Würzer, 2013). France, has taken a 
leading role in European security politics. However it increasingly looses enthusiasm for 
EU based collective action. This is mainly based on what observers have seen as a lack of 
consensus and initiative among the EU member states, which has driven France to 
consider other options, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), UN 
missions, or unilateral deployments (Muniz, 2013). Poland recently increased its 
commitment to become involved in collective defence in NATO and the EU. However, it 
sees the best option in a complementary duo where NATO is responsible for collective 
defence, while the EU deals with crisis management (Dobrowolska-Polak, 2013). Spain 
has shown a strong commitment in supporting EU security integration and has also been 
part of every military mission. However, as a border-country, Spain is instead driven by the 
attraction of further integration towards collective security (Muniz, 2013). Sweden goes on 
to represent its strategic culture in emphasising non-alignment. This highlights an interest 
in involvement in normative advocacy but to refrain from getting involved in collective 
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defence scenarios. While a threefold shift in their strategic culture drives them to slowly 
open up their strong stance, external factors (Russian foreign politics, US pivot towards 
Asia, and the evolution of the EU) will be decisive for Sweden’s future decisions in this 
regard (Marrone, 2013). Finally, the UK has proven that it can be a driving force in 
European security integration (St. Malo and the following years). However, their approach 
to EU foreign and security policy is heavily influenced by budgetary crisis and the US pivot 
towards Additionally, domestic politics in the UK, including the possibility of a Referendum 
on EU membership will influence UK approaches (Faleg, 2013).  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Russian Federation emerged as the successor state of the SU after its dissolution in 
1991. In the two decades that passed since, Russian foreign and security policy concepts 
and strategies have varied across a broad range. Changes were dependent on the acting 
president in place and to a lesser degree as well on the affiliated foreign minister at any 
given time. The strategies were commonly defined along two aspects. On the one hand 
the reference to the concept of vulnerability which served as argument for a strong 
government and securitisation on the basis of mistrust, particularly towards the West. On 
the other hand the strategies were defined by establishing the position of Russia towards 
the West, specifically the EU and the US. The state’s relations to the West ranged, 
depending on the leading officials, from dissociation and anti-western perspectives often 
related to nationalist concepts, to rapprochement and alignment. The latter has been 
specifically a phenomenon in the early years after the breakup of the SU when Russian 
leaders attempted to construct a partnership with the western actors. However, the 
enthusiasm was pushed aside soon enough based on thoughts about NATO and later also 
EU expansion eastwards. 
Since 2000 Russian foreign and security policy has become relatively steady, robust and 
assessable, under the long-term lead of Vladimir Putin.  He promoted the concept of 9
pragmatism under which Russia makes considered approaches based on its strengths and 
weaknesses to promote its position as a major power and establish foreign relations on 
 Vladimir Putin who started his career in the Committee for State Security (KGB, Komitet gosudarstvennoy 9
bezopasnosti), became Prime Minister (1999), became President (2000, re-elected 2004), remained Prime 
Minister under the succeeding President (2008), and was reelected as president in 2012.
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that basis. It aims to establish a pluralist international environment in which it represents 
one of the decisive actors (MacFarlane, 2006, p.43f). This approach clearly represents 
Russia’s continuous foreign and security policy goals which encompass a return to great 
power, increased regional influence through common economic and political institutions, 
and a multilateral international system based on the UN as the central international 
security organisation (Drent, 2012, p.7). The realisation of these aims relies on a 
demonstration of Russia’s capacities and for it to step up its position. Over time his led to 
an increase in nationalist approaches to promote Russia’s own characteristic solutions to 
international issues. Zweynert describes this with a view on economic development and 
state involvement, particularly in Putin’s second term as President. He argues it is based in 
short on the failure of westernising reforms, and the difficult transformative experience in 
comparison with former satellite states (Zweynert, 2010, p.550f). But also in the traditional 
nationalist policy area of foreign and security politics, Russia looked to present itself as a 
strong actor during Putin’s and Medvedev’s terms. As discussed below in the section on 
EU-Russia cooperation, in the recent Decree on Foreign Policy in 2012 Putin stated that 
Russia is going to promote its own interests much more pronouncedly in cooperative 
efforts (Chirkova, 2012, p.4). The drive to establish itself as a great power in the 
international system is however build on a dated concept of power-politics and therefore 
has hindered Russia from developing into be a democratic state. Instead the elite have 
governed the country in a manner to never loose their aim out of sight. On that basis 
reform and modernisation are limited by the greater aim of gaining economic and political 
power. While this could be construed as strategic adherence, there is clear criticism 
expressed in the literature which describes this as manipulation in order to ensure the 
economic and political gains solely for the elite (Fischer, 2012, p.5).  
The neo-authoritarian type of governance is clearly embedded in the mechanics of 
Russian politics and shows in the structures of its foreign and security policy (Allison, Light 
& White, 2006). The constitution of the Russian Federation which entered into law in 1993 
decreed the Russian president as the main organ in foreign and security matters. This 
means that he defines strategies, concepts, has the final say in the handling of any internal 
and external security issues, and represents the country and its decisions domestically 
and internationally. The conduction of the tasks in turn is left to the ministry of foreign 
affairs and respectively the ministry of defence, which are both accountable to the 
parliament (Allison, Light and White, 2006, p.331). Thus theoretically the basis for a non-
authoritarian type of governance is provided to some extent, however the dominant 
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position of the president is inescapable. Political parties, on the other hand have little 
possibility to exert influence on decision making processes in Russia. First of all no 
president since 1993 has been member of a political party, which means political parties 
are kept from proximity to power. Moreover throughout the last two decades additional 
laws have been adopted to reinforce the president’s independence. He appoints most 
members of the government, bureaucrats and the governors of the regions, and he has 
the power to suspend the parliament. Instead, political parties are left with the approval of 
the prime minister which the president proposes (Kynev, 2012, p.8). In this regard Richard 
Sawka’s concept of the ‘dual state’ serves as an accessible description, highlighting the 
differences between the constitutional state and the bureaucracy of the vertical of power 
(Sawka, 2011, p.3).  
During Putin’s time as prime-minister the foreign and security policy concepts and 
strategies have developed within the same frame as before. In 2009 Medvedev presented 
the National Security Strategy ‘Strategy 2020’, which retained the major aims of 
developing as a great power, as well as establishing a leading position in the post-soviet 
region. In terms of priorities the strategy has predominantly been defence prone, naming 
defence, state security and societal security first and foremost (De Haas, 2009, p.3). 
Significantly, the strategy states that Russia has overcome its internal crisis and has 
established itself as an economic power. Therefore it should be recognised as one of the 
great powers in a multipolar system. However, as Schroeder points out, the strategy is 
disjointed and rather represents a list of existing threats instead of an analysis of the 
internal and external security political environment (Schroeder, 2009, p.9). 
Also the re-election of Putin as president in 2012 was not seen as a turning point to bring 
major changes in foreign and security policy. Instead it was recognised that he still had 
major influence in politics during Medvedev's presidency (Chirkova, 2012, p.6). In May 
2012 Putin presented a presidential 'Decree On Measures to Implement the Russian 
Federation Foreign Policy’. This drew specific attention to Russia’s interest in 
strengthening integration in the post-Soviet space. It highlights specifically the importance 
of economic integration and the creation of a free trade zone, which has been agreed in 
2011 and signed by eight post-Soviet countries in 2012 (Chirkova, 2012, p.4). The regional 
integration in the post-Soviet space has received increasing attention over recent years, 
simultaneous to a stagnation in Russia’s relations to the EU and the US. Thus a current 
change of focus can be determined. Though it still looks towards the West, Russia has 
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clear ambitions to strengthen its impact in its near abroad through entering into a Eurasion 
Union as a political and economic framework for integration (Fernandes, 2014, p.27). 
Subsequently, on the basis of the above mentioned decree on Russian foreign policy, 2013 
saw the release of a new Russian foreign policy concept.  This concept has been 10
designed under consideration of the current challenges that Russia and the international 
community face. While the new concept still builds upon the previously established 
priorities it entails a clear move towards the consideration of more issues shared in the 
international environment (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European 
Union, 2013). Significantly, the document does not refer to the Cold War and its remnants 
of political interaction. But instead, at least in written form, the Russian government steps 
away from that recurring concept and focuses on the management of diverse global 
challenges mutually amplified through ‘cultural and civilisational diversity’ (Russian Foreign 
Ministry, 2013, Art. II.13). Interestingly the concept note highlights a lot of the political 
vocabulary commonly used by western actors, like soft power, multilateralism, and 
indivisibility of security. However, as scholars have demonstrated, the understanding of 
these terms differs crucially among governments which explains some of their varied 
actions (Monaghan, 2013, p.6f; Makarychev & Morozov, 2011, p.355). This calls for the 
need to commonly discuss and develop an understanding for political terms in order to 
enable the establishment of trust in political partnerships, specifically in the foreign and 
security policy sphere where sovereignty remains key for Russia. 
Significantly the policy development has been embedded in an increasingly tense period of 
events. The start of a newly tense time period in Russian domestic politics, as well as 
foreign and security policy, has been heralded with the elections in 2011/2012. The Duma 
elections as well as the presidential elections in 2011/2012 have given rise to strong 
discussions and protests, domestically as well as internationally. These have brought into 
question the exact democratic state of the Russian governance system. While some 
sources ascribe this to a minority of young activists, others debate whether Putin should 
pay more attention to the current societal developments. Two aspects are seen as 
important in this regard: firstly that the young generation of protestors knows a less 
restrictive Russian political system, and secondly, the rebuilding phase of the political 
 The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept can be found here: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/10
1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument
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system can no longer be used to hide the lack of addressing the strong societal welfare 
issues (Rukavishnikov, 2014, p.44).  
In the following, further upheaval has been fuelled through the implementation of the 
foreign agent law (2012) by Putin after his reelection as Russian President. This is a 
continuation of the NGO law that was first established in 2006. The initial law from 2006 
and its amendments in 2009, 2011, and 2012 have provided for increased monitoring of 
civil society activity in Russia. Thereby the Russian government is set to keep NGOs but to 
control developments in civil society as far as possible (Crotty, Hall & Ljubownikow, 2014, 
p.1254). 
Significantly, in foreign and security policy terms, tensions currently peak in the protests 
and discussions on the future of Ukraine (2013/2014), as well as the highly disputed 
annexation of the Crimea by Russia (2014) and the resulting violent disputes among pro-
Russian separatists and the Ukrainian military. Further developments in this tense situation 
need to be monitored closely. At this point the thesis will not provide a discussion of the 
situation as it wants to avoid premature statements. Moreover, the times of tension over 
the annexation of Crimea fall outside the timeframe of the research for this thesis. 
RUSSIA-EU COOPERATION
The dissolution of the SU represented a pivotal historical event with decisive effects for the 
foreign and security political structure of the world as a whole, but most importantly for that 
of the European continent. The end of the bipolar international system meant that there 
was the space and the need to establish new power-structures that guided interaction in 
the international sphere. Beyond that, the pressure was present to deal with the immediate 
effects of the radical change at the European continent. For western Europe (but also 
Russia) that meant that they were faced with a range of new direct neighbours who where 
previously declared ‘enemies’. Thus mutual investment had to be made on both parts in 
redefining and establishing relations with the respective other (Bordachev & Skriba, 2014, 
p.16). Former satellite states of the SU declared their independence and sought to reform 
their political systems. But also 14 states and regions that have previously been integrated 
in the SU bloc broke free and declared their independence. Moreover, the Russian 
Federation evolved from the ashes of the SU as its successor (Bordachev & Skriba, 2014, 
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p.16). And at the same time, the European Community was pushing forward to broaden its 
common external agenda (Nugent, 2003, pp.89f). On this asymmetric background a new 
political structure for the wider European sphere had to be developed. While defining and 
establishing relations with all countries, the EU and Russia have been developing a 
special relationship on the basis that they represent the two biggest powers  (one current 
and one former) on the European continent. This impression grew increasingly stronger 
over time, as the Central European countries turned towards the EU and NATO to join the 
West and avoid any possibility of being under high influence or even occupied by Russia. 
In these terms, Russia and the EU understood that their relation is an essential foundation 
for the provision of order, security and stability across the European continent.  
The development of the EU-Russia relations has been based on both, the remnants of the 
interaction between the European Community, its MSs and the SU, as well the newly 
developed dimensions and activities post Cold War. The beginning of their interaction was 
spend to negotiate ground-rules for their cooperation, while also re-ordering the European 
sphere and being exposed to an international process of re-structuring. Their first formal 
agreement to regulate their cooperation and the terms of interaction has been signed after 
long negotiation processes in 1994, namely the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA).  The PCA established the underlying structure to guide and encourage political 11
cooperation among Russia and the EU. Apart from guiding dialogue, the agreement has 
specifically been designed to regulate support for economic and democratic development 
(EUROPA, 2010). The PCA has often been perceived among Russians as being imposed 
on Russia, however research makes the case that both parties have driven a hard bargain. 
Thus by pushing stronger for cooperation particularly in trade aspects, Russia partly ‘self-
inflicted’ a more integrative agreement (Haukkala, 2015, p.28). However, already during 
the ratification process of the PCA the first serious problems occurred threatening their 
newly negotiated basis. The ratification process of the PCA was put on hold due to 
Russia’s first war with Chechnya starting in 1994. The conflict breached the agreement, as 
within the treaty it is referred to human rights and democracy to be upheld as conditionality 
of cooperation (see Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Article 2 and 107). While the 
EU put strong political pressure on Russia to end the conflict, the ultimate ratification of the 
 Russia and the EU signed the PCA in 1994 and it entered into force for the timeframe from 1997 until 11
2007. In the following it is automatically renewed for a year, if non of the parties announces otherwise in 
written form at least six months prior (see Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Article106, available at 
http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/partnership_and_cooperation_agreement_1997_english.pdf).
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PCA agreement with Russia undermined the persistence of a political portion of the treaty 
(Haukkala, 2000, p.8). The PCA entered into force in 1997 and was set up to run for ten 
years to begin with, though its duration is marked as indefinite. 
Just after the agreement entered into force, Russia’s economy collapsed in summer 1998 
and left little leeway for further trade integration, let alone a rapprochement of a common 
market. On this new background the EU MSs had to rethink their further relation and 
cooperative activities with Russia. At that point the EU MSs had already ratified a new 
policy instrument in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the so called Common Strategies. 
Based on this policy instrument the EU sought to harmonise the politics of European 
members states on shared issues. It also allowed efficiency in decision-taking and 
implementation in the CFSP, as once the common strategy had been adopted it enabled 
2nd tier decisions to be taken by qualified majority vote (Nugent, 2003, p.503). By summer 
1999 the EU put forward and agreed on the very first common position which concerned 
its strategy towards the Russian Federation. It encompassed four principal objectives (1. 
consolidation  of democracy and rule of law, 2. common economic and social space, 3. 
cooperation on security, 4. common challenges in common sphere) which were further 
outlined with areas of action, but did not put forward any concrete proposals for activities 
(Haukkala, 2000, p28). Russia felt by-passed, by the EU developing a common strategy 
without any consultations with the Russian government. Therefore the October 1999 
Russia-EU summit saw Prime minster Vladimir Putin putting forward Russia’s medium 
term strategy on the EU (Haukkala, 2010, p.33). This strategy presents Russia’s position 
and some of its intentions. It highlighted the importance that Russia attributes to its 
sovereignty, the recurrence of the great power status, a multipolar international system, 
and in that sense good EU-Russia relations that overcome NATO-centrism in Europe. First 
and foremost the speech showed that Russia did not want the EU to meddle with Russian 
affairs, especially if this infringes their sovereignty (Lynch, 2004, pp.103f).  
At the same time and beyond, the Kosovo conflict and the 2nd War between Russia and 
Chechnya provided for strong tensions among the EU and Russia. The EU strongly 
condemned Russian involvement in the Chechen War and on that basis cut its expenditure 
in support of Russian economic and democratic development (Allison, Light & White, 
2005, p.317f). However, the sanctions threatened by the EU to Russia where not put in 
place, and ultimately a few influential MSs decided to engage in interest-based interaction 
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with Russia, therewith practically revoking the ban on cooperation (Haukkala, 2015, p. 30, 
Haukkala, 2000, p.36f). 
The Feira Council in 2000 saw the reinstatement of EU-Russia cooperation on the basis of 
the concept of constructive engagement (Haukkala, 2010, pp.122ff). This developed into a 
two-pronged strategy of the EU, to cooperate for common benefits and simultaneously 
continue to criticise Russia for its non-alignment with the EU’s values. In a critical sense, 
this has been described as an attempt by the EU to try and cover the comparative 
concessions it had made to keep constructing further relations with Russia (Haukkala, 
2010, p. 124). Against this backdrop, in the early 2000s the two slowly converged again, 
recognising the significance of a good relationship in order to increase political and 
economic stability across wider Europe. From a foreign and security policy perspective 
Russia welcomed the EU’s progress on integration on CSDP matters. Russia engaged in 
the debate on wider European security, seeing the EU’s initiative as offsetting to NATO’s 
position in Europe. But the EU never planned to detach its security political affairs fully 
from NATO (Wight, Light & Löwenhardt, 2003, p.71). Simultaneously, the ‘big bang’ 
accession, including eight Central European countries, as well as the entry into force of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) put strain on EU-Russia relations. Russia saw 
these developments as a threat to its political and economic influence in its direct 
neighbourhood and in the European sphere (Kaczmarski & Smolar, 2007, p.4). To set the 
terms for their own cooperation with the EU, and distinguish its importance in relation to 
the ENP, Russia and the EU constructed the ‘Four Common Spaces’ as an enhanced 
framework of interaction, adding a more refined content to the PCA. These four spaces 
cover the range of mutual support on internal and external security, economics, and 
research (EU-Russia Summit, 2003; European Commission, 2005).  
While the following two years encompassed a time of progressive interaction 2007 saw 
another rise in tensions. Issues of dissent between the EU and Russia concerned the 
independence of Kosovo, the NATO Missile Defence Shield, and the questions about the 
renewal of the PCA. In addition several issues occurred among Russia and specific EU 
member states on a bilateral basis, including the ‘meat-ban’ issue with Poland, pipeline 
issues with Lithuania, minority issues with Estonia and Latvia, as well as the dispute 
concerning trans-Siberian flights (Light, 2008, p. 8f; Stent, 2008, p.1099). While the parties 
agreed in mid-2008 to pick up negotiations on a renewed PCA, discussions have been put 
on hold abruptly due to the war between Russia and Georgia, which cooled the relations 
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off strongly in 2008. The discussions regarding the PCA have since reopened but led to no 
re-instigation of the PCA from 1997, instead the PCA is extended on a yearly basis (on the 
basis of Article 106 which requires written notice at least six month ahead if a party wants 
to leave the agreement) (Drent, 2012, p.9). 
  
In the same timeframe, a further process has been instigated to discuss foreign and 
security political cooperation in wider Europe. Russia’s newly elected president Medvedev 
proposed a dialogue on the pan-European security architecture in early June 2008, 
deeming that Europe suffers from security deficits and that existing frameworks and 
organisations have so far proven inadequate to deal with those (Klein, 2009, p. 6f; Lo, 
2009, p.1f; Layton, 2014, p.2). In his proposal to promote integration with the EU in 
modern ways that leave aside disagreements which have lead relations to a dead-end (like 
the heavy involvement of the US in European security affairs), Medvedev has been 
provided with strong expertise by the Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) 
under Yurgens (Yurgens, 2008). Medvedev’s specific proposal on security political 
integration was eyed carefully at international level, as it was seen to propose a 
replacement of existing structures, and set out to redefine the roles of involved actors. 
After the conflict between Russia and Georgia cooled down the relations between Russia 
and the West (August 2008), Medvedev picked up the dialogue again. It was first 
discussed in the frame of the OSCE foreign ministers meeting in Helsinki (December 
2008). Thereafter it was picked up by the Greek chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009 and 
made part of the Corfu Process, which was seen as an initiative to build trust and promote 
further dialogue. From there it was taken forward by the chairmanship of Kazakhstan who 
initiated regular meetings that led to the Astana conference (December 2010) at which a 
commitment for a common framework of action was to be decided (OSCE, 2010b). In 
further meetings on strengthening security cooperation the Helsinki+40 decision has been 
launched (2013), which proposes that the idea of a pan-European security community is 
carried forward and strengthened among OSCE members until 2015 (which marks 4 
decades since the Helsinki Act has been agreed) (OSCE, 2013, p.1). This process has 
been gravely undermined by the Ukraine crisis. In this regard the seminars surrounding 
the Helsinki+40 anniversary have resulted in the finding that: 
  
‘Unfortunately, the entire Decalogue of Principles has been broken during 
the Ukraine crisis. The damage that has been done may be irreparable and 
the OSCE, even if it does survive, will emerge in a greatly diminished form 
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unless all participating States reconfirm the relevance […].’ (OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, 2015, p.3) 
Moreover, 2010 saw a further agreement on a broad scale to enhance cooperation 
specifically between the EU and Russia namely through the Partnership for Modernisation 
(P4M). This has been set up to provide the EU-Russia relations with new momentum. It 
focuses on economic and institutional reform, but also aims to increase dialogue across 
civil society (Council of the European Union, 2010; ENP, 2014). In this regard it has 
promoted ongoing dialogue across a broad range of topical areas, in the absence of a 
renewed PAC agreement or specific roadmaps. In terms of foreign and security politics, it 
has specifically contributed to the Common Space of Freedom Security and Justice by 
promoting a discussion on facilitated freedom of movement, as well as increased 
cooperation among Russia and respectively Eurojust and Europol to fight terrorism, 
money-laundering, and other transnational crime (Larionova, 2014, p.71f). While the 
Ukraine crisis is a major set-back to this partnership, it remains to be seen how the 
framework of the P4M can be reset or followed up on, dependent on how the partnership 
is carried forward in the future (Flenley, 2014, p.14). 
Another small initiative in foreign and security policy terms, is the development of 
cooperation on member state basis in so far as a Russian-Polish-German trialogue has 
been initiated in 2009 (OSCE, 2010; Das Auswärtige Amt, 2011, Valdai, 2012). However, 
this is purely a consultative measure, which has no structured format or schedule. 
All these steps towards interaction did not overcome overall stagnation and resistance on 
the basis of old stumbling-block issues, paired with mutual disappointment as well as a 
lack of interest in foreign and security political interaction. Therefore, over the last four 
years differences among the EU and Russia have grown stronger again. Politically the EU 
still sees itself as the example for others and promotes the need to adopt the EU’s value 
and norm system. This is a point of view that Russia opposes strongly (Danilov, 2012, p.
23; Light, 2008, p.22). At the same time the EU is still busy dealing with the economic 
crisis, which implies a limited focus on the external environment. On the other hand, talk 
about fraud at the Russian Duma elections and the Presidential elections gave rise to 
strong discussions and protests-internationally as well as in Russia- regarding the exact 
democratic state of the Russian governance system. This has been further fuelled through 
the implementation of the foreign agent law (2012) by Putin after his reelection as Russian 
President. This further strengthens the NGO law from 2006 (amended 2009, 2011) to 
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increase oversight of the civil society development (Crotty, Hall & Ljubownikow, 2014, p.
1254). However, the situation currently peaks in the protests and discussions on the future 
of Ukraine, as well as the highly disputed annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the 
resulting violent disputes among pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian military. As the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) states:  
‘The Russian Federation's role in the Ukraine conflict has seriously affected 
EU-Russia relations. Consequently, some of the [cooperative] activities […] 
are at a halt and sanctions have been adopted’ (EEAS, 2014). 
‘The EU also remains ready to reverse its decisions and reengage with 
Russia when it starts contributing actively and without ambiguities to finding 
a solution to the Ukrainian crisis’ (EUROPA, 2014). 
This conflict has damaged EU-Russia relations seriously and shows that former 
cooperation has failed to lead them towards a partnership, thus a new basis for interaction 
needs to be set up. There are only small signs for the EU’s and Russia’s ongoing interest 
in engaging with each, as for example in an unofficial EU-Russia summit at the EU-Asia 
summit in October 2014. After cancelling the biannual EU-Russia summits as well as any 
bilateral between EU member states and Russia, this multilateral setting allowed for a few 
bilateral as well as a EU-Russia meeting.  Among the various positions of the parties 12
present at the meeting no steps of rapprochement have been taken. In this sense, it was 
much more a minor diplomatic activity. Moreover it served for the agreement of a further 
unofficial meeting encompassing a broad range of world leaders for January 2015 
(Rettman, 2014). The developments in this regard are highly tense and have to be 
monitored further in much more detail, in order to be able to get a comprehensive 
understanding of interaction among Russia and the EU for the specific period. However, 
the discussion of this situation lies outside the frame of the thesis at hand, as the scope of 
data collection does not include this period. 
 This meeting was indeed not a full EU-Russia summit but took place in a simplified format with the 12
presence of both the Russian and the Ukrainian presidents, as well as officials from the EU, France, the 
UK, Germany and Italy. 
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Russia and EU Member States 
To enable a comprehensive picture of EU-Russia relations an important point to be made 
is the diversity among EU MSs and the respective role of bilateral relations with Russia. 
The increased interest of some EU MSs for EU-Russia cooperation (and vice versa) is 
generally mentioned in the context of Russia preferring to deal with states on a bilateral 
basis. Some argue that this is based on their principle of state-centrism (Kratochvil, 2008, 
p.411). Others add to this by considering that the EU is an exceptional, non-transparent 
and inconvenient format to deal with from a Russian perspective. Also, Russia’s 
acceptance of the EU as a partner has not overcome the issue that its foreign and security 
policy remains intergovernmental (Interviewee A). Building upon this, the biggest difficulty 
that presents itself on both sides is that Russia’s relation to the different EU MSs is of such 
a varied nature, that a comprehensive policy toward the EU proves difficult to establish 
(Interviewee A, Interviewee B).  
The frame of this thesis does not allow us to engage with the depth of the body of literature 
that covers each of the complex bilateral relations that Russia keeps with various EU MSs. 
However, it is still necessary to sketch some of the relations here, in order to present the 
broad variety in which Russia must perceive this range of actors which are summed up in 
the format of the EU. Therefore the following paragraphs outline the essence of Russian 
relations with several EU MSs, in order to emphasise the variety. It must be emphasised 
that (as described above) the relations of EU MSs with Russia are currently highly reduced 
due to the Ukraine crisis. Further developments in this tense phase will have to be 
observed.  
While most European states have strong economic relations with Russia, a good few also 
rely on Russian energy supply to a varying degree. Thus in one way or another most EU 
MSs are involved in pragmatic relations with Russia (Boersma, 2013, p.1). At the same 
time however, historic and political context have generated discrepancies regarding the 
status of each bilateral relation. Germany is the forerunner among the EU MSs in 
cooperating with Russia. They have close economic, political, cultural and social ties, and 
are connected through long-term historic ties (Westphal, 2008, p.106). Since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union the two of them slowly evolved among the key players in 
the pan-European political sphere. The relationship between the two has been steady, 
although a range of conflicts have cooled it down for periods of time. The important issues 
for the German government is to balance its progression in cooperation with Russia 
against its aim to foster consensus and integration in the EU. Thus while in some cases it 
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can try and guide EU policy towards Russia based on its interest in the relationship or it 
may decide to go it alone, it still needs to be careful enough not to damage the trust in 
solidarity among the EU member states (Timmins, 2011, p.197).  
In contrast, some of the CEE countries have much more difficult relations with Russia. 
When Poland and other previous satellite states of the SU entered the EU, this put a strain 
on EU-Russia relations. Their recent history of occupation and oppression by the Soviet 
Union meant that the country looked for stronger integration with the EU and NATO. These 
countries forming the EU’s border towards Russia looked to make sure that Russia could 
not gain a dominant impact on them (Copsey & Pomorska, 2010, p.312). On their 
accession to the EU, Russia demanded to debate new circumstances for formalised EU-
Russia relations, as it did not agree with the impact the new MSs may have on EU-Russia 
relations (Light, 2008, Makarychev, 2008, p.25). On that basis, Poland’s relations with 
Russia have been problematic (Andrzej, 2010, p.24). Further strain has been put onto it 
through the establishment of visas for Russian citizens, the US anti-missile defence shield, 
the Nord Stream pipeline, several economic issues including the meat-ban in 2007, and 
the August war with South Ossetia in 2008 which was followed by more precise 
agreements with the US regarding the missile-defence shield (Stent, 2008, p.1099). Since, 
Poland has taken steps towards closer cooperation with Russia, participating in the 
Russian-Polish-German trialogue. It seeks to establish itself as one of the leading EU 
actors in guiding relations with Russia (DGAP, 2014, 2013; IFSH, 2012, p.8). 
The Baltic States acceded to the EU at the same time as Poland. Their relations with the 
Russian Federation are impacted by the recent historic burden of their occupation and 
incorporation by the SU. While they looked to enter the EU and NATO as a protective 
measure, particularly the EU turned out to be more incoherent than expected in terms of 
policy development. While Estonia’s relations with Russia have improved after the EU 
accession, relations of Lithuania and Latvia with Russia still remain strained. The issues 
with Russia that remain since the dissolution of the SU are on the one hand the highly 
delicate subjects of minorities as well as border security (Galbreath & Lašas 2011, p.261). 
On the other hand the heavy reliance on Russia in terms of energy supply and energy 
transit make the Baltic States vulnerable to potential arbitrariness on parts of Russia. Over 
time the Baltic States have uploaded their issues with Russia to the EU level at different 
occasions. For them a comprehensive EU-Russia policy will need to consider the specific 
position of the Baltic States (Grigas, 2012, p.3). 
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Finally, the UK’s relationship with Russia is stretched in a number of areas. A primary issue 
is the UK’s strong transatlantic ties, which lead on the one hand to mistrust and on the 
other hand it involved the EU in issues between Russia and the US. Factors that 
heightened tensions were on the one hand the wars in Kosovo, Iraq and Georgia. On the 
other hand the 2006 death of Alexander Litvinenko as well as mutual accusations about 
the use of spies have also meant relations deteriorated (David, 2011, p.205). From 2010, 
the relation did experience at small reset with the decision of the UK to draw a line under 
the Litvinenko affair, and to focus on economic ties between the two countries. However, 
there are concerns that this will be set back with the UK Government decision in July 2014 
to open an inquiry into Mr Litvinenko’s death (Monaghan, 2014). Nevertheless, David 
(2011, p.202) points out that in the case of the UK and Russia bilateral relations do not 
only bring more difficulties for interaction at the EU level. Instead they offer another 
channel to handle interaction, thus mitigating the potential of there being a negative impact 
on EU-Russia relations. 
In its latest foreign policy concept from 2013, the Russian government states that it looks 
to ‘boost mutually beneficial relations with Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
other European states, as a considerable resource for advancing Russia's national 
interests in European and world affairs’. Moreover it also mentions to seek a possibility to 
re-instate relations with the UK (Russian Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, Section IV.60). 
How far this will take place and under what terms is to be seen. As mentioned above, in 
the light of the Ukraine crisis the relations between EU MSs and Russia are currently 
phased down and need to be observed further. 
Inferences 
What becomes clear when outlining the development of EU-Russia relations, even in 
slightly broader terms, is an alternation of rapprochement and disagreement. Though they 
both acknowledged the need to engage in dialogue in order to enhance stability and 
prosperity across wider Europe, they did not find a common way. While establishing an 
agreement on cooperation as early as 1994, they have not been able to construct a stable, 
reliable and growing partnership. Throughout the literature this is primarily attributed to two 
factors: first, their respective strong adherence to a number contradictory political 
principles, and second (resulting from the former) often one-sided proposals for 
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cooperation structures (Allison, Light & White, 2006). The former is based on their differing 
set-up and development which influences their existent policies and the understanding of 
their role in the international system. On the one hand is the EU, which acknowledges the 
importance of cooperation with Russia to stabilise security and economics across wider 
Europe. But due to its strong principles on liberal democracy and human rights it pushes 
Russia to adopt European rules and values. In the EU’s eyes that would mean that Russia 
turn to become a ‘developed’ country with a democracy based on the Western prototype 
(Averre, 2009, p.1798). In the EU’s opinion this is a necessary step to optimise interaction 
among the two. On the other hand is Russia, which bases its political activities on the 
principles of state centrism, military force, great power status, ideological uniqueness, and 
international pluralism (counter NATO-centrism in Europe (Kratochvíl, 2008, p.417f, Lynch, 
2004, pp.103f). This represents strong adherence to the principle of sovereignty in foreign 
politics and clear limits to the Europeanisation of Russian politics. In defining their politics 
along these opposing principles, they set an intricate framework in which they can define 
agreements. 
The latter issue practically emerges from this application of opposing principles and 
expectations outlined above. The EU primarily criticises Russia for its opposition to 
democratisation along European lines and its records in securing human rights. It finds 
that these do not meet the standards that it expects from its partners. Thus, in order for 
cooperation to be successful, the EU urges Russia to adopt its norms and values. 
Speaking down from their ivory tower they highlight the significance of the contested 
issues and pay less attention to positive developments (Danilov, 2012, p.23). On that basis 
it puts forward one-sided cooperation structures that ask for Russian approval of EU 
norms and values (Allison, Light & White, 2006, Haukkala, 2015, p.26). Although it must be 
underlined, that due to its format as a community of member states the EU has less 
leeway in its negotiations with external entities. However, the attempt to base cooperation 
on a one-sided system is not a viable option when seeking to establish a stable and equal 
partnership. In this regard, it is highly questionable on what basis the EU aims to establish 
and enforce common values in its relations to Russia and other neighbouring countries. 
Consisting of 28 member states, it is impossible to develop and implement a truly common 
set of values within the EU itself (Leino & Petrov, 2009, p.659). Thus it proves even more 
difficult to extend these to a range of highly varying neighbours and partners. 
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These difficulties have been recognised and expressed by the Russian government in the 
majority of cooperative decisions, and are to some degree stated in the latest documents 
on foreign policy by Russia. In Putin’s decree on foreign policy as presented in May 2012, 
the need for an equal partnership based on mutual benefits is specifically highlighted. 
Moreover, the cooperative efforts shall represent more of Russia’s interests, which have 
been thought to be compromised in too many places beforehand. ‘[…] [T]his implies that 
Russia considers that it is no longer willing to bargain for 'imaginary benefits’ -a 
recalcitrance yet to be accepted (or not) by the EU’ (Chirkova, 2012, p.4). However, it 
needs to be highlighted that until 2013 Russia still showed interest in retaining and 
strengthening the relations with the EU. In the latest Russian Foreign Policy Concept it 
identifies itself as  an ‘integral and inseparable part of European civilisation’. On that basis 
it demonstrates its interest in promoting foreign and security policy as well as economic 
interaction. Throughout it specifically points out that both partners need to play an equal 
part in taking decisions and ensuring their implementation (Russian Foreign Policy 
Concept, 2013, Section IV. 57, 58 & 59). 
Before the turning point of the Ukraine crisis, recent literature has discussed two rather 
new phenomena that did at that point deserve more attention, enabling further 
perspectives. One aspect that became visible was the increased similarity of vocabulary 
between Russia and the EU, although both of them ascribe their very own meaning to the 
terms. The 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept is the first to include terms like soft 
power, multilateralism and indivisibility of security. Although these terms are common, the 
vocabulary is not based on the same understanding. Therefore there is room for increased 
dialogue (Monaghan, 2013, p.6f; Makarychev & Morozov, 2011, p.355). It is important to 
underline that the EU and Russia are not the only actors who diverge regarding the 
content of such broad terms.  
A further debate that emphasises the multi-layered character of their relationship is the 
reconsideration of the predominant emphasis on a normative dispute. While the majority of 
the literature on EU-Russia relations refers to the predominance of normative challenges 
in cooperation among the two, the EU’s approach of constructive engagement, and recent 
Russian considerations of normative aspects in their foreign policy show that the two do 
not necessarily stand for purely normative or pragmatic positions (Haukkala, 2009, p.1770; 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, Section II.9, 13 & 20). On that basis, Casier argues 
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that discussions purely based on a normative dispute are not sufficient to understand the 
difficulties in their relations. In deconstructing the policy papers, statements and behaviour 
he identifies a rather more pragmatic and interest driven policy by the EU, embedded in 
debates on normative considerations. On the other hand, he highlights the increasing 
number of Russian statements of a normative nature, although this is not necessarily 
converted in the conduction of its foreign policy (Casier, 2013, p.1385). This demonstrates 
that a further deconstruction of the policies and their origin is needed in order to 
understand cooperation under exclusion of the preconceived normative narrative. This 
recent debate highlights that some policy does not correspond naturally with the common 
narrative of strong normative differences at the core of the dispute recurring in the outline 
of literature above. It highlights that EU-Russia cooperation cannot be understood as 
dispute with clear and concise oppositions, instead cooperation consists of a set of layered 
spheres which shape the narrative. 
However, as mentioned above, the Ukraine crisis has seriously damaged EU-Russia 
relations and shows that former engagement in cooperative activities has failed to lead 
them towards a genuine partnership. 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
In outlining the theoretical and empirical context of the thesis, this chapter represents the 
foundation on which the upcoming research is constructed. The first section discusses 
increased deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues and establishes the need 
to look at cross-border interaction to strengthen our understanding of actors’ capacities to 
operate and cooperate in the transnational sphere. Moreover, the section defines the need 
to study non- and quasi-governmental actors who constantly rise in numbers and have 
long been identified as crucial source of information for both the political and the public 
sphere. Building on the acceptance of the significance of expertise, the subsequent 
discussion on the power of knowledge establishes that the thesis understands the 
underlying structure/agency nexus following Bourdieu’s approach (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170; 
Wacquant, 2004, p.318). Thus the adopted meta-theory describing cooperation between 
structure and agency acknowledges that the continuous interplay of the two represents 
their strength. This helps the analysis of cooperation among EU-based and Russian 
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research institutes working on foreign and security policy. It allows to trace the discourse 
that guides cooperation. 
The section outlining the empirical context of EU-Russia relations in foreign and security 
policy primarily establishes that both of them have several shared issues, but they 
developed different approaches to deal with them (Danilov, 2012, p.23f). While the 
labelling of their foreign and security politics slowly grows similar, the interpretation and 
implementation still differs. In a nutshell, the EU aims to foster multilateralism, the 
legitimacy of international law, a leading role of the UN in decisions regarding international 
security and strengthened capacities for peace keeping and peace enforcement 
(European Council, 2003, p.9). Thus, the strength of the EU as an entity lies rather in soft 
power and the drive to prevent violent disputes such as high-end combat operations. 
However, it must be recognised that the EU is not a unitary actor. Thus the development of 
its policies depends on the discourse among its MSs under consideration of their 
integration in the EU institutions, as well as on the respective domestic interest in the 
present propositions.  
While Russia’s policy also commonly highlights its aim to strengthen a multilateral system 
with the UN being the central international organisation, next to that it focuses on its return 
to being a great power and increase its regional influence in the near abroad. Therein it 
builds upon authoritative and more nationalist political approaches with a strong military 
that ensures the security and integrity of the nation and its sovereignty. While EU-Russia 
relations over the last two and half decades are described as a continuous up and down, 
they rather stagnated over the last seven years and currently find an extreme low-point in 
their stand-off over the Ukraine crisis. As the discussion demonstrated, the inherent 
problem in their relationship is the contradiction between the differing political standpoints 
and interests which are embedded in a broader debate on respect and equality. However, 
attention must be paid in further research to be cautious about the utilisation of the link 
between normative differences and disputes. The EU is not an absolute normative actor 
but also driven by interests and pragmatism. In the same manner, Russia is not an 
absolute pragmatic actor, but increasingly exposes normative aspects in its policy 
(Monaghan, 2013, p.6f; Casier, 2013, p.1385). Instead, further deconstruction of the 
policies of both the EU and Russia is needed without relying on the preconceived 
normative arguments. 
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Chapter Four builds upon this by entering into the empirical research on cooperation 
among public policy research institutes. It introduces the organic development of Russian 
and EU-based research institutes and subsequently differentiates between various types 
of research institutes among the variables of level of governance, affiliation and output. It 
then moves on to outline the opportunities, processes and challenges of transnational 
cooperation among research institutes in wider Europe as perceived by staff of research 
institutes. Thus, it first introduces the narratives on cooperation, which are afterwards 
compared to the narrative provided by conducted cooperative activities, as well as the 
narrative of EU-Russia cooperation in high politics (see Chapter Six). 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CHAPTER 4 - PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 
INSTITUTES ACROSS WIDER EUROPE
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, research on transnational cooperation in foreign and 
security policy between the EU and Russia has so far been focused on interaction among 
governments, as well as the role of international organisations in strengthening 
cooperation (Drent, 2012; Danilov, 2012; Averre, 2009; Fernandes, 2014). What it lacks, 
however, is a consideration of the contribution of the increasing number of non-and quasi 
governmental actors, that generate and provide knowledge while providing a new range of 
measures and channels in an increasingly multilevel and de-territorialised international 
environment. This thesis examines specifically the role of public policy research institutes 
which represent a type of non- and -quasi governmental actor with an authoritative claim to 
knowledge.  These have been identified in the transnationalist literature as important 13
contributors to the policy environment (Keohane & Nye, 1971, p.332; Haas, 1992, p.16).  
This Chapter adds to our understanding of the tools and capacities that public policy 
research institutes possess to operate and cooperate at the increasingly significant 
transnational level. It supplies and analyses vital insights regarding the organic 
development of research institutes in the EU as well as in Russia with a focus on security 
politics. This enables the identification of different types of research institutes, and the 
nature and dynamics of their work including their varying goals, measures and channels. 
Subsequently, the dynamics of cooperation among European and Russian institutes is 
explored critically, highlighting opportunities and challenges. This allows for an 
understanding of their work in the transnational sphere and their potential to contribute to 
transnational cooperation regarding foreign and security policy issues.  
 A definition for public policy research institutes as understood in this thesis is introduced in Chapter Two.13
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RESEARCH INSTITUTES ACROSS WIDER EUROPE
ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU
When looking at the organic development of research institutes in the EU, we can 
establish that the development of research institutes is more commonly conceptualised as 
the development of think tanks. The first think tanks in Europe and America developed as 
early as in the first half of the 1800s. Among the first organisations referred to in this 
context are the Royal United Services Institution (1831), the Fabian Society (1884), and 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910) (RUSI, 2014; Fabian Society, 
2014, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014). Present-day public policy 
research institutes with a specific focus on foreign and security policy are identified to have 
their roots in Institutes of International Affairs (IIAs) that were set up in the early 1920s. 
The first two IIAs have been Britain and US based, namely the Royal institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House) and the American Institute of International Affairs 
(now Council of Foreign Relations) (Parma, 2004, p.19). This puts an anglo-american 
stamp on the nature of the process, which is inflicted even more by the aspect that the 
term ‘think tank’ has been framed in World War Two and has later been adopted by the 
anglo-american sphere of policy research. However, this perspective cannot be adopted 
as sufficient description of research institutes in these days (Stone, 2007, p.261). 
Interrelated to this, a great deal of the literature deals exhaustively with the development of 
think tanks in the US, and to a small extent with the work of think tanks in the UK 
(Medvetz, 2012; Pautz, 2011; McGann & Weaver, 2000; Kandiah & Seldon, 1996). Beyond 
that, the literature generally concerns two strands of questions: first, the policy impact of 
think tanks, and their contribution to democratisation (e.g. Selee, 2013; Abelson, 2002; 
Pautz, 2012; McGann, 2010). The second range of questions deals with the 
transnationalisation of research and the review of policy networks (Eilstrupp-Sangiovanni, 
2014; McGann & Sabatini, 2011; Krahman, 2010, Stone, 2008). Instead the 
comprehensive literature on the history of think tanks and research institutes is rather 
limited to a few volumes. For this reason the work ‘Think Tank Traditions: Policy Analysis 
Across Nations’ by Stone and Denham (2004) is used as a primary reference in this 
section on the history of research institutes in Europe.  14
 This is not the case for the section on Russian think tanks, where a slightly wider literature was available in 14
addition to some of the interviews with Russian researchers conducted for the thesis at hand. 
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The initial growth of research institutes was inspired by the recognition of social changes 
pairing industrialisation and urbanism with women’s movements and working class 
movements. It led the British and US governments to instigate scientific examination 
regarding the social change and societal interest in political progress (Parma, 2004, p.20). 
At the peace conference of the victors of the First World War in Paris politicians from the 
UK and US discussed the establishment of a common public policy research institute with 
a branch each in Britain and the US. The research institutes were meant to inform policy 
making through research based information, and to understand and develop public views 
and consensus towards government policies. However, the overwhelming political opinion 
in Britain and the US was not supportive of a common and collaborative institute. Thus 
they each developed one by themselves consisting of policy experts, lawyers, journalists 
and the like, but without establishing inherent links to the likeminded institute across the 
ocean. 
Their major responsibilities in the early years were to conduct policy research and analysis 
for their governments in the Second World War, and to take a role as unofficial diplomats 
for their countries (Parma, 2004, p.21). As the overview above shows, this first group of 
research institutes was state-based, and emerged from elite-led processes which aimed to 
drive political consensus as well as societal understanding and support. Subsequently 
other IIAs and public policy research institutes developed following the example of the first 
two to some extent. However, it must be recognised that they all evolved in different 
conditions of culture, society, governmental system, and historical heritage. This explains 
differences in forms, goals, measures and ultimately different types and degrees of impact. 
Moreover, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of the cause for establishing a 
research institute in relation to its shape as well as its output. Thus, by determining the 
underlying cause for the construction of a research institute in relation to its size, its 
affiliation, its funding sources, its network(s) as well as the type of tasks it performs, 
enables one to understand the way it works and what it wants to accomplish. 
Scholarship determined that a second wave of increased establishment of research 
institutes started in 1945. While this boost was more considerable in terms of numbers and 
wider geography, the institutes were commonly affiliated to their domestic government, for 
reasons of funding and due to a heavily domestic audience of their information and advice. 
Transnational cooperation has not been a visible characteristic of their work in those times 
(Stone, 2004a, p.35; Stone, 2000, p.192; Haas, 2002, p.6). This emphasises that the 
development of research institutes in the security political sphere was bound to the 
sovereignty and power of the nation states. Therein it also reflected the fundamental 
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perception in security politics of threats being directed towards nation states and security 
being enforced through use of force and weapons towards (an)other nation state(s).  
The third and so far final wave has been identified by heavily increasing transnational 
cooperation among research institutes from the 1970s onwards, often in bilateral or 
regional terms (Stone, 2000, p.193). The strong increase in transnational activity can be 
justified by evolving political space through increased interaction of nation states in 
international fora, the diminishing sovereignty of nation states, and the simultaneously 
increasing impact of subnational actors and regional entities. Thus international fora like 
the WTO, the UN, the G8 and the EU gained in importance and became a new focal point 
for think tanks’ attention. In the EU this process has been particularly strong due to its 
comparatively integrative framework (Boucher et al., 2004, p.9f). However, this must be 
understood under recognition of reciprocity. Research institutes work hard to take up their 
space, to use it, to defend it and if possible to widen it. The restructuring of the security 
political sphere in Europe offers them opportunities, but the research institutes are (as any 
other actor) responsible for perceiving chances and receiving access. After all research 
institutes are in competition with fellow institutes and other actors for political space 
(Boucher et al., 2004, p.9f; Stone, 2004, p.15). Thus while interaction improves 
progression, research institutes must be careful to be a partner or a leading entity in 
cooperation in order to be able to establish themselves, their idea or their project at the 
centre of debate. In this context, networked cooperation is a tool that needs to be applied 
resourcefully.  
This reflects what we find nowadays in Europe, where foreign and security policy research 
institutes evolve and act in a networked system (Boucher et al., 2004, p.10). This includes 
a predominant amount of institutes being based at nation state level, and in addition 
several institutes have occurred at EU level (CEPS , EPC ). But also the institutes 15 16
constructed within specific nation states do not solely focus on their domestic policy and 
audience. Instead they are heavily involved in transnational interaction with other research 
institutes (at EU as well as nation state level) (Cross, 2013, p.139f). They accept the broad 
reach of foreign and security policy issues which is not limited by state borders. In this 
context, they conduct their research, and gather and spread information under the 
consideration of the overlapping transnational, regional and/or global policy spheres, as 
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well as a wider audience. Therein, either their research projects are designed at a 
transnational level to start with, or, more often, they conduct research with regard to their 
domestic perceptions and premises in order to then exchange viewpoints and develop 
informed opinions regarding similarities as well as opposing positions (Interviewee R; 
Interviewee C). It must be kept in mind as well, that apart from cooperation with fellow 
research institutes, the centres also cooperate with different types of actors, like civil 
society groups, governments and economic entities. The balance of their interactive 
activities is strongly connected to the nature of the research institutes and particularly their 
affiliation, which in turn influences their range of access to information and policy 
processes alike. Research institutes might be affiliated to governments or political parties, 
they might be based at universities, or be non-governmental in nature, others conduct 
contracted research. 
The strong recognition of a transnational reach of foreign and security policy issues and 
the simultaneous extension of networks, leads slowly but surely to the establishment of a 
transnational research sphere, including new methodological and theoretical foci as well 
as vital changes regarding input and output of involved researchers and institutes (Cross, 
2013, p.139). Methodological approaches must be able to deal with a growing range of 
comprehensiveness and a wider scope that research spans, while guaranteeing efficiency 
and resourcefulness at the same time. Beyond that there is a strong need to broaden the 
range of available statistics to suitable scopes, to subnational and regional level. 
Theoretical approaches need to move away from a nation state focus and concern more 
fundamental and inherent abstract understandings that are not territorialised. In this 
context, the last two decades have shown an increased turn towards security political 
theories that focus on interaction and the inherent discourse, encompassing 
constructivism, post-structuralism and postmodernism (Wendt, 1999, p.1; Goldstein & 
Peevehouse, 2008, p.96f; Wacquant, 2004, p.318). In terms of input and output, the 
research institutes need to consider but also use the increased scope of information, data 
and audience which is not only available, but also has to be taken into account to improve 
their structural positioning. Thus they need to adjust the scope of their work and redefine 
their aims in order to accommodate the changed opportunities for them and expectations 
of them. 
A special impact for European research institutes is the unique status of European 
integration, as an ever closer economic and political union heavily promotes an interactive 
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environment (Boucher et al., 2004, p.10). Due to the relevance of EU level agreements 
and policies that its MSs constructed and/or joined in with, interaction at EU level is by now 
an intrinsic characteristic in the political sphere of the MSs. The EU heavily promotes 
research and works to establish a European Research Area (ERA) (European 
Commission, 2014e). The ERA was endorsed by the March 2000 European Council, and 
is anchored in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (European Research Agency, 2014). Therein, the 
MSs agreed to push ahead with research in order to ensure the wellbeing of their citizens 
as well as deal with the increasing complexity of policy areas and cost, while enhancing 
accountability based on expertise. Thus the EU seeks to constitute concerted approaches 
in furthering and developing research across all policy areas, and to link the self-contained 
entities existing so far, also across political levels and various disciplines (European 
Commission, 2012). Most significantly the EU contributes funding to enable and facilitate 
research and educational projects. The funding through the EUs' framework programs 
increased continuously over the last three decades. Although, it must also be recognised 
that the time frame broadened over the years. As the budgetary overviews of the last three 
decades show, the funding for the categories ‘ideas’ and ‘capacity’ started out small in 
comparison, but they increased especially the category ‘ideas’. This reflects a commitment 
by the EU and its MSs to promote research development. The category ‘security’ was 
always among the lower ones, but it has also been growing steadily, the budget from 2007 
having been tripled until 2013 (European Commission, 2013). While the EU seeks to 
develop an interactive and transnational research area, funding opportunities, particularly 
under conditionality of cross-border projects, provide a good incentive (Boucher et al., 
2004, p.10).  
In the multinational EU, different levels of research institutes exist. The EU has its own 
advisory groups generating in-house research. Beyond that research institutes exist at EU 
level but outside the EU as an organisation, and the majority of research institutes has 
been established at MS level. An example of in-house research is the Bureau of European 
Policy Advisers (BEPA) which in turn consists of several expert groups. At European 
regional level, but outside the EU institutions one can find Brussels based institutes like 
the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the European Policy Centre (EPC). 
But one can also find other transnational institutes across Europe that are explicitly based 
in a variety of states like the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). However, 
most research institutes are found to have been established within a specific nation state. 
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While the majority of security political research institutes are established within a particular 
nation state, the highly integrative structure of the EU ensures proximity with other 
research institutes. Although the institutes are settled in their domestic environment, 
catering for a domestic audience, they all work under consideration of EU policy. Among 
the research institutes in the EU, typical types and structures developed over time 
according to each of the MS’s own development. Following the recognition that the EU is a 
transnational entity in itself, these differences are significant in understanding the potential 
for cross-border cooperation among the institutes. In the following paragraphs a few 
examples are outlined briefly to present an impression of the differences. However, these 
examples are not exhaustive and need to be outlined more comprehensively within the 
specific case study on cooperation among research institutes in Chapter Five in 
accordance with the research institutes present in the case.  
The UK as described above, has been leading in establishing research institutes in the 
topical realm of foreign and security policy, Chatham House being the first one in Europe. 
On the basis of early action and cooperation between the US and the UK institutes, a 
characteristic anglo-american conception formed. This anglo-american conception 
provided a basis for the development of numerous research institutes around the globe 
(Williams, 2008, p.53). In terms of engaging with its integration in the European Union, the 
UK developed a number of specific think tanks as well as using networks to promote 
collaborative research, and beyond that to concur actively to the European policy making 
in a multi-level environment (Ullrich, 2004, p.58). The main institutes dealing with 
European affairs encompass the rather progressive Centre for European Reform (CER) 
and the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) who have a drive to contribute actively to debates 
regarding European integration and EU policy. On the other hand are the traditional 
nationalists like the Federal Trust for Education and Research, for whom the EU is one 
topic amongst many about which they seek to promote and influence an informed public 
debate (Ullrich, 2004, p.59). 
In Germany, the development of research institutes has been strongly hampered by the 
two great wars and the Nazi regime. Therefore research institutes only really emerged 
after the Second World War. The majority is affiliated to the government (both levels of 
German government: one half Länder, one half Bund) to some degree through contract 
funding or because they are party foundations (Braml, 2006, p.26). At the same time, 
many German institutes are affiliated with universities. However they all look for contracted 
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research opportunities as a third source of income. Beyond that German advocacy 
institutes, which are more typical for the anglo-american sphere, are growing in numbers 
slowly but surely (Thunert, 2004, p.76f). A specificity for the German research community 
is the prominent role of party foundations who are neither official nor semi-official, but 
conduct highly funded research and educational events on the basis of fundamental 
concepts of the parties all over Europe and beyond (Thunert, 2006, p.193). Research on 
European Integration has been promoted in particular since the early 2000s in times of 
dispute regarding deeper security political integration of the EU, as well as of the 
accession of a group of ten foremostly Central and Eastern European states. In the same 
manner foreign and security policy research has been promoted along the critical junctures 
of the War in Kosovo as well as the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London. 
Thus, a strong focus on the international sphere has been established, and is 
strengthened along the lines of more recent critical junctures (Thunert, 2006, p.198). 
Interestingly the French political science sector forms an exception to the wide spread 
anglo-american concept of research institutes. Williams places much of the reasoning for 
this on decisions made by political elites in France at the end of First World War, who, 
unlike their Anglo-American allies, based their policy not on political decisions about the 
future of Europe, but on more emotionally charged and ‘backward’ looking approaches 
(Williams, 2008, p.67). The French system primarily relies on its main national research 
centre, the Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique (CNRS, 2014). Over time this has 
developed as an umbrella for a broad range of affiliated institutes which cover all research 
areas ranging from scientific, across political and cultural research. It unites all the tasks 
under one roof that in other European countries are conducted by various (sometimes 
competitive) institutes (CNRS, 2014). These institutes of the Centre National de la 
Recherché Scientifique are so closely linked to the state that they can be recognised as 
an integrated part of it. However, because they have significant cross-over and thus impact 
in the educational and political realm Fieschi and Gaffney consider them worthwhile to be 
recognised in a presentation of the think tank sphere (Fieschi & Gaffney, 2004, p.116). 
There are exceptions to the broader description of the French research sphere. Most 
prominent among the exceptions is the Institut Français de Relations International. It 
resembles the anglo-american conception of research institutes in that it is not affiliated to 
political parties and highlights its academic and scientific excellence as its main predicate 
(IFRI, 2014; Fieschi & Gaffney, 2004, p.118). 
 95
Central and Eastern Europe has a completely different experience, which is caused by its 
long integration in the Soviet System. As satellite states of the Soviet Union the soviet 
model of the academy of sciences was forced onto them. It must be said that each country 
still developed their own version of the same system, according to the small degrees of 
liberalisation as well as country specific amounts of impact and activity that the research 
institutes managed to generate (Sandle, 2004, p.124). After the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union most of the research institutes in Central and Eastern Europe focused on economic 
development to contribute to the market reform of their respective countries. In these days, 
the increased growth propelled a promise of an increasingly strengthened civil society in 
an environment moving away from communism both economically and ideologically 
(McGann, 2010, p.67). This was strengthened by the lure of the West and the pull-factors 
to become involved with the EU and NATO. Thus, taking the economic perspective 
allowed them to have an influence on the broader political development in their country.  
However, the impact of research institutes has clear limits, which has led to the 
observation that they face a ‘stark challenge’ regarding their sustainability (Struyk, 2000, p.
277). While NGOs succeeded in contributing to the political change in Poland (first non-
communist government), the majority of think tanks nowadays do not have a strong 
impact. Many of them lack independence as they have been set up in affiliation to the 
government. Moreover, they suffer from missing funding for the scientific and educational 
sectors and suffer from brain-drain (McGann, 2010, p.67f). Hungary represents the same 
case, however its research community has also been highly interested in security politics 
in the context of joining NATO and the EU. In contrast Bulgarian institutes are said to gain 
from a weak economy and a weak political system, as this keeps talented people in the 
research institute sector which has been successful in winning over Western donors. In 
this context, Bulgarian research institutes are proven to be successful in very directly 
influencing policy making (Sandle, 2004, p.133f). The Slovakian research community 
serves as a counter example, its limits being based on weak economy and withheld 
political support. Legislation restricting the activities of research institutes has split the 
community into a pro-government camp and a counter-government camp, which provided 
the situation with an explosive composition. However, they were able to win Western 
donors to ensure survival and activity of the unsupported part of institutes. The most 
influential think tanks have developed substantial numbers of high quality staff, been 
 96
involved in a range of different research areas, and exerted relatively significant impact on 
the policy process (Sandle, 2004, p.135).  
This exemplary overview shows the necessity of understanding the roots and the 
development of the various research institutes involved in specific cases of cross-border 
cooperation. There is a need to understand the nature and the causes of their formation 
and progression rooted in the historical, economic and political development of their 
domestic environment. This enables one to grasp the status of the current nature and 
dynamics of the institutes. Beyond that it supplies information on their capacities for cross-
border cooperation, encompassing internal and external reasons for success and limits. 
ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA
For the research at hand it is important to recognise differences in the organic 
development between Russian think tanks and EU based think tanks which are caused by 
their different political environment. In communist times the Soviet research community 
was monopolised by the state and its highly intertwined political and ideological formation. 
In completely state-funded research projects data were collected and knowledge 
generated under control of the secretariat of the communist party. Therein the concepts of 
knowledge and power nexus were indisputably linked (Sandle, 2004, p.121f). In this 
system three types of research institutes existed, Academy of Sciences institutes, 
institutes attached to ministries, and institutes within the communist party itself. The 
personnel were employees of the state and enjoyed a privileged lifestyle. The institutes 
were large and worked on very specific issues and thus had no competition. They 
generally produced on demand and had a high rate of activity. While policy-makers read 
their reports regularly, the policy-input was still rather based on the conformity of the 
research with the party line (Interviewee A; Interviewee B). 
Stalin’s death led to a slight loosening of the system and an increasing need for 
information by researchers, which was mainly based on the intricate political 
circumstances of the Soviet Union. The leaders had to deal with guiding a maturing 
industrial society, which was at the same time leading the regional communist bloc and 
was involved in the complex disputes of the Cold War. At the same time, the party 
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leadership noticed that the in-house institutes were lacking abilities as they were made up 
by careerists (Sandle, 2004, p.122f). 
‘The "thaw" of 1950s and 1960s gave birth to a group of new, policy-
oriented, internationally inclined research institutes. […]. The newly 
proclaimed course for coexistence and competition with the capitalist world 
demanded deeper and more objective analyses of the economy and politics 
of the capitalist countries. That was the background of the initiative by the 
USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium in April 1956 to start the world-class 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). […] 
Though its formulation was grossly influenced by ideological dogmas, it was 
a big step in the direction of studying more objectively the outside world and 
establishing contacts with the academic community’ (Yakubovsky, 1995, p.
35). 
Throughout communist times the number of channels available for researchers to 
contribute to policy making were highly limited and intricate. The foremost manner was to 
provide reports that the party-state asked for. Moreover they had the chance to publish 
through a small amount of minor channels, mainly internal to their institutes. Another, and 
the most significant option was to be in the favour of a leading political person and thereby 
acquire access. But this was to be approached carefully, as it could lead to the opposite 
outcome. Generally, it was always helpful if the ideas were in line with the party interests 
(Interviewee A). In this way researchers could try to be smart and cater for the party-states 
wishes, while also proposing a few small new approaches (all covered under arguments 
that are in line with the state party). 
The times of change introduced by Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika generated a 
decrease of political and ideological restrictions, encompassing a change of personnel and 
abolition of previously dominant analytical institutes in policy processes (Tuchman 
Mathews, 2004). Instead research institutes became involved in the policy processes in a 
coalition with figures from politics, media and bureaucracy (Interviewee A). At the same 
time a move away from the predominance of academic institutes took place. Instead 
several political lead-figures established new research institutes which were primarily 
focused on providing policy based research and advice (Yakubovsky, 1995, p.42). These 
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changes strongly altered the position of research institutes and allowed for autonomy in 
their research projects. 
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has been installed as the successor 
state, while another 15 smaller states have struggled to establish themselves in Central 
Asia. The communist structure imposed on the research community has left its tracks 
although the political system has been shattered. The very specific nexus between power 
and knowledge inherent in the Soviet research community is something that needed to be 
dealt with while the country was in an unsteady political and economic state (Interviewee 
A). Since 1991 the interest in Russian research institutes by Western researchers has 
been strong, as it has been interpreted, maybe too readily, as a sign of democratisation 
and the growth of a stronger civil society. By now, many theories challenge this view, elitist 
theories being only the tip of the iceberg supported by a broad range of theorists that 
challenge liberal democrats’ definitions and perceptions of democracy.  
Westerners who researched the phenomenon of heavy growth of research institutes in 
Russia have been quick to make comparisons to western developments. However, it is of 
importance to consider the developments in the context of post-communism (Interviewee 
A). As mentioned above, the communist era has left its marks on the current research 
institutes in terms of organisational structures, norms and values, and future perspectives. 
The main struggles facing the research institutes concerned resources in terms of 
personnel, funding, and future perspectives (Struyk, 2000, p.288). This also encompassed 
independence issues as both internal and external funding had strings attached to some 
degree. However, beyond all of that was the overriding question whether the growths of 
the number of research institutes really reflects the way towards a strong civil society 
(Sandle, 2004, p.128). The main reasons for the growth of the number of think tanks can 
be reduced to three aspects. Firstly, missing funding for the previously huge state-led 
institutes drove many researchers to embark on building their own little institute in order to 
be able to survive in the industry. Secondly, competition increased strongly, and for the first 
time ideological competition was allowed. Thirdly, governance became increasingly 
complex, as Russia established as a federal state with interest in regional and international 
stakes (Interviewee A; Interviewee B; Tuchman Mathews, 2004). Generally, Russian 
research institutes still rely on Western funding to a notable extent, albeit it must be said 
that they diversified their sources. Moreover their foremost interest remains the economy, 
while they also diversified their issues. Beyond that, the last two decades saw a re-shaping 
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and stabilisation of their organisational structures as well as their systemic methods 
(Interviewee A). The strong competition and the difficulties of ensuring funding that allows 
for enough freedom in research and independence led institutes to grow smaller and at the 
same time cover a broader range of issues, while increasingly considering short-term 
employment (Tuchman Mathews, 2004).  
In a recent study on the worldwide ranking of think tanks, the BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa) have been defined as outstanding as they increased 
the number of think tanks across the countries by over 100 percent between 2008 and 
2011. Therein, Russia ranks twice among the top-thirty think tanks in the world and leads 
the table of top-thirty Central and Eastern European think tanks (McGann, 2012, p.16). 
The main focus of research in Russian think tanks working on foreign politics currently 
concerns economic reform, modernisation and Russia’s position in the international 
environment (Tuchman Mathews, 2004; Interviewee B; Interviewee C; Interviewee D). 
While the post-soviet federal system of Russia provides more access points for research 
institutes to take policy influence, the dominant presidential strength limits their 
opportunities for access (Interviewee A; Interviewee B; Interviewee E). Despite the positive 
rankings displayed above, research institutes based in Russia are increasingly restricted 
through the centralisation policy followed by the government. Particularly the non-
governmental institutions are limited in their freedoms by the governmental administration. 
Most recently, re-elected president Putin pushed through a law that NGOs that receive 
foreign funding have to register themselves as ‘foreign agents’. This legislation has been 
developed particularly with human rights and environmental organisations in mind, but the 
scope of the law encompasses all NGOs involved in political activity.  
Other state institutions like the State Duma and political parties have made use of the 
analytical abilities of research institutes. However, the restrictions through the dominant 
position of the president in the state system have led back to the necessity of personal 
links which was renowned from communist times (Interviewee A). Researchers with 
personal contacts to leading figures in politics have good opportunities to exert influence in 
sharing their ideas and offering advice. As is also the case in Western countries the media 
is an important tool to make an impact (Interviewee A; Interviewee F; Interviewee G). 
Using the media and new communication techniques, research institutes have the 
opportunity to challenge present practices, offer their own ideas and encourage the public 
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debate. As one of the interviewees put it: there are enough access points, you just have to 
be adamant in looking for them and smart in using them (Interviewee A).  
However, while it is difficult to receive response for the work, it is also difficult to instigate 
research in the first place. The work of research institutes researching foreign politics is 
further challenged by a deficit of funding by the Russian government as well as the 
business sector or independent philanthropists. At the same time those parties that provide 
funding prefer to apply output that supports their cause (Interviewee B; Interviewee E; 
Tuchman Mathews, 2004). This links in with the above mentioned aspect concerning the 
significance of personal contacts.  
Moreover, a further challenge to the research sphere is a lack of a new generation of 
researchers. The academic system in Russia is under-financed and positions as 
researchers or academics do not carry prestige. Thus the current system only attracts a 
very limited new generation of students and scholars of foreign policy that aim to enter 
positions as academics or researchers. In this regard the relation between government, 
think tanks and education is off balance (Interviewee A; Interviewee H). 
This limited number of young researchers has received attention from academic literature. 
Deriglazova, Makarychev and Reut found in their topical research on Russian foreign 
policy that a new generation of students, educators, activists and professionals is 
emerging in Russia. Importantly, they do not agree with the current foreign politics. Instead 
they highlight the existence of a value gap between the current governmental 
administration and the new generation of IR specialists. Therein the new generation 
promotes their wish for Russia to progress in a cooperative world (Deriglazova et al., 2012, 
p.6). This position has generally been supported throughout the interviews conducted for 
this thesis. However, interviewees also highlighted that it is difficult for young researchers 
in Russia to become established outside the main circle. Thus in order to gain recognition 
as a researcher one needs to work with the those few leading figures that have been 
acknowledged for their work. To be able to work with them, one has to support their views 
and their work. The same is true for the highly limited job-market (Interviewee H; 
Interviewee A). Thus, the missing interest in entering an academic or research job may 
also to some degree be linked to the limited impact and development that is currently 
possible in that sphere.  
Another phenomenon in the Russian think tank sphere is that some previous lead-figures 
in politics take on leading positions in think tanks. After the disintegration of the Soviet 
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Union several politicians have constructed their own research institutes, and the other way 
around a number of researchers have taken on jobs in politics (Yakubovsky, 1995, p.38f). 
Nowadays the range of recognised scholars on foreign politics is still restricted, a small 
elite group established itself. Moreover, a number of previous politicians contributed to the 
set up of policy fora which facilitate debate among think tanks, politicians and media. On 
the one hand these processes are helpful in connecting researchers and politics. On the 
other hand it could be seen as a way of lead figures trying to stay in the game.  
TYPOLOGY
TOOLS
Public policy research institutes avail themselves of a range of tools and deploy these in 
different social settings using a variety of specific channels according to each tool. 
Throughout the interviews for this thesis a number of tools have been established and 
reaffirmed which relate broadly to the tasks of gathering data, generating knowledge, and 
spreading expertise. The majority of them comprise primarily communicative measures in 
their application. This links to the academic study of the development of think tanks in the 
EU, where Ullrich (2004, p.54) identifies a typology of think tanks based around three main 
tasks: Generating ideas; policy-orientated analysis and outreach; furthering debate. In the 
process of the interviews undertaken during fieldwork, these three tasks were further 
investigated. However, as interviews developed, the terminology also developed: thus 
instead of Ullrich’s terms, the three terms used by this thesis are ‘gathering data; 
generating knowledge; and spreading expertise’. The interviews also show that some tools 
and measures are not only relatable to one of the three main tasks named above, but 
overlap in a manner that they can be utilised for the conduct of two or all three types of 
major activities.  
One underlying type of measures which is crucial for each of the three main areas of tasks 
conducted by research institutes (gathering data, generating knowledge, and spreading 
expertise) is to obtain resources (see for instance Denham & Garnett, 2004, p.245; Braml, 
2006, p.228f). These resources comprise data as well as funding and appropriate staff. 
This is highly reliant on cooperative activities which facilitate for example the access to 
data, and as the fieldwork identifies, is specifically driven by the rise of transnational 
research activity. As several interviewees explained, they are/were part of transnational 
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projects in which the institutes from a variety of countries each gather data in their own 
country and then join them in a common analysis (Interviewee B; Interviewee C; 
Interviewee E; Interviewee I). Interaction is often particularly promoted by increasing the 
likelihood of funding for inter-institutional or transnational projects. However, this needs to 
be handled carefully, as the organisation of interaction is likely to lead to biases in the 
research projects.  
In the realm of gathering data, three types of tasks are distinguishable: immaculate 
research preparation, data collection, and data analysis. In conducting fundamental 
research the usefulness of cooperative activities is limited to the certain parts of the 
process of data gathering. On the one hand cooperation with other research institutes 
increases the availability of resources. However, it also needs to be considered that the 
gathering and processing of data requires accurate and tedious analytical work which may 
be hampered, slowed down or made inaccurate through a contribution of a variety of 
actors (Interviewee J). These aspects need to be out balanced continuously and 
interaction needs to be integrated in the research plan in a constructive and supportive 
manner.  
For the task of generating knowledge no fundamental research needs to be conducted, 
although it may be done beforehand. Instead it requires the abilities to analyse existing 
information and data, and weigh out their according propositions. Beyond that, there is the 
need to be able to explain the interconnection between various arguments, or the 
annulment of one argument by another. In this process cooperation is extremely useful to 
obtain a broad variety of data and propositions which inform a critical debate leading to the 
generation of ideas and propositions. After all researchers must provide enough strong 
arguments for a position that they elaborated, in order to promote their ideas and 
propositions. Thus, there is a need to establish contact to obtain data, as well as to 
establish a supportive network in their respective organisation and in between 
organisations that enables them to debate, test and promote their propositions 
(Interviewee K; Interviewee C). 
McGann identifies that spreading expertise can be done in three ways. Firstly, by providing 
policy advice directly to the policy makers. Secondly, by discussing and providing opinions 
in the expert community, at conferences and the like. Thirdly, by shaping the dominant 
socio-political dialogue through sensitising the civil society. Therewith they may influence 
agenda setting, support the negotiation of outcomes, bestow legitimacy, and help to 
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monitor and implement policy solutions (McGann, 2011, p.10). For this area of tasks 
written, audio, and video material needs to be produced in accordance with the audience 
for which the material is prepared. Subsequently, this material needs to be distributed to 
reach the planned audience (or even a broader audience). Researchers and institutes 
alike need to gain capacity by establishing a supportive network in their organisation and 
among organisations. At the same time they need to connect with policy makers at their 
political level as well as other political levels. Moreover they need to collaborate with the 
media to reach a wider, more diversified audience. Beyond that, education is a most useful 
tool and channel to spread critical thinking and innovative thinking, as well as more 
specific ideas and norms. According to interviews regarding education, Russian academia 
especially is strongly relying on debates portrayed in ‘western’ books, which has been 
related by interviewees to the missing prominence and recognition of Russian material 
abroad (Interviewee A; Interviewee L). In all of this, research institutes increase their 
publication activities by making strong use of technical advancements (Interviewee B; 
Interviewee K). Transnationalism promotes the availability of a wider audience that may be 
reached through an increased range of channels caused by the multilevel nature of 
transnational governance. 
GOVERNANCE LEVEL, AFFILIATION, OUTPUT
The exploratory nature of this project enables the researcher to identify the wide variety 
among public policy research institutes across wider Europe. By choosing a broad 
definition of the unit of analysis the research has been conducted under consideration of a 
number of institutes with different attributes. In a broader sense they can all be considered 
as public policy research institutes, but each of them features characteristics promoting 
specific opportunities and capacities as well as specific limits. More precisely, they perform 
a variety of tasks using different tools and measures. Therein, the governance level at 
which they are established and their affiliation offer them a variety of channels to perform 
their tasks and stabilise their position in the policy environment.  
The aim of this section of the thesis is to facilitate a general survey of public policy 
research institutes in wider Europe that have been encountered throughout the research. 
In the table below different types of expert organisations involved in gathering data and 
generating knowledge on security politics across Russia and the EU are distinguished. 
The table is not presented to provide an in-depth review of each research institute. 
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However, in context of the descriptions regarding European and Russian research 
institutes provided above, we aim to supply an easily graspable shortcut towards the 
variety among research institutes. This is of interest in the context of the thesis, as first of 
all such summaries have not been provided too often thus far. Beyond that the table 
supplies a more abstract insight regarding research institutes. Throughout the research it 
was of significance to familiarise oneself with the displayed variables that represent 
fundamental descriptive concepts which allow to identify the nature and dynamics of 
research institutes as well as their abilities to cooperate in a policy environment.  
By reference to extant literature on research institutes as well as by means of interviews 
conducted during field research, three fundamental variables have been determined on 
which basis research institutes can be characterised. The first one describes the level of 
governance at which they are established, the second determines their affiliation, and the 
third variable identifies their main output. The illustrative table below differentiates several 
research institutes which work to varying degrees on foreign and security policy in wider 
Europe on the basis of the three variables. Therein it exemplifies how the variables help to 
recognise basic structural similarities. This structure is picked up again later on in the Case 
study (see Chapter Five). It is then used to develop a basic mind-map of the varying 
institutes in the case study, and enable a structured thought process about the 
opportunities and challenges they face in cooperation with each other.  
Determining the level of governance at which research institutes have been established 
encompasses a first few steps in identifying the way they work. This variable covers a 
range of attributes including the international level, the regional level wherein it is 
distinguished between the EU and non-EU, and the nation state level wherein it is 
distinguished between EU MSs and Russia. Assigning one of the attributes to each 
research institute allows, in context of the descriptions on Russian and European research 
institutes provided above, to size up their available channels. Thus the level of governance 
is a ‘social setting’ (Axelrod, 1990, p.19) that provides information regarding the channels 
that are present at this governance level for the institutes to connect with and use to 
conduct their chosen tasks. While multi-level governance enables research institutes to 
operate at various levels, the level that they have been established at facilitates the 
institutes’ access towards specific actors. This is mainly due to the fact that they have 
been established at a certain level, with a certain audience and a certain output in mind. 
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On this basis they had to develop specific tasks as well as accompanying tools and 
measures to realise these tasks, formulate their output and stimulate their audience. 
Entering another level of governance, means that they have to adapt their output in 
aligning their tasks, as well as to please a new audience. Adjusting to a new audience and 
widening their range of output as well as the tasks they perform will take additional 
resources including time, but also staff and funding. 
Corresponding to the interviews for the research at hand the main factor providing 
information on how research institutes work is the affiliation of think tanks. It supplies 
insights regarding the tasks they perform, the channels they possess, and allows for 
estimations regarding their access to policy processes. The variable affiliation is presented 
in the table through a choice of the following attributes: non-governmental (independent, 
multiplicity of donors), quasi-independent (reliant on a major donor), university affiliated, 
quasi-governmental (mainly reliant on government funding), governmental (set up by 
government), corporate (work for profit), hybrid (a mix of several) (McGann, 2011, p.10). 
As the work of think tanks primarily relies on projects provided for by investors, think tanks 
rely on affiliation. The nature and dynamics of their affiliations in turn provide information 
about their way of work and thus their potential contribution to transnational cooperation. 
Along the spectrum, research actors have the possibility and the role to promote social 
justice based on expert knowledge and an understanding of the issue at hand that is not 
informed by political affiliation. On the other hand, every research institute (as well as its 
staff) has its intentions and preferences, and the need to ensure funding (often project 
based) challenges their independence. Their affiliation may provide them with resources 
fiscal and intellectual, but may also keep them from other resources. At this point it is 
important to make a differentiation between those research institutes that have been set 
up under the premise of a certain affiliation, and those that have been set up as 
independent organisation but receive their position by the donors they manage to attract. 
The third variable integrated as descriptive measure into the table is the output generated 
(or not) by public policy research institutes. This variable ranges along the attributes that 
represent the tasks which the institutes principally perform. These tasks are divided into 
gathering data, generating knowledge, spreading expertise. While the first describes the 
conduction of fundamental research, the second task concerns the development of 
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knowledge and ideas from existing data. The third task in turn concerns an emphasis on 
publication activities. Herein, the research at hand accepts that some institutes focus on 
generating two types of output to a high degree. Identifying one or two of the attributes of 
major significance for a research institute contributes to both understanding the nature of 
the tasks the institutes perform, and establishing their opportunities for policy-input. This 
variable demonstrates the nature of the output that is generated, and in combination with 
the descriptions on EU and Russian research institutes above, it also indicates the 
underlying purpose in producing the given output. Moreover, the variable induces thoughts 
regarding at what point the output adds to the policy cycle. However, the production of 
output must not be seen as a one-sided process. At this point it must be kept in mind how 
far the output is utilised and stipulated by third parties. Beyond that, in examining 
cooperative activities within this thesis the output is an important factor as it helps to 
constitute and justify the conduct and continuation of cooperation. In this regard the 
variable adds to our understanding of existing basic conditions of research institutes’ 
involvement in cooperative processes. The basic conditions clearly vary according to each 
attribute and they way it is performed. The basic conditions need to be explored in 
accordance with the specific case studies.  
 107
TAXONOMY
Table 1 - Taxonomy of Public Policy Research Institutes analysed in the thesis 
This taxonomy is modelled after a typology of EU think tanks provided by Ullrich (Ullrich, 
2004, p.54). While her model includes the level of governance as well as the tasks of the 
institutes, this taxonomy encompasses affiliation as a third variable. Throughout the 
interviews the importance of the affiliation of institutes has been highlighted as an essential 
predicate that stands in a correlation with the tasks that institutes perform. Due to this 
determinant impact, it is included as a variable in the table above. Similar to the think tank 
typology provided by McGann and Weaver it covers primarily the institutional set-up of the 
Governance 
level 
(Channels)
Independent Quasi-
independent
University
affiliated
Governmental Quasi-
governmental
Corporate
Regional (EU) CEPS  
(generate 
data, 
generating 
knowledge, 
spreading 
expertise)
Bureau of 
European 
Policy 
Advisers 
(BEPA) 
(generate 
knowledge, 
spreading 
expertise)
Regional 
(non-EU)
European 
Council on 
Foreign 
Relations 
(ECFR) 
(generate 
data, 
generate 
knowledge, 
spread 
expertise)
Nation State
(Russia)
PIR Centre, 
(generate 
data, 
generate 
knowledge, 
spread 
expertise)
MGIMO 
(gather data, generate 
knowledge, spread expertise)
IMEMO 
(generate data, generate 
knowledge, spread expertise)
Nation State
(EU)
IFSH 
(gather data, generate 
knowledge, spread 
expertise)
PISM 
(generate knowledge, spread 
expertise)
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institutes (McGann & Weaver, 2000, p.10). The table exemplifies several of the European 
(EU MSs level and EU level) and Russian organisations which have been encountered 
during the research. Beyond that, it includes some additional institutes (ECFR, CEPS and 
BEPA) which are not part of this specific project, but serve to complement the illustration in 
the table. The table serves to outline how the variables help to recognise basic structural 
similarities and differences among research institutes involved in cooperative efforts. This 
is based on a review of the institutes’ origins, affiliations and tasks which is conducted with 
the help of reports, websites and interviews. At a glance the table elucidates that several of 
the institutes represent hybrid structures that involve at least two of the affiliation 
categories. This generally allows them to conduct their tasks at various levels. Moreover, it 
enables them to increase their success in gaining resources from diverse sources which 
relate to different aspects of their diverse profile. Moreover, the range of tasks and the 
priority of specific tasks differs among the institutes. This relates to the point that an 
institute that prioritises policy advice and policy impact requires a completely different 
structure, toolset and mechanisms than an institute prioritising fundamental research, 
although the recurring hybridisation of institutes as well as the increased competition for 
space in public policy governance (powered by competition for resources based on 
impact) blur the lines among foreign and security policy research institutes, seeing them 
cover more and more tasks to varying degrees of capacity. 
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is rather unique in its set-up as it 
represents one of the only transnational, or to be precise ‘pan-European’ think tanks. It is 
not affiliated to the European Union in direct terms, and receives its funding from a broad 
range of donors including foundations, governments and corporate donors (ECFR, 2014). 
By now ECFR has national offices in seven countries across the EU (ECFR, 2014b). It 
conducts research on a broad range of subjects all concerning foreign policy issues, but 
ranging from security politics, via economics, to socio-political aspects.  
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is one of the leading institutes established 
at European level. It is highly involved in debates on EU politics ranging across all the 
policy areas the EU is concerned with. While conducting all three tasks on the basis of in-
house staff as well as affiliated research fellows, it primarily focuses on generating 
knowledge and spreading expertise on the basis of its prime location and status among 
policy makers and researchers. While the primary funding source remains the EU, this is 
not an outstanding amount and it is outweighed with a range of other sources (CEPS, 
2014). In this sense CEPS can be located between quasi-independent and independent.  
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The Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA) was the in-house think tank of the 
European Commission. The Chief Advisor reporting to the Commission president has been 
cut in early November 2014 and the institute is to be replaced with the new European 
Political Strategy Centre (European Commission, 2014). It will be interesting to see which 
changes come with the change in structure from BEPA to the European Political Strategy 
Centre. However, for now the BEPA serves as good example of a research institute 
affiliated directly to the regional governor body. It consists of expert staff that support the 
policy makers in the EU Commission with policy advice on all possible topics, and is 
directly subordinate to the president of the Commission (European Commission, 2014b). 
As the in-house research institute of the EU Commission, it is directly linked to policy 
makers and is involved in drafting policy papers. In its work it focuses primarily on giving 
policy advice and engaging in outreach work (European Commission, 2014d). Thus it 
prioritises the tasks of generating knowledge and spreading expertise, and sets aside the 
task of generating data in fundamental research. It relies on liaison with other research 
institutes to accumulate valid data. 
MGIMO is the elite Moscow University on International Relations. It is a governmental 
institution that belongs to the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation (Interviewee N). 
At the same time the institute is a university, which means that the staff and research 
groups working on EU-Russia relations in MGIMO are university affiliated. MGIMO’s broad 
curriculum encompasses European Studies and EU-Russia relations from political, 
economic and social perspectives. Apart from its predominant educational activities, 
MGIMO also includes a prestigious scholarship known for its research on EU-Russia 
relations. In this context it is also well connected with the Russian Academy of Sciences in 
its research activities (Interviewee N). Thus, in MGIMO’s EU research centre all three 
tasks are conducted, generating both data and knowledge, and spreading it. 
The Centre for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Centre) is a high level Russian think tank that 
studies foreign politics and particularly Russia’s evolving role. Topics cover primarily 
Nuclear Disarmament, Russia and Asia, the Middle East and the rising powers (BRICS: 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). While research and policy advice is their 
predominant occupation, the centre is also takes its spreading of knowledge to another 
level by providing educational activities like topical seminars, summer schools, and 
internships (PIR Centre, 2014) In its funding it seeks to gain support from diverse sources 
in order to increase the opportunities to conduct independent projects (Interviewee M). 
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The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) is one of the leading 
research institutes in Russia on EU-Russia relations. It has been founded by the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and government funds are still a vital resource, although resource 
scarcity in political and social sciences as well as the opportunities offered by a diversified 
market, drive the utilisation of diverse funding sources (Interviewee A; Interviewee C). The 
institute provides outstanding research on the international economy as well as foreign 
and security policy. Its specialised centres focus on the study of the EU as well as on a 
range of EU MSs in particular. IMEMO staff fulfil all three main tasks conducted by 
research institutes. First, they conduct fundamental research to generate data. Second, 
they analyse data to generate knowledge. Third, they spread expertise through policy 
reports, but also through the education of a new generation (Interviewee A; Interviewee C). 
The staff at the institute are outstanding experts in their fields and commonly also take 
positions in leading Russian universities to teach the new generations (IMEMO, 2014). 
Although the institute is now part of the competitive and diverse market since the 
disintegration of the SU, government funds remain an important source for it, and the 
researchers are well connected with policy makers which is the toll of trying to have policy 
impact.  
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) is a quasi-governmental research 
institute working on foreign and security policy in the widest understanding of the term. It is 
directly affiliated to the Polish Ministry of Foreign affairs and provides policy reports and 
advice to the ministry (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). PISM conducts all three 
tasks of research institutes, generating data, generating knowledge and spreading 
expertise. It emphasises the importance of fundamental research for policy making (PISM, 
2014). But beyond that the institute is strongly involved in transnational and international 
analytical and educational projects (PISM, 2014b). It also offers a number of short-term 
courses to teach a new generation of diplomats and businessmen about behaviour in 
diplomatic situations. 
The IFSH is a German academic research institute specialising in peace and security 
research. It incorporates the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) and a number of staff 
focusing on security in wider Europe (IFSH, 2014). The IFSH as a whole is a quasi-
independent research foundation as well as a university affiliated institute, being situated 
at the University of Hamburg. It receives a good part of its funding from the German 
government as well as federal government bodies. But beyond that its sources are diverse 
covering support through funding by foundations and corporate donors. The IFSH primarily 
 111
engages in research, policy advice and consultancy, but also supports postgraduate 
education (IFSH 2014b). This shows that they cover all three tasks of research institutes, 
generating data, generating knowledge and spreading expertise. 
The taxonomy illustrates a number of inherent aspects that are determinative for the 
performance of public policy research institutes. First and foremost, as displayed in the 
sections above, research institutes are not at all homogenous entities but instead hold 
different potentials to make a contribution. Further research will have to take their varying 
capacities and limits into account when examining their cooperation, as it establishes 
which input and output can be provided by the actors and the processes that they are 
involved in. Moreover, it is of interest to see whether institutes with similar attributes are 
more likely to cooperate, or whether a variety of attributes is a more attractive reason for 
cooperation. In this context, the second aspect to consider in the analysis concerns the 
established research institutes and networks in the policy field in question. It needs to be 
ascertained how far a research environment exists in the concerned policy field and to 
what degree cross-border interaction can be set up at all. Therein, it is of interest to what 
types of institutes have been pioneering in the field and which ones have joined in or 
linked up later on and what that tells us about the political environment of the policy field. 
This relates to a third aspect, regarding the issue of access to the policy field. It is of 
interest how far the composition of the current political discourse allows and encourages 
the contribution of expertise and the political space for research institutes. Herein, it is also 
questionable whether a certain type of research institute, performing a specific task is 
especially preferred or successful. In this regard a fourth factor becomes visible, 
encompassing the significance of available resources. It is also of importance for the 
analysis of the performance of public policy research institutes to understand the roots and 
the availability of resources. Political space and strongly constituted networks may provide 
a good starting point, but they need to be linked to available resources in order to make 
use of the space. These four lines of thought induced by the consideration of research 
institutes’ functional developments and drivers, are further investigated both in the 
upcoming analytical section of Chapter Four and throughout Chapter Five. 
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TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES
While the sections above have provided insights regarding the nature and dynamics of 
European and Russian public policy research institutes, the thesis goes on to examine 
specific opportunities, processes, and challenges in transnational cooperation among 
research institutes in the following paragraphs. Understanding their cooperative practices 
enables to determine their capacities and limits to make use of the transnational sphere. 
The issues discussed below are specifically based on the perceptions as expressed by 
interviewees during the fieldwork.  
Europe and Russia represent the two major forces on the Eurasian continent which need 
to interact in order to stabilise and secure the wider European region and its inhabitants. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three the security political interaction between Russia and 
the EU as well as single Member States is on an up and down course in high politics. It is 
driven by convergence and reluctance depending on key events which test the recognition 
of communal strength as well as trust on both sides. The main reason is that the security 
political relation between Russia and the EU MSs is flawed based on the contradiction 
between different political principles on the one side, and the straddling cooperative 
structure linking energy security pressure and europeanised norms and values. However, 
both actors recognise the need for interaction to a varying degree, in some security 
political areas. Therein it is of importance for Russia that its sovereignty is respected, while 
it wants interaction to be based on the recognition and the appreciation of equal 
partnership. In addition Russia promotes cross-border/international cooperation based on 
UN decisions as it values its opportunity to not compromise its sovereignty in that format. 
On the other hand the EU promotes being recognised as a full and competent actor, which 
stands in contrast to the Russian government’s preference for bilateral agreements. 
Moreover, it asks for highly Europeanised standards of cooperation based on its own 
norms and values. 
However, this describes the high politics at government level, drawing conclusions from 
their interaction over the last two decades. In this timeframe, research on transnational 
security cooperation in wider Europe has generally focused on governmental interaction, 
and in some parts on the contribution of international organisations (Drent, 2012; Danilov, 
2012; Fernandes, 2014). Instead the thesis at hand is looking to close an apparent lack of 
research regarding the potential role of the increasing number of non- and quasi 
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governmental actors that generate and provide knowledge and supply new types of 
measures and channels in a multilevel and de-territorialised international environment. 
Analysing the dynamics of cooperation among European and Russian institutes enables 
one to grasp their capacities and tools to work at transnational level. Based on interviews 
conducted during field research the upcoming section outlines opportunities, processes 
and challenges of transnational research cooperation as perceived by the staff of Russian 
and EU based research institutes. It illustrates a number of aspects that have been 
mentioned repeatedly throughout the interviews. In the end a critical reading of that 
overview leads to the question how far the cooperation as it exists with its limits is nurtured 
by its set-up and participants, and whether further development is hindered actively in this 
way.
OPPORTUNITIES
When considering increasing interdependence, two primary processes come to mind. On 
the one hand, actors have to deal with a broader range of issues, but simultaneously they 
are also presented with a wider range of opportunities. The opportunities represent the 
pull-factors that encourage research institutes to enter the transnational sphere. In this 
regard they need to be of high enough value (and thus return) to raise the interest in cross 
border cooperation. Therefore, it must be kept in mind, many institutes have been 
established at the nation state level in the first place and need to compare the investments 
of entering the transnational sphere to the return. Though once they participated in cross-
border cooperation and re-directed their ways of working it is easier to do so again. 
When asking staff of research institutes for the opportunities that they see in cross-border 
cooperation, a recurring range of answers is provided. One of the main opportunities that 
is mentioned is that cross border cooperation allows institutes and researchers access to a 
broader range of data. By linking up several research institutes based in different 
countries, each institute can share its country specific data or its country specific view on a 
shared issues. This is a common practice among research institutes these days, which is 
highly facilitated through new methods of communication. The use of methods like emails, 
drop-box, and Skype but also online journals and electronic books enable an increasingly 
faster exchange. At the same time electronic communication also provides space for an 
infinitely growing database. There is a strong appreciation for the value of data exchange. 
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Interviewees raise the point that cross-border projects enable them to broaden their 
perception of a specific issue (Interviewee C; Interviewee B; Interviewee K). 
However, the availability of a broader range of data must be treated with care. While a 
mere exchange of data among foreign institutes is commonly perceived to facilitate 
research on foreign and transnational issues, it does not account for a truly transnational 
perception of an issue. To gain a truly transnational understanding of a common problem, 
research needs to be conducted commonly based on shared goals, conceptualisations 
and operationalisations. Instead the current trend of exchanging information is at times 
likely to promote a perception of the participating institutes or researchers as 
‘representatives’ of their respective country (Interviewee C). That is more likely to 
encourage an explanatory environment among the multinational research team. Thus it is 
likely to lead to a situation where each respective countries position is outlined, while the 
project as a whole is not going beyond that and facilitating a transnational understanding 
or proposal. 
Another opportunity is the broader pool of funding sources that may be addressed in 
transnational cooperation. This is a pretty straightforward argument, in terms that each of 
the participants in a cooperative project can look into applying for funding in their 
respective domestic environment. The positive side effect that this may bring along is that 
a multiplicity of resources may increase the claim for independence of a certain project. 
This is caused by the fact that the project may not be dependent on one specific donor 
anymore, which would cause a critical review of the goals of the donor and thus the project 
as a whole. If a project manages to secure multiple sources of funding, though, it is more 
likely to balance the goals of a multiplicity of donors and thus it may be less biased 
towards one specific outcome. In this context, regional bodies like the EU specifically 
promote the case to fund multinational projects and thus encourage applications by 
research teams consisting of researcher institutes from a various countries. While this 
increases transnational exchange, some interviewees criticised this trend of international 
and interdisciplinary research. In their opinion it poses difficulties for the very basic 
exercise of gathering and working out data, which ‘may instead require a consequent 
approach of one person sitting in a room and working out the data with clearly 
conceptualised and operationalised tools’ (Interviewee D; Interviewee O). This is along the 
lines that too many cooks spoil the broth, especially when it concerns the very systematic 
task to gather and work out data.  
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Furthermore, transnational cooperation facilitates the establishment of contacts in a 
foreign environment. The partners can exchange their contacts and facilitate access to 
other institutes, politicians and media in their respective home country. In this way they act 
as gate-keepers for each other. This highlights the importance of interpersonal relations in 
the research environment (Interviewee A; Interviewee D). At the same time, cooperative 
activities across borders also facilitate the access to foreign research environments and 
the opportunity to publish for a different audience. This links to the challenge that foreign 
researchers, especially between the EU and Russia, may not be as respected in the 
research environment. The respect is lower in so far that foreign experts or institutes are 
primarily legitimised in their domestic research sphere, and in this sense shared projects 
primarily enable them to report back to their domestic research environment (Interviewee 
A; Interviewee L). However, a common project enables the participants to publish abroad 
and reach a wider audience that is concerned by the respective study. A particular aspect 
raised by interviewees in this context is the different international perception of research 
produced in Russia and research produced in EU based institutes (particularly western 
European). Due to the long lasting state monopoly on Russian research institutes, they are 
often considered to still be in a developing phase, living up to more independence and 
explicit research. While Russian researchers are easily accepted as country specialists in 
the foreign and security policy sphere, they have to work especially hard for the 
international recognition of their research (Interviewee A; Interviewee L). It must be 
emphasised that this is not true for every single project and every researcher, but the issue 
is acknowledged in the Russian (foreign and security policy) research sphere. 
Finally, it is interesting to see whether the emergence of new generations of IR specialists 
may increase a recognition for the importance of cooperation, as Deriglazova et al. 
identified (Deriglazova et al., 2012, p.6). This point has also been expressed in interviews 
conducted in Russia (Interviewee H; Interviewee C). However, it is questionable how far 
they are able push through any interest towards more transnational interaction, as their 
education and professional development requires them to work within given boundaries. 
Moreover, it was also questioned how far these tendencies represent much more the 
interest and opportunities of the youth to travel and enjoy international movement at lower 
cost, instead of the recognition for the need to interact transnationally (Interviewee P). The 
call for caution reflects a position that is part of the current societal developments which in 
turn also have an impact on the changing perception of territory and power. But 
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significantly, several studies by Makarychev back up the position of a changed opinion of 
early career IR specialists acknowledging the significance of international interaction. 
The interviews show that cross-border cooperation offers opportunities for the participants 
across wider Europe. These opportunities are comparatively basic in appearance but at 
the same time perceived as relatively coherent. Significantly, there is a clear trend that 
research institutes recognise the opportunities of transnational cooperation for gaining 
benefits primarily in terms of resources (data, staff, funding). This is driven by the 
underlying issue that non- and quasi-governmental actors need to secure resources at a 
convenient rate. Although at the same time they have to balance this with their level of 
independence and their related reputation.  
PROCESSES
When looking at transnational cooperation among research institutes several steps 
crystallise as significant markers in establishing and reinforcing cross-border interaction. 
These steps were identified through a series of interviews, particularly with Interviewee C, 
Interviewee B, Interviewee K, Interviewee J, Interviewee Q, Interviewee R, and Interviewee 
E. Those steps are partly self-imposing, as they represent a specific cycle that is followed 
up on when cooperation is initiated. In other parts the steps of cooperation require the 
activity of the research institutes and are in this way dependent on their choices. Beyond 
that the steps are also partly imposed by the dominant political discourse and the way it 
shapes the current political environment of the policy field in question. These three sides 
which influence transnational cooperation offer insights in the underlying interplay of 
structure and agency. This visualises the point made earlier that the interplay of structure 
and agency propels strength for both of them. The contribution of each of the three sides 
distinguished above, is reliant on the inherent dynamics between structure and agency. In 
addition the single contributions integrate with another level of structure/agency nexus 
when joining in the process of transnational cooperation. This means that some ideas and 
tools may represent a new addition to the steps of transnational interaction. The way they 
are thought of, introduced, debated, and integrated is dependent on the dialectic between 
present long-term established patterns and new ideas and contributions at a variety of 
levels, within as well as among the involved research institutes’ discourse, and in the 
dominant political discourse at domestic and international level. 
 117
Transnational cooperation can generally be described through the following self-reinforcing 
steps: recognition and adaptation of a transnational issue, identifying partners, establishing 
contact/relations, conducting cooperation, provision of output, reflection. These steps (not 
as such but in similar form) are identified in the interviews that are conducted for this 
research, although it is of significance to note that interviewees state that several activities 
linked to the steps are habitual work and that they did not necessarily conduct these 
activities with persistent recognition of contributing to strengthen transnational cooperation 
(Interviewee C; Interviewee B). This indicates that these activities have become inherent to 
their working pattern, and are automatically present once the mind is set on an initiative. 
However, at the same time this indicates the possibility that not enough conscious 
attention is paid in some cases to fulfilling the activities in the best possible way 
considering the auspices of the transnational sphere. While the majority of public policy 
research institutes have been established at nation state level, working at the transnational 
level requires different tools and measures (or at least a different application of the existing 
ones). To adjust to the ways of working takes resources in terms of time, staff (changes) 
and money (Interviewee A; Interviewee Q). In this way activities need to be adjusted to 
concern the correct scope and subsequently need to be optimised to make the most of the 
opportunities that cross-border cooperation offers for research institutes. 
The first step in cross-border cooperation among research institutes encompasses the 
need to recognise and adapt a transnational issue. This consists of two parts, firstly the 
institute needs to recognise and adapt the issue in general, and secondly it needs to 
acknowledge the transnational nature of the issue at hand. It must be taken into account 
that this may take a variety of forms under consideration of the nature, the topical interests 
and the goals of the research institutes, as well as their access to data and information 
regarding the issue in question. While all institutes in this study are identified as generating 
and spreading knowledge, information and advice regarding security politics, each of them 
may focus on a different aspect of an issue usually within the context of a specific 
discipline. In addition each institute is set up and explores over time its primary goals that it 
projects within the work it is doing. Therewith different institutes may again emphasise the 
importance to work on a very specific part of an issue. Even more fundamental, as shown 
in the table and the associated explanations above, the institutes are likely to correspond 
to different styles of organisation, varying in their underlying nature and thus in the way 
they work. Beyond that, not only the institutes themselves but also external factors 
determine the access towards data and information regarding an issue. This in turn 
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influences institutes (in)ability to engage with an issue, even though they approve its 
importance. Counter-terrorism represents a good example in this case as a lot of work in 
the field encompasses intelligence and secrecy, which means that information can only be 
gathered to a limited degree. 
Secondly, the institutes need to identify (a) partner(s) with whom to conduct cross-border 
interaction regarding the same issue. In this regard it is of interest to determine in the case 
study in Chapter Five on what basis partners are selected. There are two underlying 
principles for choice, one is the (more or less careful) selection of a partner who shares 
similar measures and goals. The other option is the (more or less careful) selection of a 
partner who adds complementary measures while the interaction allows both to reach their 
own goals to some extent. Herein, it is also of interest to see what role policy networks 
play in forging alliances. The following step entails establishing relations/partnerships 
with the fellow institutes which have been identified as partners. Therein, each party to the 
cooperation has to develop a mind of what it wants to gain from this interaction. On that 
basis the depth of the cooperation (whether contact or partnership), the structure of the 
interaction (simple contact or hands-on project), and the involved resources (number and 
background of members of staff, amount time and money) are determined. This connects 
to the structure agency debate, as it shows the importance of persons and their reputation, 
but also of organisational structures and the reputation these structures carry. 
The establishment of the relation is deeply entwined with the subsequent step of agreeing 
on methods of cooperation. They need to find consent on how they want to 
operationalise their interaction. The decision often falls in either category of just generally 
noticing that they are interested in each other and keep in touch (possibly also in the 
broader frame of a policy community), or they conduct a hands-on project together. The 
interviews have shown that cross-border cooperation usually contains both types of 
interaction. Most transnational cooperation among research institutes is perceived to 
flourish through informal contacts which are on the basis of resource availability nourished 
to prosper in a communal project. In these terms cooperation may skip from simple contact 
and actual projects. A typical counter example is the presence of funding which is bound to 
the prerequisite of a joint project of international actors. In this case, institutes might go out 
and look for contacts in a variety of foreign countries with whom to apply jointly for the 
project. In both cases they have to operationalise the amount of contributed resources in 
terms of time, staff, money and data. Moreover, the parties to the cooperation need to 
identify the structure of their communication including whether they interact formally or 
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informally, written or face to face, monthly or quarterly. Beyond that, they have to establish 
how they are accountable to each other and on what basis they ensure to attempt a 
successful completion of their interaction within a set time and budget. 
The next step encompasses the production of output. The cooperating research institutes 
need to determine what they want to present with the help of their output, and they need to 
decide what each of them is allowed to/is willing to disclose under consideration of 
domestic and international political agreements in the policy area in question. Moreover, 
they have to agree in what shape or form the output is presented including for example 
reports, briefings, lectures, simulations, or further projects. The output and the forms it 
takes may change over the course of the research, depending on the findings made, on 
the interest precipitated, and the contacts established. Herein it is of importance to 
recognise the broad range of an audience that interaction at transnational level caters for. 
Therein the output presented needs to be adjusted to the wishes and needs of the specific 
audiences. Their output might be limited in these terms, as contractors or domestic 
governments might not want research institutes to disclose information freely. Finally the 
institutes need to reflect on the cooperative activities, determining whether a partnership 
is appreciated (in its current form), what aims have been reached and what measures 
have been applied more or less successful. Moreover, it shows how aims and opinions 
change over time, which is highly likely in research areas which represent moving targets. 
In addition, reflection provides insights how far the operationalisation of the cross-border 
interaction can be enhanced. Beyond that, it provides insights not only regarding internal 
issues concerning the parties to the cooperation, but also regarding external issues that 
influence the availability of resources, as well as the free and rightful interaction among 
actors based in differing domestic political systems. 
Through the reflection the wheel of interaction may turn onwards, in case a cooperation is 
not actively abolished or fizzling out. This may start with a redefinition of the issue and a 
restart of a complete cycle. Or it may just as well skip either of the first three steps and 
start by rethinking the methods of cooperation. Furthermore, all the steps mentioned 
above are not taking place one after the other, but surely overlap. The transnational aspect 
of the cooperation adds difficulties and limits in terms of language and cultural barriers, 
meaning that interaction needs to be conducted carefully, to make sure parties understand 
similarities and differences, and attempt to deal with those. Just as well it presents 
difficulties in terms of adding a multiplicity of laws and policies to be considered in 
understanding the workings of a policy-field beyond the domestic area. Apart from that 
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hurdles are presented by the variety among the increased range of the audiences that 
need to be catered for. While a broader audience is available in the international sphere, 
successful transnational cooperation relies on raising interest among various actors, 
wherein data and outputs need to be adjusted to appeal to the audience. In the same 
context, interaction is exacerbated in some cases through preferences of varying funding 
sources which are often found to be national governments and increasingly specific 
contractors. 
In sum, the common perception of the processes in initiating interaction with fellow foreign 
institutes shows that the persistent will for cooperation is complemented by a coherent 
understanding of enacting basic cooperation (Interviewee C; Interviewee B; Interviewee D; 
Interviewee R). Thus, although the research institutes across wider Europe developed in 
different socio-political environments, they make use of similar tools and can be roughly 
defined among the same characteristic variables (see typology above). In addition the 
interviews establish that they perceive a number of opportunities and processes of cross-
border cooperation similarly. However, the interviewees also voice several challenges that 
they encounter and struggle to address in transnational cooperation. It is of interest to see 
how far these challenges are of a functional nature, or whether they are related to 
difficulties of cooperation in high politics.  
CHALLENGES
The processes of interaction, as retrieved from the interviews with Russian and European 
experts show that there is not only a shared will for cooperation. But, beyond that also a 
coherent understanding for the necessary steps that need to be taken to establish 
cooperation exists. However, based on a survey of the extant literature as well as 
qualitative interviews with experts from Russia and the EU several obstacles for 
transnational cooperation among research institutes have become visible. They draw 
attention to the gap between necessary and sufficient preconditions for cooperation. 
Interview questions were directed to learn about reasons for cooperation, methods of 
interaction, and difficulties for cooperation to start up or to continue. Throughout, it became 
clear that the majority of incentives and obstacles towards cooperation are deeply 
intertwined. 
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To begin with the research has presented a broader issue regarding the topical foci that 
are handled in cross-border cooperation across wider Europe. The interviews in Russia 
raised awareness of the fact that cooperation among Russian and European research 
institutes often deals with a lot more fundamental issues. The majority of pan-European 
projects among research institutes are designed with a very broad underlying approach 
and coverage of a wider topical realm (Interviewee B; Interviewee R; Interviewee H). This 
feeds into the nature of the matter, emphasising the most inherent need for constructing 
and maintaining cooperation. While there are countless successful examples of 
cooperation, the effort of building and upholding ties should not be underestimated. It 
leaves space within the projects for exploring common interests and establishing 
commonalities.  
But at the same time it increases the likelihood of projects being dependent on lead-figures 
(Interviewee D). This may lead to projects being limited in the variety of invested agency. 
Moreover, the lack of specifying research approaches and detailed topics leads to a lack of 
induced variation. This in turn leads to a facilitated return to commonly discussed topics 
among European and Russian research institutes. It limits the range of topics involved in 
cooperative projects and thus also the variety among the possible case studies for this 
thesis. But more importantly, it leads to some degree to a fatigue among the researchers 
to engage in cooperation when similar topics are discussed repeatedly. What this section 
demonstrates for this research project is the need to take a step back and work with the 
empirical presence, and thus available data. It justifies looking at cooperation among 
European and Russian research institutes in a more fundamental manner, and to take 
account of it while it is being shaped. 
Another challenge raised in most interviews is that research institutes’ main tool remains 
their claim to knowledge based authority. This authority, however, is not to be seen to 
provide them with the sovereignty to shape policy making to their liking. It is a soft power 
that is ideally used to contribute to enabling and developing an informed dialogue among a 
plurality of actors. However, acknowledging that it is a soft power points towards a difficulty 
for research institutes to exert influence in more general terms. And while the use of soft 
power is a common tool in the EU, it is rather unestablished in Russia. This point became 
clear throughout the interviews in which interviewees described different ways by which 
they set out to conduct research on a topic (Interviewee A; Interviewee B; Interviewee C; 
Interviewee R; Interviewee I). While this depends to some extent on the type of research 
institute, it is also related to external factors in terms of access to resources and demand 
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for and utilisation of the research. This emphasises the significance of the present political 
system as well as the current dominant discourse, and the dependent role of research 
institutes. While some projects are specifically initiated by a government or a contractor, it 
is much harder to interest an audience with independent research, particularly when the 
role of research institutes in the domestic system is not (yet) developed in such a way 
(Interviewee A). The transnational sphere offers opportunities to loosen the dependence 
on the purely domestic audience and systemic environment to some degree. 
Furthermore, an important challenge for research institutes lies in moving to the 
transnational level after being established domestically. As already noted before, many 
research institutes are based in a national environment and are adjusting to a highly 
increased demand for foreign and transnational knowledge (Boucher, et al., 2004, p.10). 
However, working at the transnational level requires different tools and measures (or at 
least a different application of the existing ones). To adjust to the ways of working takes 
resources in terms of time, staff (changes) and money. In this way activities need to be 
adjusted to concern the correct scope and subsequently need to be optimised to make the 
most of the opportunities that cross-border cooperation offers for research institutes. 
This sets clear limits to the abilities of research institutes, which can only be overcome 
through step-by-step development which is based on a need for sufficient demand. 
Exchange between research institutes can help to lower these limitations. But in the realm 
of foreign and security policy this is mainly used to develop an understanding for each 
others policy processes and critically review each other (Interviewee B; Interviewee C). 
However, it does not necessarily include the review of the cooperative processes in cross-
border relations. Beyond that, the highlighted predominance of government affiliation of 
research institutes in the EU and Russia and the related issue of independence still 
remains strong. Russian research institutes have the additional problem of being 
increasingly restricted through the centralisation policy followed by their government 
(Interviewee B; Interviewee I; Interviewee L). Moreover, entering a partnership with foreign 
institutes might bring even more restrictions, in referral to the recently updated law on 
foreign agents. But as interviewees described it: each institute, European or Russian, has 
to be creative in finding its channels and access points. 
In addition, interviewees coherently agreed in interaction among European based and 
Russian institutes/experts that recurring debates from high politics take centre stage too 
easily. Experts often attend events at which they have to explain the policies and acts of 
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the country in which their organisation is based, which puts them in a defensive position 
instead of being able to discuss common issues and hands-on solutions (Interviewee Q; 
Interviewee I). While there are enough possible topics of shared interest among the 
countries, foreign policy research by European and Russian research institutes is in its 
majority confined to a critical review of the respective others’ government appearance and 
policies. Therein, a number of topics prove particularly persistent (shared neighbourhood, 
Eurasian integration, NATO, human rights, democracy, energy politics and dependency, 
and nuclear proliferation). These topics are all of significance, however, a majority of 
interviewees indicated that they are constantly brought up in as a way to criticise each 
other, but not to develop constructive interaction in research. Interestingly the majority of 
scholars agrees that interaction and dialogue gets easily caught up in these virtual 
conflicts, which can be seen as hypocritical to some degree.  
Generally, it is exactly these critical topics that gain funding and media coverage. In first 
instance that leads to the conclusion that scholars need to act more considerately and 
diplomatically in their choice of interactive effort. Criticising and repeating the same 
perceived wrong-doings in meetings, speeches and presentations does from a conflict 
resolution point of view not have the other party relent in their ways. Instead it is likely to 
push them into a defensive position, though paradoxically they might not have set out to 
defend that position in the first place. But the repeated attack on the value system that 
they understand may lead them to explain and defend. However some Russian scholars 
see a twist in this, reasoning that the virtual conflicts were established to discredit Western 
voices and therewith exactly avoid political closure to the West, in the short-term that is 
(Busygina and Filippov, 2008). This would add another level of diplomatic interplay that 
needs to be considered when seeking to understand the goals of interaction and the 
various measures taken to reach those goals. The point has not been made as such in 
interviews for this research. Interviewees offered discontent with the recurring criticism of 
Russia’s politics hindering debates (Interviewee Q; Interviewee J). The frequent 
occurrence of criticism in research but also in the media and in political statements is likely 
to hamper cooperative activities. Moreover it takes away the focus from commonly 
researching and developing shared knowledge on topics of common interest (such as 
counter-terrorism, integration of minorities, migration, supporting the shared 
neighbourhood, promoting environmental politics, and more). 
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In this context another challenge towards transnational cooperation in wider Europe is 
raised, which relates to both the challenge of moving to the transnational sphere and the 
challenge of recurring debates from high politics. The recognition of transnational research 
is limited in various ways, based on the origin of the researcher(s). On the one hand, 
researchers talking/writing about their domestic environment are more easily perceived as 
experts by their domestic audience, while the foreign audience is more likely to perceive 
them as biased. On the other hand, researchers talking/writing about a foreign 
environment are more easily perceived as outsiders that cannot grasp the issue to the full 
extent, while some of the researchers’ domestic audience may perceive him/her as 
‘changing sides’ (Interviewee A; Interviewee L). Thus an international project does not 
necessarily provide acknowledgement of the work, and at the same time the 
acknowledgement is likely to differ across various audiences. Additionally, across Europe 
there is a gap in the perception on the quality of research that is bound by geographic and 
institutional factors. This hinders a more frequent and general exchange in the research 
sphere. 
Moreover, interviewees discussed that project-funding offered by the EU and EU based 
entities represents the main contribution to cross-border activities across wider Europe. 
This relates to the EU’s strong campaign for a role for expertise in politics, and at the same 
time to a prevailing non-accreditation of the EU as a significant security political actor by 
Russia. Instead, they recognise the US as the more important security political actor to 
look at. On this basis the interviews emphasise a clear division between who is really 
interested in the in EU-Russia relations at either side. Generally actors who share a border 
or a region of interest have more of an incentive to interact issue bound. Meaning they 
have a common interest in solving very specific issues that are not contained by borders 
and as such are faced by several actors commonly. An example is arctic security and the 
interactive effort that Finland and Russia established (Interviewee R; Interviewee B). 
Instead actors that are not directly concerned by issues and only bound to have an 
opinion, for example in the regional sphere of the EU, are more likely to debate broad 
policy issues and point out problems. This also connects to the aspect whether interaction 
is issue related or concerns the broader debate of EU-Russia relations. A number of 
interviewees stated that at bigger and non-project related events they often have to explain 
and defend the policies of the country their research institute is based in, instead of talking 
about common issues and solutions in a more hands-on manner (Interviewee Q; 
Interviewee J).  
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Beyond that, the field research shows that cross-border interaction is restricted in 
geographical terms. This aspect has been particularly highlighted in the interviews. While 
all Russian institutes confirm their interest in cooperative activities there exists a small 
amount of recurring countries in which partner organisations are based. In Europe, these 
include (but are not confined solely to) Germany, Poland, Finland, the UK and France 
(Interviewee Q; Interviewee C; Interviewee R). These countries either share geographic 
proximity with Russia, or have kept an interest in research on Russia that developed 
throughout Cold War times. This underlines that it is difficult to see the EU as one entity 
when dealing with Russia. The number of EU research institutes as well as truly 
transnational research institutes is highly limited. Therefore Russian institutes are most 
likely to find partners in nationally based institutes. However, both Russia as well as 
European MSs other than those few named above, are not likely to develop a strong 
amount of interest in cooperation. This decision is based on geographical proximity, topical 
overlap, perceived importance of a partner-country, and long-term construction of a 
partnership based on historic interaction. 
As a related aspect, the research provides for another geographical based challenge 
towards cross-border cooperation in wider Europe. It shows that the majority of Russian 
foreign and security policy experts agree that the United States (US) is a much more 
significant foreign and security policy player than the EU (Interviewee M; Interviewee H). 
While some agree that this is expressed through NATO on the European continent, others 
think that even NATO does not play a role in that equation anymore (Interviewee M). It has 
been clear from the outset that economic interaction between Russia and the EU has 
always been the more important discipline. The aim of this research is not to argue against 
this most obvious point. Instead it is of interest to investigate how far and why 
transnational cooperation among experts may take place although the level of political 
integration is limited and the political climate is strained at times. 
Another aspect that limits cooperation among research institutes is the predominance of 
general acts of cooperation like round-tables, seminars, discussion groups, or support for 
the same by funding (see Annex 2). Differences in efforts, expenses and sustainability 
necessary for the different types of interaction cause research institutes to primarily 
engage in these general acts of cooperation, rather then specific common projects. In turn 
they often build the groundwork for explicit commonly designed projects (Interviewee C; 
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Interviewee B). Project based interaction that would involve a higher degree of 
transnational effort appears much more scarcely. This dominance is true both within the 
EU and in Russia. However at Russian based research institutes the rate of both general 
interaction as well as project based interaction is generally fewer than in the EU. The two 
main explanations for this are the much higher number of research institutes in the EU, 
and beyond that the different political structures, which provide Russian political research 
institutes with much more restricted opportunities to conduct projects of their liking and to 
have a bearing with those (Interviewee A). Furthermore, project based transnational 
interaction is not only lacking at the more general level of being initiated in the first place. 
But in cases where project based cooperation takes place, interaction lacks at also at the 
functional level in terms of how it is conducted. These projects often miss a set of common 
definitions, as well as common conceptualisation and operationalisation which would avoid 
a common clash among the varying research cultures.
The relatively small amount of full-blown transnational research projects may come (to 
some degree) as a surprise based on the perception of high reciprocal interest that 
appeared in the research. However, it can be explained by two findings: the predominant 
importance of (single) social relations at the centre of cooperation, and the bound public 
support restricting the funding (Interviewee A; Interviewee C). In any case, it limits the 
research in so far as it is much more difficult to take account of trivial cooperation and 
develop an understanding for its set-up and its workings.
Finally, the questionable emergence of a new generation of IR specialists in Russia 
represents as much a challenge as it is an opportunity (see section on ‘opportunities’ 
above). It has been established by a few researchers that the new generation recognises 
the importance to increase transnational cooperation in order to develop common 
understandings and approaches towards shared foreign and security policy issues 
(Deriglazova et al., 2012, p.6). While this point has been agreed upon by some 
interviewees, others raised the concern that a new generation is missing as academia 
(and research) is currently not a prestigious job, and also their actions may be limited as 
their education and professional development requires them to work within given 
boundaries (Interviewee H; Interviewee A). Moreover, in some interviews it has also been 
questioned how far these tendencies represent much more the interest and opportunities 
of the youth to travel and enjoy international movement at lower cost, instead of the 
recognition for the need to interact transnationally (Interviewee P). The call for caution 
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reflects a position that is part of the current societal developments which in turn also have 
an impact on the changing perception of territory and power. Importantly this debate as 
such has further implications, indicating a partial acknowledgement of underdeveloped 
transnationalisation on behalf of the researchers. 
In sum, the challenges do not occur one by one but often a few of them operate in unison. 
The issues raised above highlight once again that transnational cooperation requires 
strong engagement in trust-building, resource-finding and mechanisation of new 
processes. Interaction in a transnational environment is more difficult to realise and 
requires more commitment to overcome language and cultural boundaries, difference in 
research cultures, historical boundaries, underlying differences in the legal systems, 
political boundaries, and related organisational difficulties integrating macro- and micro-
processes. But at the same time it enables research institutes and their staff to enter and 
strengthen a new research environment from which their domestic research benefits.  
Interestingly, the limited utilisation of project based cooperation has only been noted by a 
minority of interviewees. Instead the majority of interviewees has highlighted and outlined 
the importance of the existing methods of interaction. This, in relation to the pre-
dominantly broad topical foci (Interviewee B; Interviewee R) as well as the weak 
perception of opportunities, raises the question what type of cooperation is nurtured. This 
points towards the further question how far the development of cooperation is hindered by 
its own set-up and its participants. In this regard, the opportunities, processes, and 
challenges as perceived by the interviewees need to be reviewed on the basis of the 
specific case study in order to validate and enrich the thoughts with applied empirical 
material. 
In reference to the questions that are raised by setting up the taxonomy above, the 
opportunities, processes and challenges of transnational cooperation provide us with a few 
insights. In general, they are better addressed on the basis of the case study which 
provides more detailed information on participating actors, their input, and their manner of 
contributing to cooperation. However, the perceptions of cooperation in Chapter Four, that 
are less detailed in terms of participants and characteristics, provide some general 
impressions. In part the answers to these questions also link in with the descriptions 
provided in the section on the organic development of research institutes. The first few 
questions concern the lack of homogeneity among research institutes and how that is dealt 
 128
with in practical cooperation. In part this refers back to the varying organic development 
among the research institutes in the EU and Russia. This highlights that in addition to the 
characteristic differences caused by affiliation (non-governmental, quasi-independent, 
university affiliated, quasi-governmental, governmental, corporate, hybrid), their 
development in differing socio-political and economic environments causes them to 
operate and cooperate on the basis of different tools and capacities (McGann, 2011, p.10). 
The interviews show that the identification of partners plays an important role in the 
processes of cooperation. Often personal contacts and previously existing links facilitate 
the selection of foreign institutes. Herein, it can be said that the institutes working on EU-
Russian cooperation in foreign and security policy are generally established in the field for 
longer time, and the research community is manageable in terms of size. Therefore 
personal and institutional connections have long been formed and dominate collaboration 
(Interviewee C; Interviewee D; Interviewee S). In functional terms, the commonly broad 
topical focus of cooperative activities does basically allow for a broader range of actors to 
join the debates. On the other hand the restricted geographical habits of cooperation limit 
the range of actors, in purely functional terms. 
Therein it also answers the second range of questions that asks for the existence of a 
research environment and the differentiation of driving institutes as well as those that join 
later on. Interviewees have stated that new contacts to institutes in the field most 
commonly evolve through personal contacts (Interviewee C; Interviewee D; Interviewee S). 
In this way cooperation is primarily entered into on the basis of trust and interpersonal 
accountability. 
A final scope of questions concerns research institutes’ connection with politics, and the 
related debate on the availability of resources. On the one hand, many institutes have 
been established at nation state level, with a domestic audience in mind. Moreover, a 
majority of the institutes is affiliated to some degree to the government body, either by 
affiliation or by funding. This shows that politics takes an important impact on a majority of 
research institutes. On the other hand, it must also be considered that the institutes 
conduct research on politics and policy processes, and therefore concern themselves 
specifically with the political sphere. In this regard, many of them have the aim of providing 
advice to politics and civil society. Thus, the connections to politics provide them with 
access points to gain insights and spread expertise. A challenge that comes into view at 
this point is the recurring debates from high politics which many interviewees find difficult 
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to get around in cooperative activities. This is mainly based on the fact that interaction 
primarily promotes the exchange of knowledge and the explanation of each other’s 
governments polices. Thus, in their aim to investigate politics and policy processes, 
research institutes reinforce themselves a connection to politics, which provides them with 
opportunities but at the same time leads them towards independence from the political 
sphere. 
  
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
This chapter provides an understanding of public policy research institutes that work on 
foreign and security policy across wider Europe. It establishes what research institutes 
perceive as processes and opportunities of transnational cooperation, as well as the 
challenges that present themselves when looking in more depth at their operation and 
cooperation in the transnational sphere. Throughout it is primarily based on semi-
structured interviews conducted during field research. 
The geographical scope of the thesis concerns wider Europe and specifically the 
interaction among EU-based and Russian research institutes. In outlining their organic 
development the chapter grasps a range of differences among the institutes caused by the 
different socio-political and economic systems in which they have developed up to current 
times. The main point is that EU-based institutes entered the phase of transnationalisation 
earlier, while Russian institutes only started developing independently from the state since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and since then had to deal with reinventing themselves 
while being in a challenging economic and socio-political environment. 
Despite the inherent differences in their state of development, the research institutes share 
the range of tasks which they can avail themselves of as tools to make a contribution. 
These encompass the gathering of data, generating knowledge and spreading expertise. 
Moreover, the chapter establishes a typology for research institutes, by distinguishing a 
range of inherent characteristics. These encompass the level of governance that the 
institute is established at, the affiliation, and the output. Therein, it provides an abstract 
shortcut to grasp a few underlying and significant characteristics of research institutes on 
the basis of the three variables. This is further used to categorise the institutes 
participating in the case study and helps to distinguish their attributes and contributions.  
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Beyond that the chapter identifies a range of opportunities, processes and challenges 
towards cross-border cooperation, as perceived by the interviewees. The opportunities 
include a broader range of data, a broader range of funding sources, facilitated foreign 
contacts, publishing abroad and the development of a new generation of IR specialists. 
The challenges encompass the broad topical focus, soft power, domestic set-up of many 
research institutes, recurring debates from high politics, recognition of foreign 
research(ers), funding sources, geographic dependence of interaction, predominant 
interest in Russia-US relations, and a predominance of general acts of cooperation. 
As becomes clear, a number of the opportunities and challenges are closely related, like 
for example the funding sources, or the opportunity of facilitated foreign contacts is highly 
connected to the challenges of recognition of foreign research(ers) as well as the domestic 
set-up of many research institutes. Moreover it is visible that some of the challenges 
overlap with the differences established in the organic development, like for example the 
geographic dependence of interaction and the recurring debates from high politics. 
Importantly, the limited utilisation of project-based cooperation has only been noted by a 
minority of interviewees. The majority of interviewees has focused their discussion 
primarily on general acts of cooperation. Set in relation with the pre-dominantly broad 
topical foci as well as the basic perception of opportunities, this triggers a question about 
the impact of participants on their own cooperative practices. To establish the impact of 
these thoughts, it needs to be established how far these perceptions are validated in 
applied cross-border cooperation. The opportunities, processes, and challenges as 
perceived by the interviewees will be reviewed on the basis of the specific case study in 
Chapter Five. This provides further insights regarding the perception of the interviewees 
and the coherence with empirical findings.  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CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDY
The previous chapter has left us with an understanding of the inherent characteristics and 
tools of public policy research institutes across wider Europe, while taking care to relate it 
to their varying organic development. On that basis, the discussion on cross-border 
cooperation among research institutes has been entered. Building upon interviews 
conducted during fieldwork, the chapter introduced a range of perceived opportunities and 
challenges to cross-border cooperation among Russian and EU MSs based institutes. It 
demonstrated on the one hand that cooperation is limited in terms of topical focus and 
goals of the participants. The question this brings up is how far the challenges perceived 
by staff of research institutes translate into the conduction of cooperative activities. This 
triggers an in-depth review of applied cooperative practices, including a case study, in 
order to compare the outcomes from the fieldwork to further data sources.  
The function of Chapter Five is to clarify the practical conduct of cooperation in a bi- or 
multi-national frame. By turning the attention to the functional and operational level of 
transnational cooperation another analytical layer is added to the research which provides 
depth to the arguments. This enriches the subsequent discussion (see Chapter Six) that 
integrates both the findings based on the examination of the inter-relational conditions, as 
well as the outcomes from the analysis of the functional level. 
Starting in a broader realm, the chapter begins by highlighting that general acts of 
cooperation are considerably more common than specifically initiated transnational 
projects. On that basis it goes on to review general acts of cooperation, outlines commonly 
occurring practices in transnational research cooperation, and illustrates their limiting 
implications. Consequently, the second section turns to study the rarely occurring 
transnationally initiated projects. The example case is the Initiative for the Development of 
a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) which finds its roots in the 
OSCE’s Astana Declaration as well as the German-Russian-Polish trialogue (IDEAS, 
2012g). Both sections provide further ground for the two concerns raised in Chapter Four, 
namely the limitations to current transnational cooperation among research institutes, and 
the unawareness of research institutes about some of the challenges that they need to 
address to overcome limits in operating and cooperating at a truly transnational level. 
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PRACTICES IN RESEARCH COOPERATION
A fundamental interest in the field research has been to distinguish the formats of 
transnational cooperation among Russian and EU-based research institutes engaged in 
foreign and security policy. The amount of general acts of cooperation among these 
research institutes is considerably higher than the amount of explicit project-based 
interaction. This hypothesis that has been established and validated throughout the 
interviews conducted during field-research (Interviewee B; Interviewee C; Interviewee S). 
For this thesis, general acts of cooperation include seminars, conferences, and simple 
collaboration on edited books and articles. Project-based cooperation encompasses 
defined research projects with a clearcut multilateral framework. They consist of a 
sequence of cooperative activities that contribute to the same formulated target. In 
common terms they are finalised with the output of a project report. They often dedicate an 
own website that holds information on their aim, participants and output. These projects 
are generally found (but must not necessarily) to be named with an abbreviation of their 
full title, that is accessible and memorable. 
In this regard, the difference in numbers comes to some degree by definition, as general 
acts of cooperation include a range of activities while the scope of what defines project-
based cooperation is rather limited. However, the respective definition is in so far suitable 
as it differentiates between two particular ways of interaction that differ in terms of 
conduction, aims and output. General acts of cooperation are more simple in nature and 
have the primary aim of information exchange, as well as partnership building and 
maintenance. Instead project-based cooperation asks for more commitment often over a 
longer timeframe and looks to establish or further expertise jointly. In this sense, in general 
practices of cooperation each researcher is more likely to contribute their own piece, while 
project based cooperation promotes the release of one shared contribution. 
To further investigate the formats of transnational cooperation and examine how far the 
findings from the interviews translate into applied cooperation, a review of applied 
cooperation is conducted in the realm of this study. This is done in two ways. Firstly, by 
discussing general cooperative practices on the basis of a review of cooperative activities 
as discussed by research institutes in reports and on websites. This is exemplified in 
Annex 2, which offers a selected range of Russian and EU-based research institutes 
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working in the field of foreign and security policy, identifying general and project-based 
cooperation. Secondly, the chapter identifies a case study of project-based cooperation 
which has been established on the basis of the fieldwork interviews as well as a survey of 
the research organisations’ documents and websites.  17
Considering this review, it affirms that general cooperative practices are substantially more 
common than project based cooperation. The case for this can be made in both directions 
of the line of argument. First of all the number of cooperatively designed, launched and 
conducted projects with transnational partners is limited. Secondly, the amount of other 
general cooperative activities with transnational partners is significantly higher than the 
former. This is still true when considering a margin among acclaimed partnership and 
actual repeatedly utilised partnership (see Annex 2). 
The differences occur due to the varying efforts and expenses that need to be invested for 
each cooperative action. Here the overarching rule is that the more self-sufficient a project 
can be set up and conducted, the less effort and expense it is likely to incur. However, at 
the same time this might lower the quality of the output. Instead the output generally gains 
through increased cooperation with other actors for an event. Thereby the pool of (first 
hand) knowledge as well as audience and funding may be broadened (Interviewee C; 
Interviewee O; Interviewee E). Thus increased cooperations induces a perception of 
higher value of the event among the broad majority of the interviewees. 
The differences in numbers among project-based interaction and general interaction is 
applicable in both scenarios within the EU and beyond. However, when looking at 
cooperation among EU based and Russian research institutes the amount of explicit 
project-based interaction in foreign politics is particularly small. Also general types of 
cooperation are fewer, but they still constitute a multiple of the project-based interaction 
(see Annex 2). The two main explanations for this are the considerably higher number of 
research institutes in the EU. And beyond that Russian political research institutes are 
faced with more restricted opportunities to conduct projects of their liking (Interviewee A). 
Instead, inside the EU is a much more developed network among research institutes, both 
at national and transnational level.  
 The geographic focus lies on cooperation between EU member state based and Russian research 17
institutes, and the time-limit is going back at the most to 2008 to ensure relevance. The section is based on 
findings made in interviews, and data found on research institutes’ websites as well as in media reports.
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With regard to interaction among European and Russian foreign policy research institutes 
Germany represents one of the strongest partners. Many leading German research 
institutes have a rich history of partnership with Russian institutes. This concerns research 
institutes of various types, like the leading Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 
but also the party affiliated think tanks like Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, or University affiliated 
researchers for example from the University of Bielefeld. Moreover a lot of German 
foundations have established country-offices in Russia, which emphasises their 
involvement in many transnational projects. They help through funding, organisation, 
providing venues and their good name. Furthermore Russian institutes developed a strong 
exchange with Polish institutes. Though political cooperation has been strained for a long 
time, the proximity of the two countries and Poland’s rising position of influencing the EU’s 
politics towards Russia have led to the recognition of need for dialogue. In the same sense 
Russian institutes develop relations with institutes from the Baltic countries as well as the 
Nordic countries, due to a common interest in the Baltic Sea as well as the Arctic 
(Interviewee R; Interviewee S). The exchange with institutes from the Baltic and the Nordic 
States has increased the recognition of at least considering Russia’s position when having 
talks about the Northern Dimension in the EU. Interestingly, British research institutes have 
also developed a strong scholarship on Russia and cooperated with Russian institutes, 
even though the geographical and historical factors do not particularly speak for a 
proximity of the two countries. However, academic institutes, but also leading London think 
tanks, conduct comprehensive research on Russia and enter cooperation with Russian 
researchers (examples are King’s College, University of Birmingham, University of 
Glasgow, St. Andrews University, Chatham House). 
Despite all the positive examples, the interviews have specified that the level of 
cooperation increases with a change of topical focus towards science and technology. 
Furthermore, it increases when looking at interaction between Russian research institutes 
and their Asian and American colleagues (Interviewee M; Interviewee E). Thus the interest 
in as well as the demand for research in EU-Russia relations in the field of foreign and 
security policy is rather low currently, some would say barely existent (Interviewee M; 
Interviewee H). 
Importantly, while differentiating types of cooperation and determining the varying degrees 
to which these types occur, it is not the aim of the text to judge that one is more (or less) 
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worth than the other. Instead this section only examines how the different types of 
cooperation look like and what they consist of. It is then part of the discussion in Chapter 
Six to establish what opportunities each of them provide and also what they lack.  
Several types of general cooperative activities can be determined which occur as regular 
events on websites, in documents, and have been described in interviews. Most commonly 
research institutes set up projects that consist of round-tables and seminars, both single or 
in series. At these seminars a speaker presents research or opinion pieces on foreign 
policy issues of Russia, the EU, the EU Members States, or their common neighbourhood, 
which then leads to a debate with the audience. The presentations are mostly given by in 
house or domestic experts. However, for the cause of cooperation foreign experts may be 
invited to speak at times (Interviewee C; Interviewee Q). Examples are the European 
Dialogue at IMEMO, the Bertholt Beitz Centre seminars, or the Chatham House projects 
on Russia and Eurasia. This can take a more established form in terms of discussion 
groups and encourage a long-term format of organisation and participation. However, they 
are also more limited in membership. An example is the Grunewald Discussion Group. In 
Universities these talks often take the form of seminars that are conducted within a 
department which focuses on either European Studies, Russian Studies, or Central and 
Eastern European Studies. They appear as both long-term planned as well as ad hoc in 
reaction to current events (see Annex 2). 
Another common occurrence in transnational cooperation is the cross-border support of 
projects through funding. Most Russian research institutes interviewed for this research 
have in some shape or form organised an event in cooperation with one of the German 
foundations present in Russia. Generally that would be the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung or the 
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (Interviewee C; Interviewee B; Interviewee S). Apart from this, 
sponsorship by the European Commission is also provided specifically in the range of the 
Partnership for Modernisation program as well as in higher education. An example for 
support on cooperative projects in higher education are the Tempus projects at St. 
Petersburg University, or the European Centre at the Immanuael Kant Baltic Federal 
University (see Annex 2). These examples show the strong advantage of working 
transnationally through shared resources. However, conditions for interactions have been 
complicated through the decision of the Russian government to introduce the foreign 
agents law, that applies to all organisations funded by foreign donors (International Centre 
 136
for Not-For-Profit Law, 2014). This leaves an aftertaste for many organisations both foreign 
and domestic, and discourages domestic institutes to take funding from foreign institutes. 
A further option for cooperation can be found in the traditional educational sector. 
Throughout the interviews, education has generally been named as one of the most 
important channels and areas of impact that researcher institutes (especially of academic 
nature) can avail themselves of (Interviewee C; Interviewee A; Interviewee Q). The 
importance of this channel was recognised in raising awareness for common political 
issues, and providing early training for young adults to understand and discuss political 
issues in the multipolar international environment. Beyond that, research institutes also 
see further opportunities in this sector, for example interaction with other institutes often 
leads to some exchange of resources, through researchers/teachers exchange, exchange 
of research material, common research projects and shared funding. This is encouraged 
as mentioned above, for example through EU Commission funding for TEMPUS or 
Erasmus Mundus Projects, as well as the buildup of European Studies Centres in Russia 
(see Annex 2). 
However, it must be noted that the accessibility of resources also varies in this sector. On 
the one hand, funding may be more readily available for student/early career events, 
however, the amount is still limited and rarely covers the costs that meet the participants of 
a transnational event. At the same time, language has often been named as the most 
obvious disruptive aspect in resource exchange. Many Russian projects and materials are 
produced in the Russian language. In the same way, many European countries produce 
documents and materials in their home-base language, however, throughout the EU the 
amount of material produced in English as a common language is significantly higher than 
in Russia. This is a restrictive system in which limited funding for translation in smaller 
activities hampers the reach of reports, documents and project outputs (Interviewee A; 
Interviewee L). However, this is something that can be tackled with the help of 
transnational projects in which documents and outputs are produced in several languages. 
Moreover, interaction in the form of educational events can contribute in the long-run as 
well when they are complemented by language training. 
Most common educational projects that universities as well as a number of think tanks and 
foundations establish or support are summer schools or youth conferences. These 
conference-like events are used to debate common interests and gain awareness of the 
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multinational character of most political issues. This aims not only to raise awareness of 
other positions, but also allows dialogue and cross-border contacts to be established early 
on. There are a number of Universities who offer these summer schools on EU-Russia 
relations on a recurring basis, like the European University of St. Petersburg, the 
University of Tartu, the University of Helsinki, and others. Moreover several think tanks and 
foundations offer conference-like events for exchange among young adults. An example is 
the Centre for International and Regional Politics (CIRP), St. Petersburg. This is a small 
think tank which encourages an annual summer or winter school for young adults from the 
Baltic countries. For the organisations based in St. Petersburg the focus on the Baltic 
partners is a common feature for cooperation. The summer school however, allows space 
to go beyond the Baltic region. The latest event for example concerns the EU’s and 
Russia’s shared neighbourhood and takes place in north-west Russia (Interviewee T). 
Referring back to the three identified tasks of a research institute (in Chapter Four), the 
research on cooperative practices shows that most cooperative activities as discussed 
above serve the basic goal of information, learning about the respective other and trying to 
understand the respective others actions. It emphasises that informative, educational 
events with an opportunity for critical engagement seem most common and in this sense 
highlight the basic goals that the cooperation serves so far. Therein it also shows how 
much further research cooperation can progress. Moreover, it depicts a clear role for 
university affiliated institutes in encouraging and conducting cooperation across the 
borders between the EU and Russia. While current researchers spend a significant 
amount of time learning about the respective other, cooperation in university affiliated 
institutes offers new generations the chance to acquire an understanding of both the EU 
and Russia as well as their interplay early on (Interviewee A; Interviewee E; Interviewee 
K). This is particularly the case, as university affiliated research institutes in Russia seem 
more responsive to transnational cooperation with EU institutes. At the same time think 
tanks need to define their role at the transnational level better and expand it to more 
potential. Currently academic research institutes and think tanks seem to duplicate 
cooperative research methods to some extent, as becomes visible in the commonly used 
seminars and round-tables. The following case study assists to shed further light on the 
different roles of research institutes in cooperation. 
While the cooperative practices are to some degree limited in their formats and purposes, 
they reflect what is possible in terms of cooperation within the current dominant discourse. 
The activities represent a stage in the development of interaction among Russian and EU-
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based research institutes, which is needed to stipulate the basis for cooperation. Therein, 
it is guided by reflection on cooperation and the political discourse in high politics as one of 
the topical foci. 
PROJECT-BASED INTERACTION: IDEAS
The project 
The project under examination is IDEAS which is a multinational project that has looked to 
determine commonalities and hurdles in the development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 
security community (IDEAS, 2012, p.3f). The project finds its roots in a slow-paced long-
term pan-European integration process that has been intermittently promoted in the realm 
of the OSCE. In the ‘Charter of Paris for a new Europe’ the then CSCE (Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) participating states have for the first time declared to 
promote an era of respect and cooperation across Europe and beyond (OSCE, 1990). The 
states went on to spend a period of almost two decades of trials and errors in establishing 
these respectful and reliable methods of cooperation. Importantly, after this period of two 
decades, the idea has been picked up again by Russia’s newly elected president 
Medvedev. In June 2008 he first promoted an intensified debate on security political 
cooperation across wider Europe which considers existent security deficits. He drew 
particular attention to the limited abilities of existing frameworks and organisations to 
comprehensively deal with the security challenges and referred to the advantages of a 
binding agreement (Klein, 2009, p. 6f; Lo, 2009, p.1f; Layton, 2014, p.2). However, in 
August 2008 the relations between Russia and the EU cooled down sharply over the 
conflict between Russia and Georgia. But Medvedev persisted and initiated further debate 
on his proposal in December 2008 at the OSCE foreign ministers meeting in Helsinki. In 
the following it has been translated under Greek chairmanship into the Corfu Process 
(2009) that aimed to develop an ongoing dialogue on revisiting the pan-European security 
architecture. On the basis of these debates, Medvedev formulated a proposal for a 
European Security Treaty which he forwarded to heads of states and organisations in 
November 2009. While he stated that this proposal was open to any further input by all 
parties (President of Russia, 2009), the common response was one of caution. It was seen 
to propose a replacement of existing structures, and set out to redefine (or possibly 
undermine) the roles of involved actors (such as NATO and the OSCE) while 
strengthening Russia’s positioning (Saradzhyan, 2009). However, among the OSCE 
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member states the dialogue was kept going, though at a more slow pace and non-binding 
in nature. It was carried forward by the chairmanship of Kazakhstan who initiated regular 
meetings that led to the OSCE summit in Astana (OSCE, 2010) and was consolidated in 
the ‘Astana Declaration’ where states committed themselves to advance work on a Euro-
Atlantic and Eurasian security community. Herein they introduced the conceptual note of a 
‘security community’ in their agreement (OSCE, 2010; IDEAS, 2012, p.7). This concept, 
first theorised in more detail by Karl Deutsch in 1957, describes security political 
integration among two or more states to form an area in which tensions are overcome by 
peaceful means. This community may be either formally unified or the states may retain 
their sovereignty. Therein it draws on a non-realist understanding of international 
cooperation, and instead emphasises the importance of social links and intensified 
transnational cooperation (Adler & Barnett, 1998, pp.3-5). While the relation between the 
EU and Russia was riddled by to many disagreements, conflicts and mutual 
disappointment to represent an approximation of what Adler and Barnett define as a 
nascent security community (Adler and Barnett, pp.50-52), a further strengthening of their 
interaction was dependent on trust-building initiatives involving all levels of society. 
However, as the IDEAS project points out, in the case of pan-Europe there is a different 
perception among states how to promote a security community, either by first addressing 
hard security issues, or by first promoting a value community. These differences need to 
be overcome in order to promote integration successfully (IDEAS, 2012, p.7).  
Further development on the Astana declaration resulted in the Helsinki+40 decision 
(2012), which established the timeframe in which the participating OSCE members are to 
address the differences that exist among them (Liechtenstein, 2013; OSCE, 2013, p.1).  18
On this background research fellows from the Institute for Peace Research and Security 
Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) initiated the IDEAS project in 2012. As the 
IFSH also encompasses the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), it has experts in the field 
of the OSCE and its initiatives. The IDEAS project has picked up the revived drive for 
security integration on the agenda of the OSCE. As such, the project took a step towards 
facilitating (at a small scale) the needed rapprochement to possibly engage with the vision 
developing a security community. It provided a transnational forum for an expert 
community to develop as epistemic community and discuss the feasibility of intensified 
security cooperation. Therein it enabled an informed discussion among researchers as 
 By now, the Helsinki+40 timeframe has passed, and the process and dialogue on pan-European security 18
integration has been eroded by the Ukraine crisis (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 2015, p.3).
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well as policy makers and government officials. This was reinforced by the decision of the 
initiators to conduct the project based on track-two diplomacy, following up on a proposal 
raised in the OSCE, to promote an interactive network of academic institutions at 
transnational level (OSCE, 2011; Interviewee O, 2012). Thereby the initiators emphasised 
their point of view, that a security community is not restricted to states or governmental 
decisions, but involves all levels of society. As mentioned before in this thesis, participation 
enables to shape an underlying discourse of a process (Haas, 1990, 9ff; Adler & Haas P. 
1992). But at the same time, to move towards a rapprochement of what Adler and Barnett 
call a nascent security community, they put forward the argument that far-reaching trust-
building initiatives at all societal levels are required (Adler and Barnett, pp.50-52).  
Having seen a very similar project in the previous Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) 
that was spearheaded by the Carnegie Endowment, the idea was introduced to have such 
a project with more European involvement (Carnegie Endowment, 2014). Discussing 
matters of pan-European foreign and security-political integration it seemed suitable to 
frame a new multinational project involving European states and Russia. The 
organisations that ultimately conducted the project are the IFSH, the Polish Institute of 
International Affairs (PISM), the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) 
and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) from France. This limited group of 
four public policy research institutes profits from and builds upon the combination of two 
previously existent trialogues. The first is the more recent Polish-German-Russian 
trialogue, and the second concerns the Weimar trialogue which is a cooperative framework 
among Germany, France, and Poland (IFSH, 2012, p.8). Both of them represent trust-
building initiatives by the respective heads of states as well as their foreign ministers to 
establish cooperation and promote common progress across Europe. The Weimar triangle 
served mainly for matters of reconciliation between Germany and its largest neighbours. 
Since 1991 they cooperate on matters of European policy and foreign policy, for example 
supporting Poland in its transformation since it freed itself from communist rule. This frame 
still provides for regular meetings among heads of states as well as at ministerial level 
(Das Auswärtige Amt, 2011).  
On the other hand, the Polish-German-Russian trialogue serves as a viable instrument to 
encourage cooperation among the EU and Russia. In earlier times France usually took a 
strong role among Germany and Russia to discuss topics relating to EU-Russia relations 
and EU-NATO relations. But that format broke down due to the reluctance of other 
member states to become involved in intensifying cooperative ties. Poland becoming 
 141
involved in a renewed cooperative process, while it was previously rather averse to closer 
ties between the EU and Russia, indicated a new drive for EU-Russian interaction 
(VALDAI, 2012). The Polish-German-Russian trialogue has in the meantime developed 
into a format which is provisionally accepted as relevant for a variety of events, like young 
expert conferences or expert discussion groups (DGAP, 2014 & 2013). Importantly, it must 
be kept in mind though that both initiatives are merely consultations, which aim to 
contribute to trust building in the long-term. 
With regard to the IDEAS project it must be highlighted that the number of participating 
states is highly limited, considering that it analyses an idea that has been agreed by 56 
states in the OSCE. But Wolfgang Zellner, the coordinator of the IDEAS research group, 
states in the description of the project that the aim is to establish a broader research 
network in the following years (IFSH, 2012). Thus the smaller frame serves to consolidate 
the beginning of a broader cooperative network, enabling faster realisation of fundamental 
research in the beginning.  
The agreements in the OSCE and the overriding thought of the IDEAS project both aim to 
encourage debate on the possibilities for foreign and security policy convergence. Though, 
in the years leading up to the project, the foreign and security policy developments across 
wider Europe and beyond did not reflect rapprochement. A number of differences that 
existed before have since intensified. This is particularly the case for the ever varying 
relation among the West (specifically the EU and some of its member states) and Russia. 
In the context of the previous two decades being an era to establish respect and 
cooperation, the work between Russia and the EU is not complete. Although respect and 
mechanisms for cooperation have been established to some degree, this has not led to a 
status of reliability and trust. While 2010 saw the launch of the Partnership for 
Modernisation, a common stance for a renewal of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement from 1997 has not yet been found. On that background, it has become visible 
over recent years that disunity among the EU and Russia are becoming much more 
prevalent again. 
At the time when the IDEAS project was initiated in 2011, the EU has still been very busy 
dealing with the economic crisis and its aftershocks, which implied a limited focus on its 
dealings with its external environment. The austerity measures to overcome the crisis led 
to sustained violent protests particularly in Greece, but also in Spain, Belgium, Portugal, 
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Ireland, Slovenia and Lithuania (Traynor & Moya, 2010). This is not the end; some protests 
have been resumed repeatedly as is currently the case in Spain. 
At the same time, Russia prepared to re-elect its former president and then prime minister 
Vladimir Putin back into the position as president. For a broad range western actors 
(politicians as well as policy experts and organisations that review elections) the 
democratic execution of these elections has been disputed. Instead they were reviewed 
critically as an illustration of the high degree of power that Putin possesses in the Russian 
Federation. And beyond it sparked questions about where the determined leader would 
steer the country with his autocratic governance approach. The 2011 State Duma elections 
as well as the 2012 presidential elections, have been accompanied by a long series of 
large-scale protests in Russia and specifically Moscow. Between 2011 and 2013 protesters 
for fair elections on the one hand have repetitively faced the police and pro-government 
protesters in violent rallies.  
The developments since the disintegration of the Soviet Union show that respect and 
cooperation were established to some degree by 2011. At the same time there have been 
numerous events and struggles that highlight the instability of these concepts in EU-
Russia relations time and again. So far they have not been consolidated through reliability 
which could in turn foster trust. Thus, in essence the necessary prerequisites have been 
put into place, but they have not been solidified by further trust-building. The lack of trust 
fostered through an absence of experiences of open dialogue brings differences to re-
surface easily and sparks mutual weariness about returning issues (IDEAS report, 2012, p.
12). Ultimately the securitisation and optimisation of one’s own position is most valuable to 
the states, and dialogue for common progress is hampered by this inherent aspect. Joint 
activities provide a clear step forward in terms of trust-building measures, but are 
conducted insufficiently so far. 
In this environment where Russia and the EU are preoccupied with domestic turmoils, 
cooperation stagnates and mutual frustration slowly spreads, the IFSH initiated the 
multinational IDEAS project. With the support of their foreign ministries, institutions from 
Germany, Russia, Poland and France set up IDEAS in 2011 to encourage dialogue on 
commonalities and common interests in the political and security-political realm. This 
project constitutes a response to the Astana Declaration in which the OSCE states 
recommitted to a long-ranging future vision for a ‘free, democratic, common and indivisible 
security community’ (OSCE, 2010). This formulation by the OSCE represents a broad 
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space that is understood differently by every single person. However, there are also 
enough aspects where a common history of experiences, a wish for improved security and 
welfare, and some basic respect for human life lead people to approve similar aspects. 
IDEAS was aimed to make a start and ‘fill that formulation with life’ while working in a 
multinational sphere. It looks to illustrate where opinions overlap and what hindrances 
exist towards increased integration and a community of improved security.  
The lead participants 
After outlining the project and its context it is important to understand who the participating 
actors are, in this case the four institutions as well as the lead staff members involved in 
the project.  
The IFSH is a leading German academic institute on peace and security research. It is an 
independent research foundation that is situated at the University of Hamburg. Foremost, it 
operates three foreign and security policy research centres which engage in research, 
policy advice and consultancy. Beyond that the IFSH contributes to the postgraduate 
education at the University of Hamburg, offering Master and PhD studies in subjects 
related to peace and security (ISFH, 2014). Importantly for this project, one of the research 
centres at the IFSH is the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE). Established in 2000, 
CORE is the first research centre worldwide that specifically analyses the OSCE as well as 
foreign and security policy developments in the OSCE region. Beyond that they provide 
policy advice based on their research efforts, and also offer training courses for those 
states taking up the rotating chairmanship of the OSCE (IFSH, 2014b). CORE is 
represented by three people on the team, namely Wolfgang Zellner, Frank Evers and 
Ullrich Kühn. Zellner, who also acts as coordinator of the IDEAS research group, is the 
head of CORE and the adjutant director of ISFH. He is highly published with research on 
the OSCE, conventional arms control, European security, and security political cooperation 
(IFSH, 2014c). Evers is a research fellow as well as the adjutant head of CORE. His 
research interests concern the CIS member states, security politics in the CIS, cooperation 
between the OSCE-EU, and cooperation between the OSCE and their Mediterranean and 
Asian partners. Simultaneously he provides advice to the OSCE representation in Ukraine 
and the German Foreign Office. Beyond that he has contributed to the setup of the OSCE 
academy in Kyrgyzstan and also teaches there (IFSH, 2014d). Kühn is a research fellow at 
CORE with his expertise in European security, the OSCE and conventional as well as 
nuclear arms control. Beyond being one of the leading members of the IDEAS project he 
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publishes on arms control and also coordinates the transnational project ‘challenges to 
deep nuclear cuts’ (IFSH, 2014e).  
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) describes itself as an independent think 
tank working in broad terms on foreign and security policy. The institute is also affiliated to 
the Polish Ministry of Foreign affairs, providing analyses and advice specifically for polish 
diplomats (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). PISM wants to make an impact on 
policy-making processes with fundamental research (PISM, 2014). Beyond that the 
institute is strongly involved in transnational and international research projects, as well as 
interaction with similar research institutes from around the world (PISM, 2014b). 
Simultaneously the institute also offers a number of short-term or weekend courses for 
businesses, public employees and the like. These courses are designed to learn about 
behaviour and norms in diplomatic situations. 
PISM is represented with one permanent position in the IDEAS project which is held by 
Lukasz Kulesa. He is heading the non-proliferation and arms control project of PISM, and 
his research particularly focuses on weapons of mass destruction. In addition to his work 
for the research institute he has also been employed to advise the Polish government in 
security and defence issues (PISM, 2014c).  19
MGIMO is the leading Moscow University on International Relations. Its broad curriculum 
encompassing economics, business, politics, law, energy politics, European studies, and 
journalism, feeds into a wide range of interests related to International Relations. Next to 
the educational activities, MGIMO also comprises a prestigious scholarship known for their 
economic and political research. In this context it is also well connected with the Russian 
Academy of Sciences in its research activities (Interviewee O). MGIMO is represented by 
one permanent member in the IDEAS project, Andrei V. Zagorski. Zagorski is professor at 
MGIMO and the head of the arms control and conflict resolution section at the Institute of 
World Economy and International Relations in the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO 
RAS) (OSCE Moldova, 2010). His research experience makes him one of Russia’s leading 
IR experts including Russian foreign politics, arms control, European security, as well as 
Russian relations with the EU, NATO and the OSCE (PIR Centre, 2014b). 
 Since May 2014 Lukasz Kulesa has moved on from his position in PISM, but is still works with them by 19
affiliation as a research associate.
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From France the leading think tank FRS joined as one of the four actors in this project. 
This relatively young institute (founded in 1998) is one of the primary French research 
institutes working in the realm of security and defence politics. It claims to be an 
independent research centre which conducts research projects and provides advice for the 
French government and its ministries, public agencies, European institutions and 
agencies, international organisations, as well as business and private sectors (Fondation 
pour la Reserche Stratégique, 2013). FRS is also represented by three people on the 
IDEAS team, namely Camille Grand, Yves Boyer and Isabelle Facon. Camille Grand is the 
director of FRS, who previously worked for the French ministry of foreign affairs on 
security political issues. His main research interests concern conventional as well as 
nuclear arms control, European security, and transatlantic security (Fondation pour la 
Reserche Stratégique, 2013b). Boyer is adjutant director of FRS, and simultaneously 
deeply involved in higher education on national security and defence (as well as teaching 
as professor at the college of Polytechnics in Palaiseau). His main research interests 
encompass geopolitics strategic studies, European security, and transnational security 
(Fondation pour la Reserche Stratégique, 2013c). Isabelle Facon is a senior research 
fellow in FRS who is highly published in Russian security and defence policy. Therein she 
examines Russian security strategies and doctrines, but also analyses its cooperation with 
partner countries and regional organisations particularly in central Asia and East Asia 
(Fondation pour la Reserche Stratégique, 2013d). 
All four institutes and their representatives that take part in the IDEAS project have a 
highly developed curriculum in European security and East-West relations. Therein, they 
complement each other through the interdisciplinarity of their research interests, 
encompassing security politics, EU and Russian Studies, economics and history. This 
provides among them an extended knowledge in the research areas that underlie this 
project. Beyond that they are all well interlinked with research contacts at transnational 
and international level. Thus they have experience in interaction with foreign colleagues to 
a varying degree, though it must be taken into account that transnational interaction is 
rather rarely taking place in the format of very specific projects like IDEAS. Instead the 
majority of transnational interaction is usually constituted by personal research contacts 
and exchange at a much more informal level and often on a more ad hoc basis. Moreover, 
all participating institutes combine research and educational activities, although to differing 
degrees and each with a different audience.  
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Contacts and Relations 
To understand the contacts and relations among the four public policy research institutes it 
is of importance to note that the IFSH is spearheading the project. The IFSH is the lead 
organisation and driving force, in particular the CORE director and fellows Zellner, Kühn 
and Evers who represented the IFSH in this project. They initiated the project and got the 
other organisations on board to promote a required multinational character. Zellner also 
took on the role as project coordinator and the project report was first drafted mainly by 
Zellner (with input by Kühn, Evers, Kulesa and Zagorski) before being sent out to the other 
institutes.  
The depth of contacts and relations among the four institutes have been at a varying level 
before they conducted this common and highly interactive project. Beginning with the IFSH 
as the actor to drive cooperation, it was established that a Russian institute should be 
involved as the project looks at the wider European region and beyond. Previously strongly 
developed relations with MGIMO, especially with Andrei Zagorski, in addition to the 
suitable research focus made it an easy choice to ask MGIMO to become involved. 
Although it must be highlighted that this has been the first specific multinational policy 
consultation project of a bigger scope on which they cooperated. Previous interaction has 
been mainly for edited books, articles, and information exchange. Furthermore, the 
successful framework of the Germany-Poland-Russia trialogue prompted the decision that 
a Polish institute should be involved. Poland had few suitable institutes and among them 
PISM was constituted best in terms of research focus, resources, and experience with 
foreign interaction. This was the first time that the IFSH has interacted with PISM and 
specifically Lukasz Kulesa. There has been no previous contact between the institutes. 
Beyond that France is recognised as one of the main consulting partners for Germany 
regarding European security issues. This relates back to historical issues which made the 
German-French cooperation process a centre piece of European integration. French 
foreign and security policy research institutes have at that time been commonly focused on 
strategic studies. This differentiates the FRS slightly from the other three institutes. 
Cooperation between the IFSH and the FRS has existed previously to a very small degree 
and solely on a personal basis between one specific researcher of each institute 
(Interviewee O). 
While a number of countries showed an interest in being involved in the project, the 
decision was taken to keep it a small group in the first round in order to see how 
interaction works out, whether it leads to anything concrete, and to what extent a 
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multinational set up can be organised efficiently. However, the plan was made early on to 
increase the number of participants for resulting initiatives, in particular the academic 
network among OSCE members (Interviewee O; IDEAS, 2012, p.6).  
Conducting Cooperation 
Understanding the conduction of cooperative activities lies at the heart of this case study. It 
contributes crucially to the thesis by adding another analytical level to the wider study of 
the potential of research institutes in foreign and security policy cooperation. Among the 
cooperative activities, macro and micro processes that take place are equally of interest. 
Macro processes encompass the rough procedure of this project, while micro processes 
concern the subtleties of cooperation. Thus macro processes concern the planned 
sequence of the project. Instead micro processes encompass the formal/informal 
character of interaction and the use of flexible/unrestricted channels of communication. 
Most important in cooperation are the plan of interaction and the channels of 
communication. The plan provides everyone with a guide on what is happening next 
without requiring ongoing explanation by a project leader, and the communication 
channels offer the possibility to discuss details of further steps. The plan of interaction 
belongs to the macro-processes, and in the case of IDEAS encompasses a start-up 
meeting, four workshops, and the preparation of a common report which is to be presented 
in a given timeframe to the OSCE member states in Vienna. The communication channels 
are covered by both macro and micro processes in the IDEAS project. This is the case as 
the workshops and additional meetings with officials in each city are channels of 
communication which have been planned as part of the basic procedure. On the other 
hand emailing has been used for all other communication, which took place at a flexible 
and informal level. This means it was not part of the guide and could be used in a 
complementary manner whenever needed. 
The different channels of communication offer certain attributes for the members of a 
multilateral project. Communication that follows an open plan is accessible for everyone, 
like the start-up meeting, the workshops, and the additional meetings with officials in each 
country. Moreover, flexible and complementary communication channels like the use of 
email and Skype offer support for facilitated interaction. However, at the same time these 
flexible channels are likely to be limited in access and can therefore personalise and 
improve interaction among a selected few of the group. This rapprochement may happen 
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by coincidence or may be intended, and it is facilitated if (parts of) groups are set-up 
through the common method of previous personal acquaintance. It must be considered 
that this may have an impact on how the project is conducted, especially the topic areas 
considered, and the people invited to contribute. For this reason it is important to know the 
participants previous contacts or relations to each other. The impact of relations on 
communication is identified in a final section that considers the inferences that can be 
drawn from this project. The same is true for both their impact on the conduct and output 
of the project. 
In the case of the IDEAS the plan of interaction was constructed on the basis of one tool 
(workshops) and in an explicit timeframe. To begin with, the initial formation of the project, 
ranging from the very first idea to the actual start, took a few years and required a few 
attempts. In contrast the conduct of the project itself was limited to a short time frame of a 
few months. In the beginning the idea had to be promoted towards the political sphere and 
in the same approach funding had to be secured. Moreover an institute from each of the 
three selected partner-countries had to be determined to join the IFSH for the IDEAS 
project, each represented by a main contact person and possibly further research fellows. 
To start the project the main contact persons of each institute had a start-up meeting held 
in at the IFSH in Hamburg. The IFSH had established from the beginning that the project 
would take the format of a succession of workshops. Thus, at the meeting the sequence of 
workshops was determined, as well as broader content that each respective workshop 
would cover. In order to do so they had to discuss their target audience and determine 
what topic areas were to be addressed in the report. 
In the following, the four interactive workshops were held each hosted by one of the 
institutes with support by their foreign ministry. Starting in Berlin, they moved on to 
Warsaw, Paris and Moscow (in this sequence). These workshops were held under 
Chatham House rules and were not open to the public. Instead they had a limited number 
of invited participants (approximately 30-40 participants each) and the invitations were the 
responsibility of the respective host institute. Furthermore, each of the workshops would 
have the general aim of looking at the potential and the obstacles for a Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian security community. But beyond that each of them was directed towards a 
specific transnational security issue (IFSH, 2012, p.8). The first workshop took place in 
Berlin in March 2012 (Germany), not in Hamburg where the IFSH is based, as the German 
Federal Foreign Office and the Foreign Ministry had a high interest in the project. The 
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subject of this workshop concerned arms control (IDEAS, 2012b). The second took place 
in Warsaw (Poland) in May 2012 and was aimed at discussing sub-regional conflicts 
(IDEAS, 2012c). The third took place in Paris (France) in June 2012 and concerned the 
broad subject area of transnational threats and challenges (IDEAS, 2012d). During the 
fourth workshop which took place in Moscow (Russia) in July 2012 all three topics from 
previous workshops were discussed (IDEAS, 2012e). 
All the workshops were opened by a high-ranking official working for the Foreign Ministry 
of the respective host country (IDSH, 2012 p.8). This provided the track-two project with 
recognition, and connected it to the political sphere. The workshops were also all set up in 
the same format. The meetings in Berlin (IDEAS, 2012b) and Moscow (IDEAS 2012e) 
were each set up among three round-tables, and the meetings in Warsaw (IDEAS, 2012f) 
and Paris (IDEAS 2012d) were set up among four round-tables. Each round-table started 
with one or two short introductory statements regarding the discussed topic area. After a 
few minutes the discussion was opened up to all participants. Interviews indicated that this 
format worked particularly well due to the limited number of participants, although it ran the 
risk of relying on a small pool of opinions and not considering enough perspectives 
(Interviewee O). However, as in each undertaking the balance must be found to produce a 
trusted and interactive environment that offers each participant the opportunity to speak, 
while also being as multifaceted as possible. Importantly, it must be noted that the 
discussions throughout the workshops were taken very seriously by the lead institutes. 
Remarks, questions and criticism alike have been noted and re-considered during the 
preparation of the final report (IDEAS, 2012f). 
  
In addition to the workshops the lead participants had the opportunity to meet officials in 
each of the countries that they visited for the respective workshops (IDEAS, 2012g). These 
meetings were initiated by the host institute who used their connections with government 
officials to organise them. In all four countries the lead participants met with mid- to high-
ranking officials from the Foreign and/or the Defence Ministry (Interviewee O). This 
provided them with additional insights on each country’s foreign and security policy line, 
and gave them the opportunity to raise the recognition of the project within each 
government.  
After the workshops have been conducted a report was to be prepared among the lead 
participants. This was to be presented at a meeting among the ambassadors of the OSCE 
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member states in October 2012, giving them three and a half months for this task. To 
identify the input from the workshops and clarify the content of the report on that basis, a 
follow up meeting took place among the lead participants in Moscow. It was agreed that 
Wolfgang Zellner as the coordinator of the project would take the initiative to write a first 
draft with inputs given by Kuehn, Evers, Zagorski and Kulesa. The draft was then sent to 
all lead participants and they were enabled to review it and request changes. This form of 
cooperation was chosen in order to keep the difficulties of time management among the 
group of researchers to a minimum (Interviewee O). This was absolutely necessary due to 
the limited timeframe and the clear deadline. Throughout the process of preparing the 
report email contact was the outstanding tool for communication and interaction among the 
group-members.  
Project Output 
IDEAS is a policy advice project which is endowed with a clear cut ending and plainly 
determined aims to be reached in the set time. To be able to not only discuss the 
outcomes but also get an indication how far the project has come in the given time, it is of 
importance to recall the objectives that were established at the start.  
The objectives encompass five aspects, the first of which concerns the initiation of a 
transnational network of academic institutions (OSCE, 2011; IDEAS report, 2012, p.3). 
Secondly, the research aim was to develop a vision for a common security community by 
advancing the discussion on the security community and filling it with life. This not only 
means to reactivate the debate and keep it in people’s mind. Instead it sets the aim to 
‘contribute to a critical and illuminating debate on the conceptualisation of a security 
community’ (IDEAS report, 2012, p.3). Moreover it was planned to adhere to a limited 
timeframe and present a report in Vienna in 2012 to representatives from all OSCE 
countries (IDEAS report, 2012, p.3). An additional objective came up in the discussion of 
the target audience. It was noted that the group was split in two regarding who they aim to 
address with their report and project. Two institutes wanted OSCE to give only specific 
advice, in order to be able to provide explicit input and make a strong impact. On the other 
hand, two institutes preferred the inclusion of the general security political environment 
and to have the OSCE as one part of it (IFSH Annual Report, 2012). The decision was 
made to include the international environment and the OSCE in the report, while 
highlighting the steps that the OSCE may be able to take in support of such a broad 
security community. Finally, IFSH raised the point that they wanted to add a small 
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theoretical part discussing the concept of a security community, and discussing the 
development of the concept (Interviewee O). 
On a structural, functional and institutional level the actual outputs of the project address 
the objectives as named above. The main outcome is a report which has been prepared 
based on the discussions in the workshops and among the participant institutes. Within 
this report, titled ‘Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: From Vision 
to Reality’, most of the objectives are discussed and addressed to a varying degree 
(IDEAS report, 2012, p.6). The main aim of the project was to illustrate the vision of a 
common security community, to discuss obstructive differences among the participating 
states, and to propose a conceptualisation of such a security community. The report 
handles this by specifying the concept of a security community, determining specific topic 
areas that are crucial in addressing a pan-European security community, establishing the 
underlying differences among the participant states, providing guidance on overcoming the 
differences among the countries, and establishing the contribution and role of the OSCE in 
this process. 
Thus not only did they engage in debate about a common vision on a Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian security community. But they also found an agreement regarding the issues of 
the target audience by involving both the international environment and the OSCE, with a 
specific emphasis on possible OSCE measures. Moreover the IFSH prevailed to include a 
limited reference to underlying theory. The other institutes did not have the same strong 
interest in this part, as they are not as strongly research-focused but instead more policy- 
advice focused (Interviewee O). 
After its completion, the report was presented in October 2012 at an informal 
ambassadorial meeting in Vienna to all OSCE countries (IDEAS report, 2012, p.3). The 
report has widely been received positively, and was used as an impulse to promote the 
Helsinki+40 vision among the OSCE member states (Ludeking, 2012). It was also 
presented to NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in Brussels. At both events 
questions were raised regarding the difficulties of finding a truly common space in a 
multinational setting while each person’s perception differs from the other’s. But at the 
same time it was also questioned how far normative harmonisation is helpful in an 
environment that consists of a variety of groups each with their own identities (IFSH, 2012, 
p.11). 
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Finally, the project also resulted in the development of a network of academic institutions 
to inform and enrich transnational debate, to provide integrated research, to establish a 
(indirect) link towards civil society, and to support each other as well as the OSCE in their 
work for further integration. The network has been launched in June 2013 under the 
umbrella of the OSCE and currently counts 27 members (OSCE, 2014). This also reflects 
the planned extension of the frame for increased research cooperation among OSCE 
countries. Since its launch the network concluded its first project in April 2014 on ‘Threat 
Perceptions in the OSCE Area’. This has been the first project-based cooperation in the 
new augmented framework and included institutes from 18 countries of the OSCE area 
(OSCE, 2014b). 
Reflection 
From a researchers point of view, it is pivotal that this analysis includes a section on the 
evaluative activities which may have been part of the discussed project. Those may have 
been enacted either during and/or directly after the project. In research, reflection is an 
important concept and act which is discussed and performed within its realm. It represents 
the very essence of research to question studies and their conduction. This is especially 
true in the socio-political realm where the impact of qualitative content provides more 
opportunities to challenge a study. At the same time reflection also developed into an 
important tool in the policy-making spheres. This shows most prominently in the concept of 
the policy-cycle (Hallsworth et al., 2011, p.24), which serves to conceptualise and structure 
the processes in policy-making. By now any of these cycles contains a section that 
concerns underlying process monitoring, an evaluation of received against anticipated 
data, or a review of effective implementation. This broad range of evaluative measures can 
be installed to provide checks and balances for the validity and the effectiveness of 
processes, to reach a set aim, and to improve the outcome through further work. 
However, the widespread recognition that the ‘lessons learned’ may add to research and 
policy projects does not mean that they are needed or beneficial for all of them. Instead, 
projects concerning political consultation and policy advice do usually have clear cut ends 
and are not likely to be followed up by repetitive projects in the same frame. As was the 
case with IDEAS, there was a strict frame for the conduction of the project which ended 
with the preparation of the report (Interviewee O). 
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Although no frame for further reflection was provided once the project was finished, this 
has not fully eliminated the possible evaluation. As already demonstrated above, reflection 
can occur in a number of forms. In the case of IDEAS, basic process monitoring, an 
evaluation of received against anticipated data, and a review of effective implementation 
were not of relevance. This is due to the nature of the project and its clear cut ends which 
were aimed at preparing essential groundwork only (Interviewee O). Once the project was 
conducted there was no visible plan and also no need to take it further in the same exact 
frame.  
However, some reflection took place with regard to the subject matter. To be precise it 
entailed reflection about the concept and the obstructions of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 
Security Community. This evaluative activity took place throughout the project, and was 
facilitated by the sequenced set-up in four successive workshops as well as the 
subsequent preparation of the research report (Interviewee O). The set-up provided room 
for repetitive exchange and debate, from which individuals could withdraw but which they 
were also exposed to again a few weeks later. Thus although individuals came to the 
project with their given knowledge and ideas, space was provided to re-engage with those. 
However it was by no means the aim of the project to form singular opinions. Thus re-
thinking of participants’ ideas was only partially intended and beyond that left to an 
individual’s choice. Moreover, the writing process of the report provided an additional 
opportunity for reflection of the workshops and the debates thus far. In this context 
headlines like ‘How We Came to Create IDEAS’ (p.7) or ‘Why This Format’ (p.8) show how 
the writing process engaged the authors in a revival of their thoughts and debates (IDEAS 
Report, 2012, p.7f). While this evaluative processes may not be eliminated, it must be 
noted that it only makes up for a minor part of reflection as such. Not only was the realm of 
reflection limited to the minimal aspect of the subject area, beyond that evaluation was 
only partially intended, and it was of an informal nature and left to each individual’s choice. 
Importantly, with regard to both processes a two-pronged question came up which has 
already been raised above, namely ‘how do the involved actors agree on the topic areas 
discussed, and how do they agree on the written content of the report to be representative 
of their positions’. In practical terms both these questions can be answered. Firstly, a 
vague framework was settled in a preceding meeting among members of the four institutes 
at IFSH. Based on this, each institute drafted the content further by each designing their 
workshop. Further developments regarding definition and illustration of significant issues 
then took place throughout the workshops. Secondly, a first version of the report was 
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prepared in the IFSH and sent out to be critically discussed by participants of the other 
institutes (Interviewee O). In this context, both the workshop phase and the report-
preparation phase presented a facilitating environment in which experts wanted to 
exchange information. But it must be considered that the project concerns a very broad 
topic area, covering an enormous geographic realm, touching upon differing national 
interests and combining experts with varying ontological views. Therefore there was a 
danger of vacuous diplomatic language which would have not promoted the process of the 
project. In this regard it was of importance that the lead participants facilitated an ongoing 
debate in a trusted environment. And similarly they were responsible to challenge, re-focus 
or expand the debate when it seemed to reach an impasse (Interviewee O). 
At this point a reflective piece on the interaction of the lead participants during the 
processes is likely to have added a useful perspective to the report. Not only from a 
scientific point of view, but much more so in order to highlight the differences in approach 
and opinion that frame our current security political interaction. 
Inferences 
In a nutshell this project has been selected for the analysis of cooperative activities, as the 
range of participants and the concerned subject area suit the framework of the thesis. In 
this context it is one of the relatively rare project-based undertakings of multinational 
research cooperation. Looking for projects that encompass transnational interaction on 
foreign and security policy issues showed that cooperation is still at an earlier stage. For 
the most part interaction is confined to more fundamental issues (Interviewee B; 
Interviewee C; Interviewee M). Research institutes aim to understand the respective other 
nations, try to establish common ground and differences in politics, aim to explain political 
differences and criticise each other for perceived failures of governments. This project 
adds valuable insights to the research as it adds to the analytical levels that are integrated 
in the thesis. Moreover it strengthens the original character of the thesis as a whole. To 
date there is no review of cooperative activities in foreign and security policy projects 
conducted by research institutes in wider Europe.  
The first aspect of importance for the cooperation in the IDEAS project was the presence 
of the right framework (Interviewee O). At the point when the idea for the project occurred, 
the OSCE framed a debate on foreign and security policy integration across a Euro-
Atlantic and Eurasian security community. While this might seem a broad and utopian 
approach to many of us, the OSCE representatives of the member states agreed to head 
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towards integration. At the same time the German government has a strong interest in 
improving political relations among the region’s neighbours. This is especially true for the 
relations to its eastern neighbours, as the then just recently revived Polish-Russian-
German dialogue emphasises (IDEAS, 2012g). Thus, when Germany’s Federal Foreign 
Office was approached by the IFSH with the idea underlying the IDEAS project, they 
welcomed the proposal and agreed to support a funding bid. This shows that the 
circumstances and the resulting support were crucial for this project. 
In this context a second essential aspect that can be drawn from the project concerns the 
selection of partners. In the case of IDEAS, given frameworks had a decisive impact, at 
least at the choice of countries where the partner institutes should come from. As the 
project was supported by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, the agency also had an 
impact on the selection of partner-countries. Therein the previously mentioned Polish-
Russian-German trialogue provided one given framework which was extended to France, 
which has a strong tradition of coordination of foreign and security policy issues with 
Germany. Within these countries the IFSH had to choose suitable partner-organisations. In 
this process they relied on a range of both previous relations and suitability. From Russia, 
MGIMO was asked to join the project as there has been strong developed ties through 
previous successful interaction between Zellner (IFSH) and Zagorski (MGIMO). In Poland 
only few suitable institutes were to be found and among them PISM was constituted the 
best in terms of research focus, resources, and experience with foreign interaction. The 
interaction on IDEAS between IFSH and PISM (specifically Lukasz Kulesa) was the first 
ever and there has been no previous contact between the institutes. From France the 
choice fell on FRS which was represented in the project by Camille Grand, Yves Boyer 
and Isabelle Facon. Between the IFSH and the FRS cooperation has existed beforehand 
to a very small degree and solely on personal basis, only between one specific researcher 
of each institute (Interviewee O).  
Based on the typology of research institutes provided earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 
Four) it can be noted that all four institutes are relatively similar to each other. All of them 
are established at nation state level which defines their primary environment in which they 
conduct research, gain funding and set-up connections. Furthermore, while the IFSH and 
MGIMO are university affiliated they are also quasi-governmental or (in the case of IFSH) 
quasi-independent actors similar to PISM and FRS, as all of them receive a good degree 
of resources from their respective government (PISM, 2014; Fondation pour la Reserche 
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Strategic, 2013; IFSH, 2014; Interviewee N). Their affiliation may provide them with 
resources of a fiscal and intellectual nature, but may also keep them from other resources. 
This shows for example in the degree of impact that the German Federal Foreign Office 
has on the selection of participants in the project. But on the other hand it provides all of 
these institutes with channels, which allows them to invite officials from the foreign ministry 
to give the opening speech and to meet the participants after the workshops in each city 
(Interviewee O). As the project is set up to understand policy processes and on that basis 
provide further advice for governments and the OSCE, the connection to the policy sphere 
is predictable and accessible for the participants and also suits the goals.  
Furthermore, the project highlights how interaction is a fundamental tool in the two 
performed tasks, namely gaining knowledge and spreading expertise (Ullrich, 2004, p.53). 
While it serves the exchange of knowledge it also goes beyond that. A distinct example is 
the discussion on the target audience, where two partner institutes preferred an OSCE 
focus while the other two preferred a comprehensive analysis including the complete 
international environment (Interviewee O). After some debate it was decided to include 
both and highlight the role of the OSCE. This clearly shows how interaction shapes the 
progress and process of the project. In the given example it determines the topic areas 
discussed throughout the project. This reflects one of the points raised in the section on 
intra-group cooperation (see Chapter Two) that groups which recognise, address and 
integrate the various understandings and goals of their members, are more successful in 
responding to disputes in the group (Dovidio, Saguy & Schnabel, 2009, p.438f). In the 
IDEAS project the group of participants is kept small to allow for comprehensive exchange, 
and track-two diplomacy is applied to ensure a trusted environment in which the use 
diplomatic language is diminished (Interviewee O). This demonstrates the lead 
organisation’s underlying will to provide an integrative and interactive space. 
Several tools for interaction have been used to conduct the project, namely a planning-
meeting, four workshops, additional meetings after the workshops, email contact, and the 
preparation of the project-report (Interviewee O). However, the use of the tools for 
interaction is not sufficiently operationalised, only a small section is dedicated to frame the 
project and link it to the concept of security community (IDEAS, 2012, p.7f). The degree of 
accessibility of the communication channels in a multilateral and multinational project does 
provide certain advantages and disadvantages down the line. This links in to one of the 
basic issues of intra-group cooperation, which highlights the need to balance the 
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structuralisation of groups. While structuralisation enhances groups’ capacities to work 
together and respond to challenges, it easily imposes a hierarchy that dictates the 
discourse in a group (Dovidio, Saguy & Schnabel, 2009, p.431ff). In more applied terms, 
following a plan or a structure ensures open access (or at least clarified access) to the 
information exchange. In addition a planned agenda is likely to strengthen trust among the 
participants, although, if information exchange fully relies on planned activities, that may 
limit the cooperation among the participants. On the other hand, flexible and 
complementary communication channels like dropbox, email, telephone/skype seem open 
and guarantee a more engaged exchange. However, they may also promote limited 
access between a small number of participants without the knowledge of other 
participants. This can therefore personalise and improve interaction among a selected few 
of the group. This is likely to have an impact on the way the project is conducted. On that 
basis it may provide an opportunity for people to develop exclusive opinions regarding 
topic foci and the people invited to contribute. 
The intensity and success of cooperation is based on trust which, under consideration of 
the tools and methods applied in this thesis, is as much a matter of language and 
behavioural measures as it is of tools for cooperation. Within this project the cooperative 
tools (workshops, meetings, email) have been planned but not operationalised. Relating 
back to a point made previously, the establishment of all participating institutes at nation 
state level at times requires a balancing act in order to avoid a fall into diplomatic language 
(Interviewee O). While the multi-nationality of the project enables each of them 
respectively to work with actors beyond their nation state, the level that they have been 
established at still facilitates the institutes’ modus operandi. In their nation state they have 
been established with a certain audience and a certain output in mind. Thus they 
established specific tasks as well as accompanying tools and measures to realise these 
tasks, formulate their output and stimulate their audience. However, at the international 
level, they have to address the additional issues of identifying a ‘niche’ and retaining their 
‘multidisciplinarity’ (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.2). Therefore, in a multinational project 
teams often chose institutes to provide input that is familiar to their previous work, for 
example about their domestic environment. Although this suits the IDEAS project and the 
workshops as chosen communication tools, it might lead people to explain and defend 
their country’s opinion (Interviewee O; Interviewee B; Interviewee Q). In this regard it 
produces an increased need to ensure a trusted environment in which diplomatic language 
is not seen as a necessity.  
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Another aspect to highlight from this project is the role of lead figures. It is often 
questionable how far people use their positions as lead figure to establish their own 
interests and goals. A specific role in the project fell to the coordinator Wolfgang Zellner 
(IFSH) and Ulrich Kühn (IFSH). They took the lead on the project by proposing it and 
finding support for it in the German Federal Foreign Office. Moreover Zellner also drafted 
the first version of the report, to send it on to the fellow participants to propose changes. 
The examination of the project, however, reflects the interplay of structure and agency 
which did not cause a dominance of the agency neither of Zellner nor of Kühn. Using the 
example of the choice of participants highlights how previously existing structures 
determined the partner countries. Within these partner countries the partner-institutes have 
been chosen on a mixed basis of acquaintance and suitability (Interviewee O). Both 
acquaintance and suitability are traits which develop among the dominant discourse that is 
contributed to by both structural and agency actions and processes. And this selection is 
not where the discourse ends, what counts afterwards is how these institutes interact.  
The final aspect relates back to the typology in terms of tasks that the institutes were to 
conduct in this project. They encompass generating knowledge and spreading expertise 
(see Ullrich, 2004, p.54). Knowledge was successfully generated through the workshops 
and has been outlined in the project report, whilst the spreading of expertise has also been 
taking place. The report included recommendations and guidelines, and beyond that it was 
presented to the representatives of the OSCE MSs as well as to NATO’s EAPC. But any 
further reflection or development based on the little reflection present has not taken place. 
The report was accepted and one main outcome was that MSs should consider its findings 
when approaching the discussions on Helsinki+ in 2015. At this point the project was 
finished and the task of conducting this policy-advice project had been fulfilled (Interviewee 
O). This shows a clear difference between academic research and policy-consultancy. 
Though the project was finished and not carried forward building upon the success of 
interaction, still an active legacy was constructed in the form of the OSCE network of 
research institutes. While this network operates on new projects, it highlights the 
acknowledgement of the usefulness of transnational interaction regarding transnational 
issues. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY
The analysis of the case study provides more detailed insights on the questions raised on 
the basis of the typology in Chapter Four. The taxonomy differentiates research institutes 
on the basis of several defining characteristics. In establishing the groundwork for an 
abstract overview, the typology at the same time determines what questions need to be 
addressed to get more detailed information when a specific case study is examined. 
Therefore, the questions are addressed again at this point considering the information 
gained from the case study. The first few questions concern the lack of homogeneity 
among research institutes and how that is dealt with in practical cooperation. Herein the 
review of the applied practices of cross-border cooperation has highlighted two aspects.  
On the one hand, in general acts of cooperation the absence of homogeneity of all entities 
described as research institutes is not a great concern. This is mainly the case as it is 
more often single researchers who are involved in round-tables, conferences, and 
information exchange. At some events this heterogeneity is highlighted in a project-
proposal to integrate a range of views from a variety of backgrounds. As each type of actor 
is likely to have their own understanding of the same issue, shaped by the specific field 
she works in and the given tools, contacts and goals.  
On the other hand, in the case of the exemplified project-based cooperation it is found that 
the selection of research partners has been a crucial aspect both when starting the project 
and later in shaping the project. The project was framed by an intended geographical 
scope which determined some of the participants. In addition the main funding source 
promoted the inclusion of an institute from one specific country (Interviewee O). 
Throughout the project the selected participants are rather similar to the lead-institute 
IDEAS, (2012). Thus, in this example the lead institute preferred the cooperation with 
institutes that share some attributes. This does not mean that there have been no 
discussions among the institutes, instead it can even be noted that the project misses 
common underlying definitions as well as an operationalisation of communicative 
structures. Both would contribute to avoid a coalition-building or actors being pushed into 
an explanatory and defensive position. This is particularly the case as the example project 
was set up to debate challenges for broader foreign and security policy integration. Herein 
the participants had to work through political arguments and debates and consider the 
acceptance of country-specific positions within a broader integrative security structure. The 
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report features particularly considerations concerning the integration of East and West 
under a common umbrella. 
The second range of questions asks for the existence of a research environment and the 
differentiation of driving institutes as well as those that join later on. Herein the empirical 
review of applied cooperative practices strengthens the answer provided in Chapter Four. 
To recap, it establishes that the institutes working on EU-Russian cooperation in foreign 
and security policy generally exist in the field for a longer time, and the research 
community is manageable in terms of size. This has firstly been validated in the interviews 
(Interviewee B; Interviewee C; Interviewee R; Interviewee S). But importantly it also shows 
in the case study, personal and institutional connections have been formed beforehand, 
and as such lead the selection of partners in cross-border cooperation. The case study 
also highlights the generally broad topical focus that provides space for a wider range of 
actors. In the project, these actors were invited to participate in the four workshops 
(Interviewee O). However, the example project also establishes limits to the integrative 
nature of the research environment. Importantly, it highlights that the existence of an 
incentive framework is a primary tool to establish the participants and guests for the 
project. 
A final scope of questions concerns research institutes’ connection with politics, and the 
related debate on the availability of resources. On the one hand the predominance of 
general cooperative practices is often justified by lower costs and higher reactivity to 
current political issues (Interviewee R; Interviewee Q; Interviewee E). Thus the lower costs 
can be covered more easily and can be more easily integrated into a yearly budget. At the 
same time the higher reactivity to current political issues by using smaller formats does 
provide the researchers with more opportunities to spread their knowledge, and thus 
sensitise politics and social society about the nuances of a certain topic. On the other 
hand, the example of project based cooperation demonstrates that funding is essential and 
as such funding sources have an important impact on the initiation and the shape of the 
project. Most importantly, an incentive framework must be given. In this case study it 
meant that the project succeeded in gaining funding, as it was proposed at a time when 
the debate was on the political agenda. Though for the funding source, it means that its 
impact was reduced, as the project fell in their range of interest at the time it has been 
proposed. 
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As picked up on in Chapter Four, in the description of the opportunities, processes and 
challenges as perceived by interviewees, it is questionable how far the cooperation as it 
exists is nurtured by its set-up and participants. Beyond that it is questionable whether 
further development of cooperative practices is hindered in this way. This argument has 
been based on the finding that the (in some points) limited utilisation of project based 
cooperation has solely been recognised by a minority of interviewees. The majority has 
prioritised general cooperative acts. Relating this to the previously named challenges of a 
broad topical foci in interaction among research institutes and the weak perception of 
opportunities, it triggers a question about the impact of participants on their own 
cooperative practices. In order to develop a better understanding of the matter, the section 
in Chapter Four called for a case study, to examine how far these perceptions are 
validated in applied cross-border cooperation.  
Significantly, the empirical study validates the perceived challenges, but also identifies a 
number of challenges in addition to those stated by the interviewees. The challenges that 
have been acknowledged by institutes in their operation and cooperation at the 
transnational level encompass the following: overarching general topical focus, the 
predominance of general acts of cooperation, reliance on soft-power, recurring debates 
from high politics, establishing of institutes primarily at national level, the 
acknowledgement of foreign researchers, geographical dependence of interaction, 
predominant interest in Russia-US relations among Russian research institutes, and the 
questionable impact of a new generation of IR-specialists that indicate a partial 
acknowledgement of underdeveloped transnationalisation (see Chapter Four). 
In turn the often lacking common development of concepts and operationalisation of 
communication in cooperative activities has only been acknowledged by few interviewees 
as challenge (Interviewee O; Interviewee L). Beyond that, a number of challenges have 
not been acknowledged by the interviewees, including the need for an existing incentive 
framework (Interviewee O; IDEAS, 2012, p.7), the duplication of cooperative efforts among 
institutes with differing attributes (see first section Chapter Five), and the failure to 
establish a truly transnational research (sphere). These unacknowledged challenges are 
all functional in their nature and essential for effectively operating and cooperating in the 
transnational sphere. While they all present a challenge in themselves, aspect one and 
two both contribute to the failure to establish a truly transnational research (sphere). 
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The comparison shows a difference between the challenges perceived by the interviewees 
and those found in the empirical review of applied cross border cooperation. While some 
of the challenges are validated, particularly the findings on a rather general topical focus 
as well as a predominance of general acts of cooperation are strengthened. However, it 
becomes apparent that some of the challenges found in the review of applied cooperative 
practices have not been perceived (as relevant) by interviewees. This raises the question 
of how far the interviewees recognise the debilitating effects of all the challenges. Or 
whether there is a significant gap between perception and conduction of transnational 
cooperation among research institutes. While this leaves some space for speculation, it 
has been found that a number of the challenges named above have been recognised and 
partly been addressed. What makes the difference at this point is how widespread the 
recognition of the respective challenge is, how far the respective challenge is addressed, 
and how fundamental the challenge is in shaping or denying the process of cooperation. A 
further review into this enables insights into how far the struggles and limits of the current 
transnational research on foreign and security policy across wider Europe are a product of 
its participants. This is discussed in more detail in the following chapter that integrates 
important debates retrieved from throughout the thesis in order to address the main 
research question.  
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
This chapter provides an empirical review of applied practices in cross-border cooperation. 
The study moves on from the previous chapter that examines cooperative practices based 
on inter-relational factors, informed by simultaneous developments of political, economic 
and societal aspects. Instead the emphasis is now set specifically on functional and 
operational activities. In this regard it provides another analytical level that adds to the 
examination of the fieldwork in Chapter Four. By applying a new analytic lens, the chapter 
underlines a previous finding, that while there is a will, a recognition and a coherent 
understanding of the opportunities to conduct research at the transnational level, there has 
been little maturation of a truly transnational research sphere among public policy research 
institutes. 
The chapter begins by investigating general cooperative activities (non-project based). It 
establishes what formats of interaction exist and how far they are utilised, and herein 
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highlights that general acts of cooperation are considerably more common than specific 
project-based cooperation. Moreover, it establishes that the main goal behind the general 
acts of cooperation is information exchange, which explains why informative, educative 
events with an opportunity for critical engagement seem the most common format. Therein 
university affiliated institutes take a strong role in encouraging and conducting cooperation 
across the borders between the EU and Russia, as they appear most responsive to 
transnational efforts. Annex 2 offers an illustration of this by outlining a sample of research 
institutes cooperative projects. Beyond that the section emphasises that the different types 
of research institutes involved in cooperative activities commonly make use of similar 
formats and thereby duplicate their events more than each playing to their characteristic 
strengths. This raises again the question asked at the end of Chapter Four, how far 
research institutes are aware of the limits to their operations in the transnational sphere, 
and how far they address or nurture them. 
This is followed by a case study concerning project-based cooperation across wider 
Europe which occurs comparatively rarely. The chosen case is the Initiative for the 
Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) which is rooted 
in the OSCEs’ Astana Declaration as well as the German-Russian-Polish trialogue. The 
case study serves as example to outline cooperative processes in a multinational project 
including lead-participants from wider Europe (Germany, Poland, Russia and France). The 
section discusses processes and challenges that the participants had to meet in the 
project. It validates the challenges portrayed in Chapter Four and even strengthens some 
of them. However, it also identifies several new challenges to cross-border cooperation 
among research institutes, which encompass: a lacking common conceptualisation and 
operationalisation inherent to communication in cooperative activities, the need for an 
existing incentive framework, the duplication of cooperative efforts among institutes with 
differing attributes, and finally the shortcomings to establish a truly transnational research 
(sphere). 
By illustrating a range of challenges which have not been mentioned in the analysis of the 
fieldwork in Chapter Four, the section indicates a certain degree of unawareness of 
research institutes about some of their shortcomings (and at the same time opportunities) 
in operating at the transnational level. The range of challenges identified brings forward 
the question to what extent the interviewees understand the debilitating effects of all these 
problems. To address this question it needs to be discussed which challenges are 
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recognised by research institutes and how far they are addressed. Therein a distinction 
needs to be made concerning the varying significance of the challenges. While some 
influence the shape of cooperation, others might hinder its initiation in the first place.  
This discussion is deepened in the subsequent Chapter alongside three further debates 
that represent the essential contributions of this thesis. The other three debates 
encompass the conduct of transnational cooperation among research institutes, the 
suitability of a non-traditional approach to understand foreign and security policy 
integration, and the revision of EU-Russia relations from a new perspective. 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CHAPTER 6 - DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF 
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES  
The previous chapters address the nature and functionality of cross-border cooperation 
among research institutes that work in the realm of foreign and security policy across wider 
Europe. They make a case for both the broader inter-relational issues (Chapter Four), as 
well as more specific practical issues (Chapter Five). Throughout the analyses two related 
concerns are established: first, the underdevelopment of current transnational cooperation 
among research institutes; and second, a lack of awareness amongst research institutes 
of some of the challenges that they need to address to overcome limits to operating and 
cooperating at a truly transnational level. 
To address the implications in more detail and to respond to the main research question, 
Chapter Six proceeds to discuss four areas that are identified as the main contributions of 
the thesis. The first area concerns the capacities and constraints of research institutes to 
engage in transnational cooperation. The second area discusses the differences between 
the perception of cooperation by research institutes, and the empirics of practically applied 
cooperation. The third area debates how the post-structuralist understanding of interaction 
has shaped and benefitted the research. Finally, the fourth area discusses how far the 
analyses of the cooperation of non-governmental actors presented here have added a new 
perspective to understanding EU-Russia relations. 
Moving away from further explorations of new contextual aspects and cases, this chapter 
serves to gather and reflect on the findings of the previous sections. This constitutes a shift 
from prioritising significant fractions of the research to focusing on understanding the 
project as a whole. 
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A TRANSNATIONAL PROPOSITION: POTENTIAL AND 
CONSTRAINTS 
As stated in previous chapters, the main goal of this thesis is to grasp the potential role of 
non- and quasi-governmental experts in strengthening transnational cooperation in foreign 
and security policy issues. The project is set out to understand their contribution to 
recognise, contain and roll back challenges which require a transnational approach. This 
section fuses the project as a whole by linking the findings of the previous chapters to 
relevant debates about political integration and cross-border cooperation. As a short 
reminder, the subsequent research questions have provided the structural framework for 
the undertaking: 
- The main research question asks about the role of public policy research institutes in 
informing foreign and security policy cooperation in the wider European region.  
- The first sub-question explores the political space available to research institutes, as well 
as their ability to influence the dominant political discourse. 
- The second sub-question concerns the current nature and dynamics of foreign and 
security policy cooperation across wider Europe.  
- The third sub-question explores what types of public policy research institutes with a 
foreign and security policy focus exist in wider Europe. 
- The fourth sub-question inquires what the nature and dynamics of transnational 
cooperation between the public policy research institutes are, and how such forms of 
cooperation contribute to strengthen transnational interaction. 
The overview of the findings outlined above identifies a range of important debates and 
conclusions that have been raised throughout the study thus far. By setting them into 
context with the research questions, four important themes are distinguished that are 
further discussed in this chapter: 
1. Enacting transnational cooperation among research institutes. 
2. Cooperation between perception and empirics. 
3. A non-traditional approach to understand foreign and security policy integration. 
4. EU/Russia relations from a different perspective. 
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The first debate is concerned with addressing the main research question. In asking for the 
roles of public policy research institutes, it ties in the discussion on their capacities and 
limits to act and interact in the area of foreign and security policy (Cross, 2013, p.139f). 
Therein it triggers a debate about their characteristics, their tools, and the tasks they can 
take on, while differentiating existing and potential capacities. Beyond that it sets a specific 
focus on their abilities and limits to enact cross-border cooperation. Finally, it links to the 
discussion on their possible dependence on or contribution to policy processes.  
The second debate concerns the differences between the perception and the practical 
conduction of cross-border cooperation among research institutes. The data are 
respectively determined through interviews with staff in research institutes, a summary of 
cooperative activities among research institutes (Annex 2), and a specific case study on 
applied cooperation. Herein differences between perceptions and practical aspects of 
conducting cooperation are highlighted. In the following, the section questions the missing 
awareness for those differences, and discusses resulting limits for research institutes to 
engage with their full capacities in the transnational sphere.  
The third discussion highlights the theoretical contribution that the research made in 
applying a non-traditional approach that bridges social theory with IR. The section 
discusses our limits to understand transnational cooperation and demonstrates how 
drawing from post-structuralism shapes the analysis by providing a frame for critical review 
of the influence of knowledge (Whisnant, 2012, p.1; Agger, 1991, p.107). Therein, the 
section links thoughts about the power of knowledge debate to the inherent structure/
agency nexus. 
The fourth aspect deals with the contribution of the research to understand EU/Russia 
relations. This section questions whether the project enables one to approach foreign and 
security policy relations among Russia and the EU using the perspective of research 
institutes. Specific attention is paid to whether interaction among research institutes 
reflects gaps known from extant research into high politics. 
By utilising these four accounts, all main findings are involved in the analysis and linked to 
contemporary debates on foreign and security policy integration. Moreover, they 
demonstrate the various contributions to the literature that have been developed 
throughout this original piece of research. 
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ENACTING TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG RESEARCH 
INSTITUTES
The choice to investigate non-or quasi-governmental organisations is based on a strong 
interest to examine the ongoing changes in the foreign and security policy sphere. The 
increasing deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues requires cross-border 
cooperation to enhance the success of recognising, containing and rolling back these 
issues and their implications (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2008; Aalberts & Werner, 2011). Nation 
states are found to be currently unable to manage these tasks. Therefore the question 
arises what other actors could contribute to deal with transnational issues (Webber, 2005, 
p.36). Non- and quasi-governmental actors in this policy field represent a growing range of 
actors who produce expertise and contribute to shaping the norms in their specific policy 
areas (Cerny, 2006, p.97; Sending & Neumann, 2006, p.194). They have so far been fairly 
neglected in the debate on foreign and security policy governance, due to a conserved 
predominance of sovereignty lying with the nation states in this area. However, they are 
highly suitable in contributing the knowledge required of complex policy-making in a trans/
multi-national setting. Moreover, they are not bound by the same political goals and 
ideologies that drive governments. Increasing integration, regionalisation and globalisation 
have also led to stronger cross-border cooperation among non-state actors (Cerny, 2006, 
p.97). This establishes a bedrock for this project, making the case to analyse the role of 
non-and quasi-governmental organisations in the foreign and security policy sphere. 
Among the non-and quasi-governmental actors, the focus of this project is set on public 
policy research institutes. Research experts within these institutes position themselves 
between research, academia, and the policy sphere, to advise policy makers, and to 
spread their narrative of given events. Their expertise is recognised and provides them 
with an authoritative claim to knowledge. Their influence in the transnational sphere is 
exacerbated by strong challenges towards state sovereignty and the simultaneous 
ascendency of generally institutionalised regional and global cooperation (Stone & 
Denham, 2004, p.10). But all this is ultimately reliant on a reciprocal cycle, in so far as the 
political systems provide varying degrees of space to act for research institutes and at the 
same time the research institutes’ aim to use this in order to justify, establish, and stretch 
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the given space (Haas, 1990, p.9ff). Thus, the system enables them to be part of it to a 
varying degree, which in turn provides them with some possibilities to impact the system.  
As Chapters Four and Five find, engagement with the system is characterised by a range 
of variables including the relationship with the policy cycle, communication channels, and 
institutional structures. In more general terms one could say that their impact is based on 
the powers of the competing actors within the existing structure. This thesis takes a step 
beyond and brings to mind that the system, as it is, is constructed by a structure agency 
debate that establishes the dominant political discourse. In this thesis research institutes 
are broadly defined as organisations that perform policy relevant research and thereby 
contribute with the soft power of analysis and advice to the ongoing socio-political 
dialogue, by providing policy-makers and the wider public with the possibility to take 
factually informed choices. They are organised as continuous structures and might be 
affiliated to the government, political parties, universities, interest groups, the private 
sector, or be fully independent. This broad definition of the units of analysis is 
complementary to its exploratory character. 
The simultaneous trends of diversification and integration that have taken place in the 
foreign and security policy environment in wider Europe over the last two and a half 
decades provide space and access points for research institutes to contribute to the policy 
field (Irrera, 2013, p.51; Faleg, 2012, p.167f). Diversification means that a much wider 
range of security political issues has developed, and simultaneously a strong specification 
of the issues has taken place. This has made the policy sphere much more complex and it 
is difficult to keep an overview. On the other hand, integration means that transnational 
and regional cooperation on foreign security politics have steadily risen. This strengthens 
the common professional sphere for non-state actors beyond the nation state level (Cross, 
2013, p.139). However, throughout their work they are bound by a number of 
dependencies that limit their reach. Firstly they are dependent on their background. This 
encompasses the stage of their organic development that they are at, as well as the 
current political system in which they are embedded to some degree. They cannot develop 
independently of this from a poststructuralist point of view but are bound to engage with 
the structures that form part of the dominant political discourse (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). 
Furthermore, their reach also depends on the policy field that they are working in. The field 
of foreign and security policy has traditionally been dominated by the principle of 
sovereignty of the nation states. While changes to these established norms and principles 
require a lot of time, by now research institutes have the chance to try and make an impact 
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by claiming space and access. Finally, research institutes are also dependent on their own 
abilities and characteristics. The typology established in Chapter Four provides an 
overview of this. However, it is important to remember that we can distinguish research 
institutes and their abilities along the lines of three major variables: the level of governance 
that they have been established at; their affiliation; and their output. In sum, all the 
dependencies emphasise what research institutes need to contribute are space 
(inclusivity) and access points to mobilise themselves by mobilising their discourse. 
Utilising expertise as their main tool, research institutes can contribute to the policy field by 
conducting three tasks: gathering data, generating knowledge, spreading expertise 
(Ullrich, 2004, p.53f). For the performance of all three tasks it is of single most importance 
to obtain resources. These resources encompass data as well as funding and appropriate 
staff. For the specific task of gathering data fundamental research needs to be conducted 
(Denham & Garnett, 2004, p.245; Braml, 2006, p.228f). In the realm of conducting 
fundamental research three types of tasks are distinguishable: immaculate research 
preparation, data collection, and data analysis. In conducting fundamental research the 
usefulness of cooperative activities is limited to certain parts of the process of data 
gathering. On the one hand cooperation with other research institutes increases the 
availability of resources. However, it also needs to be considered that the gathering and 
processing of data requires accurate and tedious analytical work which may be hampered, 
slowed down or be compromised through a contribution of a variety of actors (Interviewee, 
J). These aspects need to be balanced continuously and interaction needs to be integrated 
in the research plan in a constructive and supportive manner.  
For the task of generating knowledge no fundamental research needs to be conducted, 
although it may be done beforehand. Instead it requires the ability to analyse existing 
information and data, and weigh out their according propositions. Beyond that, there is the 
need to be able to explain the interconnection between various arguments, or the 
annulment of one argument by another (Interviewee J). In this process cooperation is 
extremely useful to obtain a broad variety of data and propositions which inform a critical 
debate leading to the generation of ideas and propositions. After all researchers must 
provide enough and strong enough arguments for a position that they elaborated, in order 
to promote their ideas and propositions. Thus there is a need to establish contact to obtain 
data, as well as to establish a supportive network in their respective organisation and in 
between organisations that enables them to debate, test and promote their propositions 
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(Interviewee K; Interviewee C). 
Interviews from fieldwork indicate that spreading knowledge can be done in three ways. 
On the one hand, by providing policy advice directly to the policy makers. On the other 
hand, by discussing and providing opinions in the expert community, at conferences and 
the like. Thirdly, by shaping the dominant socio-political dialogue through ‘sensibilising’ civil 
society (Interviewee K; Interviewee B; Interviewee E; Interviewee J). Therewith they may 
influence agenda setting, support the negotiation of outcomes, bestow legitimacy, and help 
to monitor and implement policy solutions (McGann, 2011, p.10). The task of spreading 
expertise is all about developing channels, utilising them, and maintaining them. For this 
area of tasks written, audio, and video material needs to be produced in accordance with 
the audience for which the material is prepared. Subsequently, this material needs to be 
distributed to reach the planned audience (or even a broader audience). Therein, 
researchers and institutes alike gain capacity by establishing a supportive network in their 
organisation and among organisations. At the same time they need to connect with policy 
makers at their political level as well as other political levels. Moreover they need to 
collaborate with the media to reach a wider, more diversified audience. Beyond that, 
education is a most useful tool and channel to spread critical and innovative thinking, as 
well as more specific ideas and norms. Regarding education, it was mentioned in 
interviews that especially Russian academia is strongly relying on ‘western’ debates, which 
appear to overlook, or not recognise the depth of Russian contributions (Interviewee A, 
Interviewee L). In all of this research institutes increase their publication activities by 
making strong use of technical advancements (Interviewee K, Interviewee B). 
Transnationalism promotes the availability of a wider audience that may be reached 
through an increased range of channels caused by the multilevel nature of transnational 
governance.  
The points made above demonstrate that an important asset of research institutes is their 
authoritative claim to knowledge (Richardson, 2012, p.92). This authority, however, is not 
to be seen to provide them with the sovereignty to shape policy making to their liking. It is 
a soft power that is ideally used to contribute to enabling and developing an informed 
dialogue among a plurality of actors (Stone, 2007, p.24). It is therefore important that the 
research institutes position themselves strategically in order to spread and implement their 
narrative in the policy sphere. 
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Primarily the interviews show that there is a strong interest in transnational cooperation 
among research institutes (Interviewee B; Interviewee Q; Interviewee H; Interviewee L). 
This is bolstered by a range of opportunities that interviewees see in transnational 
cooperation. The opportunities include a broader range of data, a broader range of funding 
sources, facilitated foreign contacts, publishing abroad, the development of a new 
generation of IR specialists. On the basis of these advantages, the majority of interviewees 
agreed on a general structure of how transnational cooperation is enacted. Transnational 
cooperation can generally be described through the following self-reinforcing steps: 
recognition and adaptation of a transnational issue, identifying partners, establishing 
contact/relations, conducting cooperation, provision of output, reflection. These steps (not 
as such but in similar form) recur perpetually throughout the interviews that have been 
conducted for this research. Although it is of significance to note that many interviewees 
have stated that several activities linked to the steps are daily or habitual work and that 
they did not necessarily conduct these activities with persistent recognition of contributing 
to strengthened transnational integration. This indicates that these activities have become 
inherent to their working pattern, and are therewith automatically present once the mind is 
set on an initiative. However, at the same time this indicates the possibility that not enough 
conscious attention is paid in some cases to fulfilling the activities in the best possible way 
considering the auspices of the transnational sphere. 
The sections above demonstrate that there is a will for cooperation and a general coherent 
understanding for the necessary steps that need to be taken to set up the cooperation 
(Interviewee B; Interviewee C; Interviewee Q, Interviewee R). However, the examination of 
cooperation among Russian and EU-based research institutes in general terms, as well as 
in the specific case study, elucidates a number of hampering factors. These include: the 
need for an existing incentive framework; the difficulties of acknowledging the soft-power 
of knowledge; the difficulty to establish a transnational research environment with 
domestically based institutes; the impact that critical junctures may develop; the dipping 
interest in Russia in EU foreign and security policy; interest in cooperation still being driven 
by geographical aspects; recurring political differences and recurring questions for 
justification of the domestic governments; primarily trivial interaction and no project-based 
cooperation; and the lack of coherent operationalisation and conceptualisation in common 
activities. 
 173
The question evolving from this is what impact does research institutes’ will for 
cooperation, the accepted processes and the established difficulties have upon their 
potential to operate and cooperate at the transnational level. First and foremost it has been 
found that the diversification and integration in the foreign and security policy sphere 
promote space and access points for research institutes in wider Europe. It needs to be 
kept in mind that research institutes are only able to exert influence on the dominant 
political discourse and not to exert the power of dominating the discourse. In this context, 
their potential is limited by the common difficulty that they only have soft-power to avail 
themselves of. The acknowledgement of soft-power varies across wider Europe, but as the 
sentence indicates soft-power relies for a good degree on its acknowledgement by the 
dominant political discourse as well as by others involved in the political dialogue. 
Though the research has captured the interest and willingness of research institutes to 
engage in cross-border cooperation, this potential is not followed up upon. As Chapter Five 
shows, transnational cooperation among research institutes is limited in its formats and 
purposes (see Annex 2). Most importantly, there is little truly transnational research 
established yet. The primary difficulty lies in moving to the transnational level after having 
been established domestically. While the majority of public policy research institutes have 
been established at nation state level, working at the transnational level requires different 
tools and measures (or at least a different application of the existing ones). To adjust to the 
ways of working takes resources in terms of time, staff (changes) and money. In this way 
activities need to be adjusted to concern the correct scope and subsequently need to be 
optimised to make the most of the opportunities that cross-border cooperation offers for 
research institutes. 
In Chapter Five this research found a predominance of general acts of cooperation such 
as round-tables, seminars, discussion groups, or support for the same by funding. Project 
based interaction that would involve a higher degree of transnational effort is much more 
scarce. Furthermore there is not only the difficulty of initiating interaction in the first place. 
But, in cases where cooperation takes place, interaction is lacking at also at the functional 
level in terms of how it is conducted (see Chapter 5). These projects often miss a set of 
common definitions, as well as common conceptualisations and operationalisations which 
would avoid a persevering dispute among the varying research cultures. Cooperation in 
the highly integrated area of the EU is much more developed, involving research institutes 
at various levels (Boucher et al., 2004, p.10). Moving the analysis to wider Europe 
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exposes difficulties due to the relative dependence on a context of high political 
cooperation, and differences in the research cultures which are not yet tackled sufficiently. 
COOPERATION BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND EMPIRICS 
In Chapters Four and Five a range of challenges towards transnational cooperation in 
wider Europe are identified. The first set of challenges is based on the experience and 
perception as expressed by the staff in research institutes. This has been investigated 
through interviews. The empirical study towards applied cooperation in Chapter Five 
validates these challenges, but importantly identifies several more. This indicates that 
there may be a lack of awareness or at least a misperception of some of the challenges 
among the research institutes involved in cooperation. In either case, it raises the problem 
that some of these challenges are not addressed and thus further limit the attainment and 
output of cross-border cooperation. The main question that arises from this is to what 
extend the interviewees understand the debilitating effects of these challenges. While this 
leaves some space for speculation, it has been found in interviews and the literature, that 
a number of the challenges named above have been recognised and partly addressed by 
some of the interviewees. What makes the significant difference at this point is, how far 
respective challenges are recognised, how far the respective challenges are addressed, 
and how significant the challenges are in shaping or denying the process of cooperation.  
The following findings are based on the interviews and the study of applied cooperation as 
conducted through Annex 2 and the case study in Chapter Five. Challenges that have 
been acknowledged by institutes in their operation and cooperation at the transnational 
level encompass the following: reliance on soft-power, recurring debates from high politics, 
the need for an existing incentive framework, predominant interest in Russia-US relations 
among Russian research institutes, geographical dependence of interaction, and the 
questionable impact of a new generation of IR-specialists indicating a partial 
acknowledgement of underdeveloped transnationalisation (see Chapters Four and Five for 
a review of each of the challenges). The recognition of all of them has proven extensive in 
the interviews, but most of them have only a shaping impact on cooperative activities. 
However, the reliance on soft-power and the need for an existing incentive framework 
have a strong influence on the initiation and shape of a cooperative project (Interviewee O; 
Interviewee K). They represent the two challenges that may hinder the initiation of 
 175
cooperation before it begins. The reliance of soft-power jeopardises institutes’ abilities to 
gain support and resources for a project that is particularly costly and to some degree alien 
as it involves interaction across borders. Similarly, if the content of a research project is not 
framed in the current political debate and/or concerns pre-existing dialogue formats and 
patterns, then it is unlikely to gain the support and resources needed for the particularly 
costly and alien cross-border interaction (Interviewee A; Interviewee K; Interviewee M). 
Among all the challenges that the institutes recognise, the three issues that they work to 
address are the recurring debates from high politics, their reliance on soft-power, and the 
predominant interest in Russia-US relations among Russian research institutes. The first 
one is sometimes addressed by conceptualising and operationalising all terms and topics 
of interaction beforehand to gain a common understanding, as well as by creating an 
intimate and trusted set up for the interaction where diplomatic language is not triggered 
(Interviewee C; Interviewee O; Interviewee R). The second is addressed by establishing 
connections and networks with politicians and representatives of the media and the social 
society. These may be single connections, or may take the form of epistemic communities 
with regard to certain policy issues (Interviewee K; Interviewee Q; Interviewee D). The 
third challenge is addressed as part of the research institutes’ work, using their tools to 
spread expertise and generate interest in subjects away from the political centre stage 
(Interviewee B; Interviewee E; Interviewee H; Interviewee P). 
In turn the often lacking common development of concepts and operationalisation of 
communication in cooperative activities has only been acknowledged by a few 
interviewees as a challenge (Interviewee O; Interviewee A; Interviewee D). Moreover, even 
in projects where it is recognised, this does not mean that it will be addressed. A number of 
institutes prefer to give these debates a miss as they may be perceived as too costly on 
the grand scale. Or they may evoke the opposite effect and turn the focus of a cooperative 
activity towards a discussion of basic differences among the research cultures of the 
participants and therewith their socio-political environment (Interviewee Q). This challenge 
may not break cooperative activities, but has a high impact on the functional conduct of 
projects. 
On the other hand, a number of challenges have not been acknowledged by the 
interviewees, including the predominance of general acts of cooperation, the duplication of 
cooperative efforts among institutes with differing attributes, and the failure to establish a 
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truly transnational research sphere (see Chapter Five). These challenges have been 
captured through the case study and a survey of the relevant literature. They are all 
functional in their nature and essential for effectively dealing with operation and 
cooperation in the transnational sphere. While they all present a challenge in themselves, 
aspect one and two both contribute to the shortcoming to establish a truly transnational 
research sphere.  
Importantly, the lack of recognition prevents research institutes from addressing these 
challenges and thus diminishes their ability to make proactive use of the transnational 
sphere. This poses the question how far research institutes nurture the very limits of their 
cooperation. Or to put it differently, whether their shortcomings in recognising and 
addressing the challenges to cooperate at the transnational level imposes or reinforces the 
existing structure that becomes difficult to break as it has not been fully grasped so far. To 
understand their position however, we cannot only see research institutes as actors that 
set their own path, instead we also need to understand them as objects of the discourse 
within a broader (indeed multi-level) environment (Wright, 2006, p.104). This links to the 
post-structuralist approach that the thesis draws from, that follows Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the structure/agency nexus (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170; Webb et al., 2002, 
p.36). Following his thoughts, the current composition of opportunities and challenges 
represents the current dominant dialogue. Research institutes have the ability to make an 
impact, if they can make a strong case. This is likely to turn out more successful it they 
were fully informed about the dominant dialogue they are operating in.  
In this regard, research institutes diminish their ability to operate at the transnational level 
to a certain degree as they enter repetitive patterns of interaction which do not address 
these challenges. In addition, by not being clear about all the limits they face, they lower 
their abilities to challenge the current structure even more. At the same time they are part 
of a discourse in which they already need to fend for the position in which they are and for 
the cooperative measures they want to take. This highlights that the challenges that they 
face are at the same time bound to the opportunities that transnational cooperation offers 
them. In sum, the institutes could be better prepared if they had the full picture, and on that 
basis enter some new strategies to challenge the underlying discourse.  
As a starting point they could look to address those challenges that they have a primary 
influence on, like the duplication of cooperative efforts among institutes with differing 
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attributes. However, the reliance on soft power and resources has a limiting effect on their 
progress on establishing different formats (Interviewee T; Interviewee H; Interviewee C; 
Interviewee A). Further in this context, the overview gained thus far proposes that 
university affiliated institutes are currently most likely to be able to lead the way towards 
truly transnational cooperation, as they are most interested in gathering data and 
conducting fundamental research. To comply with their academic standards, they will have 
to consider how they go about collecting data in a comprehensive and unbiased manner 
(Interviewee K). While they also have to apply for funding, they have a little more freedom 
in comparison to quasi-governmental think tanks, to link their interests in cross-border 
interaction to a wide variety of educational purposes (Interviewee A; Interviewee E). In this 
regard, they are able to engage in long-term, project-based study that involves foreign 
partner institutes, and is based on the common academic approach of carefully 
considering concepts, terms and methods. Their environment currently provides the best-
suited framework to set up truly transnational cooperation. 
In this way, the research makes an important contribution as it determines inherent 
challenges to transnational cooperation among research institutes. Moreover, in 
highlighting that interaction is driven by an underlying discourse, it demonstrates that 
research institutes are only able to nurture their opportunities and limits to the degree that 
the discourse allows for.  
A NON-TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
INTEGRATION
To examine the role of non-and quasi-governmental actors the thesis draws from a post-
structuralist approach that allows for a critical review of interaction and the inherent 
discourse. Post-structuralism does not accept a purely objective or a subjective truth, 
instead it accepts that the truth is constructed and perceived differently by those engaging 
with established structures (Wight, 2006, p.104; Agger, 1991, p.107). The structures are 
provided through the dominant discourse, while humans retain the ability to influence the 
discourse with their ideas. In this manner post-structuralism emphasises the importance of 
understanding the interplay between structure and agency, as this determines the 
dominant political discourse.  
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In this thesis neither structure nor agency are predominant, but they gain strength from 
their ongoing interplay. Bourdieu argues that structure and agency re-legitimise each other 
and thus receive their strength from their interplay which raises the prominence of both 
unitarily (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170; Webb et al., 2002, p.36). In more applied terms of 
thinking this means that agency provides fresh sequences of input, while structure ensures 
a steady regulation which does not give in to every single new idea. Therein it must be 
recognised that structures and agencies are not clear cut concepts. We cannot simply 
assume that human beings are agents and organisations or networks are structures. 
Instead we must acknowledge that the interaction of structure and agency takes place 
more or less simultaneously at several levels at the same time (Marsh, 2010, p.220; 
Wacquant, 2004, p.318). This increases the variety of access points to shape the dominant 
discourse, but also requires involved actors to be aware of the multiple levels of interaction 
in order to plan actions effectively. Importantly, this section shows that the post-structuralist 
view, with its focus on interaction and the inherent discourse, asserts knowledge as the 
main variable to link the relations of structure and agency (Foucault, 1972, p.283). Thus, 
knowledge is ultimately what links them together and persistently maintains the energy of 
their interrelation. We can refer this back to the distinction of power and influence 
discussed in Chapter Three, in which power is recognised as the ability to constitute and 
run the current dominant political discourse while influence is understood as the in/direct 
capacity to make an impact on the constructed structures that hold the dominant political 
discourse in place (De Lange, 2011, p.118). On that basis knowledge can be both power 
as well as influence. The distinction lies in the context in which the knowledge is applied. 
Whether it represents power or influence depends on who uses the knowledge at what 
time and especially within which discourse. 
The paragraph above shortly summarises the usefulness of drawing an understanding of 
the role of knowledge in cooperation from a post-structuralist approach that engages with 
the interplay among structures and agents. The following section discusses how this 
approach has been applied to the project. It poses the question how far the critical review 
of the interplay of objective and subjective truth have shaped and furthered the analysis 
throughout the project.  
To begin with, drawing from the critical perspective of post-structuralism proved suitable for 
this project in which the focus of the analysis lies on non-and quasi-governmental actors. 
The approach does not attribute power to one type actor, but instead sees power as the 
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ability to dominate the prominent political discourse. While Foucault argues that power is 
neither in structure nor in agency, Bourdieu argues that power is re-legitmised through the 
interplay between structure and agency (Foucault,1998, p.93; Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). It 
recognises the varying scope of interaction ranging from the smallest unit (humans), 
through to further evolved organisations, and to the international environment. This means 
it enables the examination of other than just governmental interaction in international 
relations, while still considering that there is a given political framework of foreign and 
security policy. But at the same time it recognises that this framework is in flux and can be 
influenced (slowly but surely) through actors shaping the dominant discourse. In this 
regard the impact of essential incidents or radical changes may be questioned. In foreign 
and security policy moments of crises, for example, commonly trigger a phase of 
increased policy production. However, if a crisis occurs research institutes that are taking 
part in shaping the agenda are generally those who are part of the policy sphere in long-
term. 
Moreover, the post-structuralist approach complements the exploratory nature of the 
research. Firstly, by recognising that the dialogue among a range of different actors can 
make an impact on the dominant political discourse, through shaping and providing 
traction to narratives (Wright, 2006, p.104). Therefore this approach drives us to 
investigate the potential relationships in the given political environment. Secondly, based 
on the argument in the paragraph above, by acknowledging a potential role for a broader 
variety of actors, the approach facilitates an examination of the role and characteristics of 
non-traditional actors in the field of foreign and security policy (Foucault,1998, p.93; 
Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). To succeed it relies on a research framework that supports the 
exploratory nature of the project with suitable concepts and measures. This is realised 
though a broad definition of the units of analysis, a triangulation of research methods, and 
a preceding exploratory study of possible case studies. This is in line with the post-
structuralist ontology, on that basis providing for fresh insights on the contribution of non- 
and quasi-governmental actors in cross-border interaction across wider Europe. 
In this context, post-structuralism with its focus on interaction and evolving inherent 
discourse, facilitates a discussion on the impact of ideas (Foucault, 1972, p.283). It 
highlights that there is no purely objective or subjective truth, but that the dialogue among 
the two generates the dominant political discourse that is presented as political consent. 
Therefore the post-structuralist approach is most suitable for a project such as this, which 
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seeks to grasp the contribution that non-and quasi-governmental experts can make by 
using their primary tool of knowledge or expertise. If knowledge is what ties structure and 
agency together, than it drives the political discourse and its progress.  
Furthermore, post-structuralism represents a suitable theoretical background for this thesis 
as it links social science to IR by emphasising the importance of the very basic act of 
social being, namely negotiating a basis for interaction. In the thesis the interest in 
cooperation is captured by the drive to comprehend political integration, which can take 
shape in cooperation as well as withholding it or competition. The theoretical grounding of 
the thesis, drawing from post-structuralism, facilitates an abstract comprehension of 
current foreign and security policy integration that links the macro and the micro level 
through the explanatory variable of discourse (Marsh, 2010, p.220). It links to Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the structure agency discourse, emphasising the ongoing re-
legitimisation of structure and agency. Therefore this thesis shows how vital approaches 
originating in social sciences are for understanding political processes, and it additionally 
highlights the interdisciplinary drive of international relations research. 
In all these ways it facilitates the projects’ approach to start filling a gap in the literature, by 
understanding the contribution research institutes can make in order to be able to inform 
the choices that advance from the reordering of power, and to grasp the evolving political 
infrastructure. To sum up, drawing from the post-structuralist approach enables a critical 
consideration of the interplay of objective and subjective truth and thus challenges to 
question the emergence of existing patterns of cooperation. 
EU/RUSSIA RELATIONS FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
Another part of the research that represents a significant contribution to the extant 
literature is the EU-Russia focus. This section balances pros and cons how far the new 
perspective on EU-Russia relations adopted in this project provides fresh insights and 
solid ground to build upon in further research. It begins by establishing the starting point, 
namely the point to which EU-Russia relations have been researched to date. In the 
following, it outlines what the approach on hand consists of and what changes it is 
intended to bring. Finally, the section is tied up by discussing whether the capacities and 
constraints of interaction among Russian and EU-based research institutes reflect the 
previously researched political gaps. Thereby the section clarifies the contribution that the 
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new approach can make to the extant literature and it goes on to propose steps for future 
research in the area. 
As has been established in Chapter Three the relationship between Russia and the EU 
has been found to be of particular importance for the stability in Eurasia. While this is 
particularly true in terms of economy and trade, foreign and security policy interaction has 
been highly intermittent in character. Scholars generally describe the foreign and security 
policy interaction between Russia and the EU as an ongoing up and down between 
connectivity and repudiation (Allison, Wight & Light, 2006; Light, 2008; Averre, 2009; 
Fernandes, 2014). Certainly a development in terms of formal negotiations has been 
taking place since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, although at different speeds and 
at many times hesitant. However, differing political principles and unresolved disputes 
springing from these underlying principles prevent genuine convergence (Danilov, 2008, p.
23; Leino & Petrov, 2009, p.659). Russia aims to establish itself as a player in the 
multipolar world, and the EU continually criticises Russia for political misconduct that 
infringes the EU’s principles. On that basis, the development of common approaches and 
strategies seems far from realisable, without a strong enough incentive.  
It has been identified that the political differences among Russian and EU approaches in 
foreign and security policy pose a challenge when looking at their integration in the field 
(Kaczmarski & Smolar, 2007, p.4; Kratochvíl, 2008, p.417f). This is reinforced by the 
additional differences of how they handle their research institutes in the policy field (as 
identified in Chapter Four). But it is exactly these differences that serve as the initiation for 
the geographical scope of the project. In the end, the project looks at two inevitable 
cohabitants who are far from homogenous, as is the rest of the world. In this regard the 
choice of geographical scope provides for an applicable environment depicting 
representative difficulties. 
The survey about the research conducted to date on EU/Russia relations illustrates a 
potential for expansion on research of non-and quasi-governmental actors in the field. 
Previous research has primarily focused on formalised cooperation among governmental 
actors, encompassing both the EU and its MSs cooperation with Russia (Allison et al., 
2006; Busygina & Filippov, 2008; Averre, 2009; Zweynert, 2010; Deriglazova et al., 2012; 
David, 2011; Timmins, 2011; Wagnsson, 2012). Non- and quasi-governmental actors have 
only been considered in studies covering differences in think tank development around the 
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world (Stone & Denham, 2004; Denham and Garnett, 2004; Thunert, 2006; Steffen & 
Linder, 2006; Abelson, 2009; McGann, 2010; Medvetz, 2012). However, the increasing 
number of non-governmental actors that generate and provide knowledge, while also 
providing diverse tools and communication-channels in an increasingly multilevel and de-
territorialised international system, deserve scholarly attention (Cerny, 2006, p.97; 
McGann, 2012).  
In this context this thesis makes an original contribution to the research area of EU-Russia 
relations, by investigating public policy research institutes. More precisely it explores the 
potential role of research institutes in informing and strengthening transnational 
cooperation on foreign and security policy issues. This proposes a new approach to 
understand transnational cooperation, moving away from the predominance of sovereignty 
and power as underlying concepts promoting a top-down approach. Instead a post-
structuralist perspective is drawn from, which enables an investigation of transnational 
cooperation grounded in the interplay of objective and subjective factors. Therefore it 
draws heavily on the importance of understanding the inherent discourse as well as the 
acceptance of ideas in cooperation (Wright, 2006, p.104). This also benefits the 
exploratory nature of the research, which has been geared to determine applicable actors 
and their diverse characteristics, as well as a suitable case study. Thereby it enables one 
to establish a more multifaceted understanding of EU/Russia relations on an organic basis.  
The findings from the field research about research institutes and their cooperation capture 
a diverse picture that adds to the extant literature on understanding EU/Russia relations. 
The study of research institutes and their cross-border interaction has been guided by the 
following questions. These allow for a twofold investigation, concerning research institutes 
as such but also setting them into contrast with the extant knowledge on governmental 
cooperation between Russia and the EU. 
1. In what ways do the differences among research cultures hinder experts’ exchange? 
2. For what reasons and ends is cross-border cooperation among public policy 
researchers currently utilised? (This leads to a closer examination of measures, 
processes and patterns.)  
3. How far do the levels and mechanisms of cross-border interaction depend on extant 
political interaction? 
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Looking at Russian and EU-based research institutes it is of foremost importance to raise 
awareness of their distinct organic development. The most important difference is that 
Russian and in this way also Eastern European institutes evolved for a long time as part of 
the authoritarian state system (Sandle, 2004, p.121f; Interviewee A), though, since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union the institutes have been restructured and new ones 
appeared. But in the face of the new competitive environment they struggle in terms of 
personnel, funding, and future perspectives. Through their integration in the EU, Eastern 
European institutes were driven to adjust to the Western system, and could grow through 
enhanced possibilities for support (in particular funding) (Interviewee A; Yakubovsky, 1995, 
p.42). In contrast Western European institutes generally originate from the anglo-american 
background of the Institutes for International Affairs (Stone, 2007, p.5). However, the 
transnational orientation of the institutes have only heavily increased in 1970s/80s/90s 
(Stone, 2000, p.193). While the EU as an integrated region allows for more sources for the 
institutes to gain personnel, resources and data, research institutes still struggle to gain 
enough funding and to establish their independence from governments and business 
contractors (European Commission, 2014e; Boucher, 2004, p.9f). In comparative terms, 
the field research has shown that there are more members and resources available in the 
EU based foreign and security policy research environment than in the Russian one. 
Although this can be ascribed for a good part to the fact that the EU consists of numerous 
member states that each have their own institutes, while Russia is one country 
(Interviewee C).  
When examining the interaction among Russian and EU-based research institutes in 
general terms, as well as in the project-based case study, several findings have proven 
significant in capturing the character of their cooperation. 
To begin with, the case study has proven that it is much easier to set up cooperative 
projects if an incentive framework is in place (Interviewee O; IDEAS 2012, p.7f). This 
means that the debate is taking place in the political environment, either on the short-term 
basis due to critical junctures or due to long-term interest. Thereby favourable pre-
conditions are established that provide for interested partner institutes to conduct research 
at the international level, as well as for funding sources, and (at some point) policy interest. 
Both funding sources and the quest for policy interest are likely to represent a threat to 
independence. This is more applicable in Russia where it is more difficult to receive 
diverse funding (Interviewee A). However, on the other hand it must be highlighted that 
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research institutes are generally present within a policy field in the long-term. That means 
that they are involved in the field and have longer time to establish themselves as trusted 
partner (Interviewee K; Interviewee D). In this manner they are able to take an impact on 
the dominant discourse to some degree. Again, this is more difficult in Russia where it 
requires more commitment and time to establish connections and where the political 
system is also directed towards a smaller sum of lead-individuals. 
A positive factor defining their cooperation is that both Russian and EU-based research 
institutes have an interest in the international foreign and security policy environment. This 
is more advanced in EU-based institutes as it is a regional entity in itself which integrates 
its member states in common policies. However Russian research institutes working in the 
realm of foreign and security policy are also well engaged in interaction with foreign 
partners (Interviewee B; Interviewee Q; Interviewee S). Another important aspect that 
impacts their cooperation concerns the soft-power resulting from their knowledge-based 
authority. Acknowledging that it is a soft power highlights the difficulty for research 
institutes to exert influence in more general terms. And while the use of soft power is a 
common tool in the EU, it is rather less established in Russian governance processes. But 
at the same time, Russian governance must not be seen as devoid of any soft power. 
Although there are clear hierarchical systems in place, still contacts and acquaintanceship 
are significant aspects in gaining access to resources (Interviewee A; Interviewee S; 
Interviewee T). Moreover, the presence of soft-power in the Russian system is also 
represented in the latest policy concept of the Russian Federation, which refers to the use 
of soft power as a tool in the international sphere (Monaghan, 2013, p.6f; Makarychev & 
Morozov, 2011, p.355). At this point it also needs to be emphasised that transnational 
cooperation brings along the difficult task of needing to cater for a broader range of 
audiences. This is specifically problematic in the case of a variety of differing political 
systems and underlying concepts. 
Furthermore, partnerships and networks play an important role for research institutes in 
strengthening transnational activity and reach. However, the problem in establishing 
transnational networks comprising European and Russian research institutes is the 
difficulty of coordinating cooperation. Research institutes across Europe have often been 
set up in the socio-political environment of one of the Member States (MSs) and it costs 
time and resources to adjust to a broader frame (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.2f). Russian 
research institutes have the additional problem of being increasingly restricted through the 
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centralisation policy followed by the government (Interviewee A; Interviewee S). Moreover, 
entering a partnership with a foreign institute might bring even more restrictions, in referral 
to the recent law on foreign agents (Crotty, Hall & Ljubownikow, 2014, p.1254). However, 
the highlighted predominance of government affiliation of research institutes in the EU and 
Russia and the issue of independence may be challenged to some extent through 
transnational or international projects, in which funding does not rely on a single 
government but on multiple actors. 
Moreover, in EU-Russia relations, critical junctures commonly have an important impact in 
the field of foreign and security policy cooperation. While it is generally highlighted that 
they cause a more rapid progress in policy-debates and implementation, they have at 
times susceptibly weakened political relations and the related political will of interaction 
(Interviewee K; Interviewee D). In both contexts it is questionable how far research 
institutes are able to contribute to an informed dialogue with their expert knowledge. 
Herein the interviews primarily showed that non- and quasi-governmental actors within a 
policy area do not rise and fall in dependence on critical junctures - many are established 
in the long-term in the general area and gain a reputation and political space over time. 
Thus, although the public awareness may not rest on a specific topic at the point in time, 
and research institutes follow trends to ensure funding, they do stay within their broader 
research area and discipline (Interviewee K). But at this point it must clearly be said that 
the governmental (and public) agenda has an impact on the availability of funding. This 
leads to a closely related point, namely that Russian politicians and researchers have 
higher interest in developments in the US than in the EU. In contrast the interest in the EU 
from a foreign and security policy point of view dropped in the last six years (Interviewee 
M; Interviewee H). This is not the same from a EU point of view which shows in project-
funding offered by the EU and EU based entities. Next to the US it still represents the main 
contributor to cross-border activities across wider Europe. This relates to the EU’s strong 
campaign for a role for expertise in politics, and at the same time to a prevailing non-
accreditation of the EU as a significant security political actor by Russia.  
In this context, the interviews also emphasise a clear geographic division between who is 
really interested in EU-Russia relations either side. Generally actors who share a border or 
a region of interest have more of an incentive to interact on this issue bound basis. An 
example is Arctic security and the interactive effort that Finland and Russia established. 
Instead actors that are not directly concerned by issues and are only bound to have an 
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opinion, for example in the regional sphere of the EU, are more likely to debate broad 
policy issues and point out problems (Interviewee Q; Interviewee C; Interviewee R). This 
plays an important role in the selection of partners where pre-existing formats are often 
employed repeatedly. As the number of Russian institutes with foreign and security policy 
scholarship is smaller then that of the EU, selection is often limited to range of institutes 
closer to the EU border (most commonly Moscow-based institutes). 
Another finding concerning the relations of EU and Russian research institutes implies that 
interaction is commonly not issue-related but concerns the broader debate of EU-Russia 
relations (Interviewee B; Interviewee R; Interviewee H). In this regard, a number of 
interviewees explained that at bigger and non-project related events they often have to 
explain and defend the policies of the country their research institute is based in, instead of 
talking about a common issue and solutions in a more hands-on manner (Interviewee Q; 
Interviewee J).  
In this regard, the research in Chapters Four and Five has also shown that the amount of 
general cooperative practices among research institutes is significantly higher than the 
interaction taking place in the frame of common projects.  Differences in efforts, expenses 20
and sustainability necessary for the different types of interaction cause research institutes 
to primarily engage in light acts of cooperation. In turn they often build the groundwork for 
explicit commonly designed projects. This dominance is true for both within the EU and in 
Russia. However at Russian based research institutes the rate of both general interaction 
as well as project based interaction is generally fewer than in the EU. The two main 
explanations for this are the much higher number of research institutes in the EU. And 
beyond that the different political structures, which provide Russian political research 
institutes with much more restricted opportunities to conduct projects of their liking and to 
have a bearing with those (Interviewee A; Interviewee S; Interviewee Q). Instead, inside 
the EU there is a much more developed network among research institutes, both at 
national and transnational level. The exchange among them is further fuelled and 
strengthened through numerous highly evolved study-associations. The general acts of 
cooperation are found to generally serve the basic goal of gathering information and 
generating knowledge. They feed into the ongoing drive to learn about the respective 
others’ home-countries’ politics and policies. In this sense informative and educational 
 Under no circumstances does this indicate that they are qualitatively worth less. This is solely used in 20
order to differentiate a range of cooperative activities.
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events are most common (see Annex 2). Moreover, the research outlines a clear role for 
university affiliated institutes in conducting and strengthening cross-border cooperation 
between the EU and Russia. In comparison, the role for public policy research institutes as 
well as their potential remain vague. Currently academic research institutes and think 
tanks seem to duplicate cooperative research methods to some extent, as becomes visible 
in the commonly used formats with comparable outcomes and problems. Thus, although 
they set out towards differing goals, they are faced with the recurrence of informative 
events and similar criticism pointed towards each other. 
Another practical dynamic captured in the case study is that missing operationalisation and 
conceptualisation of working terms and definitions limit the possibilities to develop a truly 
transnational level of interaction (Interviewee O). It basically prevents everyone from 
starting on the same page and with the same understanding for underlying concepts and 
processes. Beyond that, it misses raising awareness of existing differences in perceptions. 
In cooperation this shows through the reoccurrence of lingering debates about differing 
normative political principles. This again carries the danger that the multinational 
participants of the project are driven to explain the moves of their domestic governments, 
thereby hindering common progress in a shared area of research interest (Interviewee Q; 
Interviewee J). In the same context, particularly in multilateral and multi-national projects, 
language and behavioural measures serve to ensure a trusted and informal environment 
that increases willingness for interaction. And in the same way access to communication 
channels encourages open debate and common progress. Thus the operationalisation of 
communication is needed in order to strengthen trust among the participants to encourage 
exchange and avoid diplomatic patterns of behaviour.  
Finally an interesting point made by several authors and interviewees concerns the 
emergence of a new generation of IR specialists particularly in Russia, who recognise the 
importance of increasing transnational interaction (Deriglazova et al., 2012, p.6; 
Interviewee P). However, it is questionable how far new generations find the capacities 
and resources to challenge existing patterns. Also it must be mentioned that in some 
interviews this development has been questioned. Instead the tendencies have been 
written off to increased interest and opportunities of the youth to travel and enjoy 
international movement at lower cost (Interviewee H). 
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To sum up, cooperation between Russian and EU-based research institutes needs time to 
evolve in order to allow for multilevel trust-building (domestically and transnationally), 
resource provision, and the mechanisation of new processes which suit the transnational 
sphere. In that context the emergence of common approaches will take even more time. 
Throughout that time it is questionable how far critical junctures may occur to strain or 
promote political cooperation. 
This leads to further questioning on whether the diverse nature of interaction among 
Russian and EU-based research institutes as portrayed above simply reflects patterns of 
high politics and reinforces previous debates. Or whether it evolves around its own organic 
developments, debates and challenges. From the overview above, as well as from the field 
research and interviews, it can be drawn that both cases are applicable. Thus, on the one 
hand, the high political environment has a clear impact on the co-operative activities 
among Russian and EU-based research institutes as well as the consequential debates. 
This becomes visible throughout the organic development of the institutes, which have 
been started, and for a long time dominated, by governments (Sandle, 2004, p.121f; 
Interviewee A). Moreover the institutes are to a varying degree still dependent on 
governments in terms of funding and their eagerness to contribute to policy fields. 
Therefore, certain institutes prevail to be the most popular partner institutes as they are 
successful in securing funding and accessing data and policy making (Interviewee K; 
Interviewee S). At the same time the impact of politics shows in the repeated resurfacing of 
certain political topics throughout the interaction (Interviewee C; Interviewee H). 
However, it must also be considered that cross-border cooperation among research 
institutes has developed its own dynamics, challenges and debates. Acquaintances, 
partnerships and networks among research institutes have developed over time in order to 
exchange data and expertise, and make use of diverse funding sources (Interviewee D). 
Also, experienced institutes and partners know how to establish a trusted and informal 
environment in which diplomatic language is bypassed (Interviewee A; Interviewee D; 
Interviewee M). Moreover, while critical junctures in high political relations might bring 
about an apparent change of interest in other projects, most institutes and players share a 
field of interest long enough to keep their interests and partnerships. Deviations due to 
resource deprivation are a common experience, and are not likely to cause a research 
institute and its staff drop all their affiliations. 
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To conclude, exploring EU-Russia relations from a new perspective, namely by studying 
cooperation between research institutes, makes an impact in a twofold manner. On the 
one hand it highlights some of the recurring political disputes and actually captures how far 
their impact can reach. This reveals the strengths of the integration between politics, 
expertise, and also media in a country or a highly integrated region (Interviewee Q). 
Thereby it also provides insights on the formation of the dominant political discourse and 
shows how it is firmly established among a range of actors involved in political processes. 
In this sense it enables us to learn more about the respective political systems and 
processes, as well as coherences between differing systems.  
On the other hand, the perspective adopted in this thesis shows a growing awareness of 
the opportunities provided by cross-border interaction. For research institutes it offers 
favourable circumstances to set up connections for the exchange of data and expertise, as 
well as to share and spread their narrative with foreign institutes who may mutually 
empower their narratives (Interviewee A; Interviewee D; Interviewee C; Interviewee B; 
Interviewee K, Interviewee Q). While cross-border cooperation still primarily takes place in 
general acts rather than at a project-based level of interaction, the will among a range of 
researchers exists to strengthen project work. Moreover the limitations of truly 
transnational cooperation among research institutes, links to the empirical presence and is 
thereby justified as a stage in further developing interaction. It is needed in so far as it 
helps to establish the groundwork for cooperation. In this sense, the recognition is a first 
step in raising awareness for the range of unexplored possibilities that lie in future 
integration. 
CONCLUSION: ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION
On the basis of the findings that have been established throughout the thesis, this chapter 
identifies four areas that represent the main contributions of the thesis. The discussion of 
each of the areas as conducted above assists the response to the main research question. 
The main research question ‘explores the nature and functionality of cross-border 
cooperation among research institutes in foreign and security policy across wider Europe.’ 
In asking about both the nature and the functionality, the question emphasises the interest 
in a comprehensive answer that encompasses both a broader inter-relational 
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understanding, as well as a specific practical and operational understanding of 
transnational cooperation. In the thesis, this is addressed in three ways. Firstly, by drawing 
on the concept of interaction and the related importance of dialogue, the thesis provides 
insights into the inherent structure/agency nexus. This facilitates our understanding of the 
interplay between actors and the dominant political discourse, as the interplay frames their 
capacities and tools to operate. Secondly, the thesis discusses transnational cooperation 
from an inter-relational perspective which integrates an understanding of the socio-political 
and economic differences across the geographical scope. On that basis, it highlights the 
opportunities and challenges of transnational cooperation as perceived by staff of research 
institutes. Thirdly, the research discusses the functional level of transnational cooperation 
based on in-depth empirical reviews of applied cooperation.  
The research has found that transnational cooperation among European and Russian 
research institutes engaging in foreign and security policy, is limited in its format and 
purposes. Most importantly, there is little truly transnational research established yet. The 
primary difficulty lies in moving to the transnational level after having been established 
domestically. While the majority of public policy research institutes have been established 
at nation state level, working at the transnational level requires different tools and 
measures (or at least a different application of the existing ones). To adjust to the ways of 
working requires resources in terms of time, staff (changes) and money. In this way 
activities need to be adjusted and optimised to make the most of the opportunities that 
cross-border cooperation offers for research institutes. Beyond that, this research found a 
predominance of general acts of cooperation encompassing round-tables, seminars, 
discussion groups, or support for the same by funding. This sees interaction stagnate 
primarily around the exchange of information and reciprocal explanations for the current 
high politics of the domestic governing bodies. Project based interaction that would involve 
a higher degree of transnational effort takes place much more scarcely. Furthermore 
interaction is not only lacking at the more general level of being initiated in the first place. 
But in cases where cooperation takes place, interaction lacks also at the functional level in 
terms of how it is conducted. Interaction often misses a set of common definitions, as well 
as common conceptualisations and operationalisations which would avoid a collision of the 
varying research cultures. 
However, it must be recognised that the limitations of research institutes’ cooperation as 
they stand reflect to some degree what is possible in terms of interaction within the current 
discourse. It represents a stage in the development of cooperation which is needed to 
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establish the groundwork for cooperation, first and foremost by reflecting on cooperation 
and the political discourse in high politics as one of the topical foci. 
Though the research has proven the interest and willingness of research institutes to 
engage in cross-border cooperation, there are also numerous challenges to be faced. The 
opportunities include a broader range of data, a broader range of funding sources, 
facilitated foreign contacts, publishing abroad, and the development of a new generation of 
IR specialists. The challenges on the other hand encompass the predominance of general 
acts of cooperation, duplication of cooperative efforts among institutes with differing 
attributes, reliance on soft-power, failure to establish truly transnational research (sphere), 
recurring debates from high politics, a lack of common conceptualisation and 
operationalisation in cooperation, predominant interest in Russia-US relations, 
geographical dependence of interaction, the need for an existing incentive framework, and 
the questionable impact of a new generation of IR specialists.  
This broad range of challenges as identified and validated in the various stages of the 
research raises the question to which extent the interviewees understand the debilitating 
effects of all these problems. The research shows that a number of the above mentioned 
challenges have been recognised and partly also addressed by some of the institutes. 
However, issues that go unrecognised include functional challenges which are most 
essential to be addressed in order to be able to make proactive use of the transnational 
sphere. Thus, while their current position in the dominant discourse provides them with the 
opportunities and challenges they face, their lack of awareness regarding some challenges 
as well as their inability to address others leaves them underprepared and diminishes 
research institutes’ ability to challenge the dominant discourse effectively. 
Throughout the analysis, research institutes’ connections to high politics have been a 
recurring facet in arguments. Therefore this represents an important point of reference to 
understand how far the ‘new perspective’ on EU-Russia relations taken in this thesis can 
be distinguished from extant debates in high-politics. In this regard, the thesis 
demonstrates that while transnational relations among research institutes develops its own 
dynamics and challenges, at the same time it is bound to high-politics. First of all this is 
due to the organic development of the institutes which generally takes place at nation state 
level and has as such been dominated for a long time by the national socio-political and 
economic environment. Furthermore, the institutes are to differing degrees still dependent 
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on their connections to governments, politics and the dominant political dialogue in terms 
of funding and their eagerness to contribute to policy fields. This shows that high politics 
has a clear influence on agenda setting in research cooperation. However, at the same 
time, connections to politics also increase research institutes’ success to cooperate with 
fellow institutes, as institutes that gain more resources can also apply more of them. Apart 
from these primarily functional issues, high-politics also remains a topic in cooperation 
among research institutes in terms of topical and ideological foci. Certain debates from 
high politics resurface repetitively throughout the interaction among research institutes. 
This is tied to the aspect that the institutes and their staff find themselves more often in 
explanatory and educational situations, than in commonly initiated research projects. 
Importantly the research distinguishes among a range of types of institutes which all have 
their specific characteristics. In this regard the review of general practices of cooperation 
shows that despite their varying characteristics research institutes currently use similar 
formats for cooperation and thus duplicate their activities. The commonly used formats 
encompass seminars, summer-schools and round-tables. However, at several points in the 
thesis a strong role for university affiliated institutes is identified. On the one hand, they 
have a clearly defined role in encouraging and conducting cross-border cooperation 
between the EU and Russia. On the other hand they currently possess the most suitable 
assets to take cross-border cooperation to a new level, indeed to the transnational level. 
This is particularly the case, as university affiliated research institutes in Russia seem 
more responsive to transnational cooperation with EU institutes. The majority of other 
types of research institutes that are involved in co-operative efforts between the EU and 
Russia need to define their role at the transnational level better and expand it according to 
their characteristics.  
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
RESEARCH SYNOPSIS
THE UNDERLYING IDEA
The purpose of this thesis is to explore transnational cooperation among research 
institutes working in the broader field of foreign and security policy across wider Europe. 
Herein the focus is directed on learning about the operationalisation, the opportunities and 
the challenges of interaction across borders. The idea for the research project stems from 
the recognition in the literature that there is a need to counter transnational challenges 
through transnationally framed initiatives (Nye & Keohane, 1971). Looking at the literature 
of transnationalisation, it identifies a significant role for non- and quasi-governmental 
actors in transnational governance processes (Cerny, 2006, p.7; McGann, 2011, p.4; 
Fischer, Miller & Sidney, 2007, p.xix). However, the study is not narrowed down by solely 
looking at reactive capacities in answering to a specific event or a temporarily intensifying 
threat. Instead it analyses how far there has been a more general move towards long-term 
communication and interexchange at transnational or multinational level. While specific 
events are likely to underpin the necessity of cross-border interaction, only long-term 
cooperation is likely to establish an enhanced socio-cultural understanding as well as 
structural frameworks, both contributing to consolidated prevention and enhanced 
response (as Chapter Five indicates). 
So far the literature in foreign and security policy has developed primarily to define the 
shortcomings of nation states to address transnational issues. It has established that 
cooperation among nation states is time-consuming, unsustainable and limited in its 
success to encounter challenges comprehensively. Webber discussed these possible 
shortfalls of nation states and points out the impact of perception in his chapter (Webber, 
2005, p.36). In addition, the possible contribution of international institutions is discussed 
by politicians and academics alike, highlighting their potential to provide political space for 
communication and exchange among nation states. However, so far they have not been 
established as game changers as their actions are commonly based on consent among 
their member states. Thus they provide complementary structures for nation states that 
promote increased interaction and serve as fora to raise transnationally applicable issues 
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(Rosenau, 1998, p.30f). What has been fairly neglected is the contribution of non- and 
quasi-governmental actors, which have been strongly rising in numbers over the last 40 
years and have been studied extensively in other policy areas (Cross, 2013, p.160; 
McGann, 2011, p.9f). As a wide range of foreign and security policy issues are 
deterritorialised nowadays, non- and quasi-governmental experts are likely to offer new 
channels and tools to interact transnationally while being bound by a significantly smaller 
degree to the political goals of a certain nation (Fieschi & Gaffney, 2004, p.118).  
This thesis focuses on public policy research institutes, which it defines (in Chapter Two) 
as organisations that generate, establish and spread policy relevant expertise and thereby 
contribute the soft powers of research, analysis, advice, translation, education, and 
lobbying to the ongoing socio-political dialogue. By positioning themselves between the 
research sphere, academia and the policy sphere they look to establish and spread 
narratives among those actors involved in policy processes. The selection of public policy 
research institutes as the type of actors to focus on is further driven by two entwined 
interests. First, the project set out to grasp a specific aspect of the developing foreign and 
security policy governance in wider Europe, focusing particularly on opportunities and 
limits of non- and quasi-governmental actors to make a contribution. Secondly, instead of 
simply assuming influence of expertise in foreign and security policy governance, the study 
set out to determine tools and channels that enable research to be relatable to policy 
processes (Doidge, 2011, p.109). Thus in very broad terms, the research contributes to the 
debates on how governance works, and how it can be developed in time and space in a 
specific policy area involving specific partners. Taking an angle that considers the 
processes of regional integration it establishes participative opportunities for a flourishing 
range of actors provided with authority through knowledge. Ultimately this exposes an 
underlying interest in the interplay of dependency and empowerment; not on a 
philosophical and/or theoretical basis of exploring the concepts in a most detailed way, but 
instead on an empirically based study which has a grasp of the theory and uses that as a 
construction plan to understand what exists, establishes and develops out there. 
In theoretical terms, non- and quasi-governmental actors, however, are difficult to analyse 
on the basis of traditional understandings of foreign and security policy governance, which 
are predominantly based on the concept of sovereignty of states (Stone, 2007b, p.153). 
Due to the deterritorialisation of foreign and security policy issues and the simultaneous 
diversification of actors in the field (Aydinly, 2010, p.18), the project requires a theoretical 
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approach that draws from more universal concepts. Therefore this thesis applies a non-
traditional approach, namely post-structuralism, that breaks with the focus on one specific 
type of actors and instead examines the political discourse and its development inherent in 
the policy area. Therein it allows the development of an understanding that considers 
smaller units and does not see nation states as single entities. In this regard it addresses 
the simultaneous processes of integration and diversification in foreign and security policy, 
focusing specifically on the evolving space and role of non-state actors (Irrera, 2013, p.51). 
Hereby the thesis contributes to a comparatively new debate in foreign and security policy 
governance, and its original nature is only amplified by the novel consolidation of its 
components.  
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
The project succeeds in informing about transnational cooperation among Russian and 
EU-based public policy research institutes in the field of foreign and security policy. On that 
journey it has established a range of findings which have developed from the overall 
project, making it an original contribution to the range of topical building blocks that the 
study consists of.  
To start with the thesis determines the need to address the deterritorialisation of foreign 
and security policy issues by researching cross-border cooperation that supports the 
creation of a common approaches and responses. Therein it highlights specifically the lack 
of consideration for the growing number of non- and quasi governmental actors in the 
foreign and security policy sphere which have long been identified as crucial source of 
information for both the political and the public sphere (McGann and Weaver 2002, p.42; 
Stone, 2007b, p.153; McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.14). Beyond that it highlights the 
necessity and suitability of non-traditional theoretical approaches to study foreign and 
security policy, focusing on the role of interaction and discourse in governance processes.  
In more empirical terms, the thesis outlines the foreign and security-political relations 
among the EU and Russia at the high political level (Drent, 2012; Danilov, 2012; Averre, 
2009; Fernandes, 2014), and identifies the lack of study of those relations from a new 
perspective encompassing a different range of actors. In addition it defines a range of 
inherent differences and similarities between Russian and EU-based research institutes 
that are essential in understanding their ways of working and cooperating. Furthermore, it 
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demonstrates opportunities and shortcomings in the conduction of cross-border 
cooperation among Russian and EU based public policy research institutes. It does so 
both in more general terms under consideration of the socio-political environment of 
interrelations among research institutes, as well as on the basis of specific studies 
regarding research institutes’ cooperative activities.  
The research is guided by a range of research questions which help to consider both the 
internal and external factors that shape the role and capacities of research institutes to 
cooperate transnationally. To provide a most comprehensive picture, the research 
questions address contextual, theoretical, and empirical approaches that cover the matter. 
- The main research question asks about the role of public policy research institutes in 
informing foreign and security policy cooperation in the wider European region.  
- The first sub-question explores the political space available to research institutes and 
their ability to influence the dominant political discourse. 
- The second sub-question concerns the current nature and dynamics of foreign and 
security policy cooperation across wider Europe.  
- The third sub-question explores what types of public policy research institutes with a 
foreign and security policy focus exist in wider Europe. 
- The fourth sub-question enquires what the nature and dynamics of transnational 
cooperation between the public policy research institutes are, and how such forms of 
cooperation contribute to strengthen transnational interaction. 
The research questions that guide the thesis are essential in picking up the research aims 
and to address them within the various chapters. These research aims are addressed 
successfully throughout the thesis. Table 2 below demonstrates this in form of a 
comparison between the stated aims and the related findings of the project 
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Table 2. Comparing Research Aims and Research Findings
Research Aims Research Findings
Demonstrate the political space available to 
research institutes and their ability to 
influence the dominant political discourse.
The political space is identified in a 
discussion of increased interdependence 
and the simultaneously growing need for 
wider range of knowledge. Thereafter the 
debate on knowledge is used demonstrates 
that knowledge ties in the discursive 
relation among structure and agency. 
(see Chapter Three)
Establish the suitability of a non-traditional 
approach to study- and security-politics.
As a non-traditional approach to study 
fo re ign and secur i t y po l i cy pos t -
structuralism shapes and supports the 
analysis throughout the thesis by:  
1. its understanding of power not being an 
attribute of a single entity 
2. supporting the exploratory nature of the 
research (recognising the importance of 
discourse, and facilitating a discussion 
on non-traditional actors) 
3. facilitating a discussion on the impact of 
ideas (considering that knowledge is 
what ties structure and agency in) 
4. linking social sciences and IR which 
reflects in the thesis’ reference to 
political integration  
5. (see Chapters Three and Six)
 198
Define the different approaches to foreign 
and security policy among the concerned 
countries, and explain their interrelations.
There are strong differences in handling 
foreign and security policy among the EU 
and Russia, which generates inherent 
difficulties in their cooperation. In addition, 
the foreign and security policy of EU 
member states are not coherent, and are 
also not perceived as coherent by non-EU 
actors like Russia. (see Chapter Three)
Highlight the challenges and opportunities 
that emerge due to multilevel governance 
as well as increased interdependence.
Increasing interdependence has by now 
been acknowledged also in the foreign and 
security policy field. This brings a number 
of opportunities and challenges for actors, 
particularly due to the missing coherence 
among different operational levels, and the 
increasingly complex interplay of micro- 
and macro processes. Importantly for the 
thesis it demonstrates that nation states fall 
short of providing for the deterritorialisation 
of foreign and security policy issues. On 
that basis the research project contributes 
to the literature on the role of non-and 
quasi-governmental actors. (see Chapters 
Three and Six)
Grasp the tools and capacities of research 
institutes to operate and cooperate in the 
foreign and security policy transnational 
environment, and inform the choices that 
the re-ordering of power and the re-shaping 
of the international political infrastructure 
offer.
The tools and processes, as well as the 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d c h a l l e n g e s o f 
transnational cooperation are addressed in 
a twofold manner. On the one hand the 
thesis outlines them in more general terms 
as identified in interviews and the extant 
literature. On the other hand the research 
encompasses a detailed review of applied 
transnational cooperation. (see Chapters 
Four and Five)
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The findings represented above can be categorised into four broader debates. Identified in 
Chapter Six, these predominantly encompass the following four discussions: 
-  A role for Research Institutes in the transnational sphere. 
- Cooperation between perception and empirics. 
- A non-traditional approach to study foreign and security policy integration. 
- A new perspective towards EU/Russia relations. 
A role for research institutes in the transnational sphere 
This first debate is concerned with addressing the main research question. In asking for 
the roles of public policy research institutes, it ties in the discussion on their capacities and 
limits to act and interact in the area of foreign and security policy (Steffen & Linder, 2006; 
Bertelli & Wenger, 2008; Struyk, 2000). It triggers a debate about their characteristics, their 
tools, and the tasks they can take on, while differentiating existing and potential capacities. 
Beyond that it sets a specific focus on their abilities and limits to enact cross-border 
cooperation. Finally it links to the discussion on their possible dependence or contribution 
to policy processes.  
The interviews demonstrate a predominant interest in transnational cooperation among 
research institutes across wider Europe, as well as a basic common understanding of its 
conduction (Interviewee B; Interviewee Q; Interviewee R). This is bolstered by a range of 
opportunities that interviewees see in cross-border cooperation.  The opportunities 21
include a broader range of data, a broader range of funding sources, facilitated foreign 
Differentiate types of research institutes to 
highlight their specific characteristics.
Based on interviews and a survey of the 
literature the taxonomy in Chapter Four is 
established. It distinguishes research 
institutes among three variables: level of 
governance, affiliation, and output. (see 
Chapters Four and Five)
 See Chapter Six for an in-depth discussion of this aspect, as well as Chapters Four and Five for the 21
identification of opportunities and challenges to cross-border cooperation across wider Europe.
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contacts, publishing abroad, and the development of a new generation of IR specialists. 
On the basis of these advantages, the majority of interviewees agreed on a general 
structure of how transnational cooperation is enacted. But although the research has 
demonstrated the interest and willingness of research institutes to engage in cross-border 
cooperation, this potential is not followed up on (see Chapter Four). Transnational 
cooperation among research institutes is limited in its format and purposes. Most 
importantly, there is little truly transnational research established yet. The primary difficulty 
lies in moving to the transnational level after being established domestically. While the 
majority of public policy research institutes have been established at nation state level, 
working at the transnational level requires different tools and measures (or at least a 
different application of the existing ones) (McGann & Sabatini, 2011, p.2f). To establish 
transnational processes of working takes resources in terms of time, staff (changes) and 
money. In this way activities need to be adjusted to concern the correct scope and 
subsequently need to be optimised to make the most of the opportunities that cross-border 
cooperation offers for research institutes. Beyond that, this research found a 
predominance of general acts of cooperation, as opposed to rather scarcely appearing 
project based interaction. In addition, interaction does not only face the difficulties of being 
initiated in the first place, but where it takes place it lacks to some degree in terms of 
conduction. 
Cooperation between perception and empirics 
A further debate that has been prominent in the thesis concerns the differences between 
the perception of cross-border cooperation and the actual conduction of cross-border 
cooperation. The data expressing this balance are on the one hand based on interviews 
with staff of research institutes, as well as an analysis of how institutes represent 
themselves through websites and reports.  On the other hand the conduction of 22
cooperation and its shortcomings have been researched by reviewing conducted activities 
and projects (using Annex 2 and the case study on IDEAS). The question that arises 
throughout the thesis is whether the lack of awareness of the differences between 
perception and conduction of cooperative practices by research institutes produces and 
emphasises their limits to engage fully in the transnational sphere. However, that said, this 
analysis must be conducted under strong consideration of optimistic assessment to boost 
capacities. Indeed the differences between perception and conduction may to some 
 Find a list of interviewees in the references, and a list with exemplary questions for the semi-structured 22
interviews in Annex1.
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degree result from positive appraisal that members of institutes may provide to emphasis 
their organisation’s role. 
Chapters Four and Five identify a number of limits to transnational cooperation among 
research institutes in wider Europe. While the first set of limits, outlined in Chapter Four, is 
based on interviews with staff of research institutes, the empirical analysis on applied 
cooperation in Chapter Five validates these limits, and identifies additional challenges.  23
Thereby a lack of recognition or misperception of these limits becomes apparent, which in 
either case prevents research institutes from addressing the challenges and improving 
their transnational presence. One implication of this lack of awareness is that research 
institutes nurture their own limits in the transnational sphere. In other words, they 
contribute to the discourse that provides them with limits to operate and cooperate in the 
transitional sphere.  
However, research institutes do not simply act in a vacuum as subjects that set their own 
paths. Thus to answer this question it needs to be acknowledged that they are also objects 
within the broader discourse of the policy area they engage in. Therein the discussion links 
to the post-structuralist basis of this study, drawing from Bourdieu’s understanding of the 
structure/agency nexus (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170; Wacquant, 2004, p.318). On that basis, 
the present composition of opportunities and challenges represents the current dominant 
dialogue. Research institutes have the ability to make an impact, if they can make a strong 
case and find support for their cause. This in turn is likely to be more successful if they are 
more widely informed about the workings of the dominant dialogue they are operating in. 
Thus in short one can say that research institutes to a certain degree nurture their own 
limits to operate at the transnational level. This is mainly based on the finding that they 
enter repetitive patterns of interaction which do rarely address the challenges sufficiently. 
Moreover, the limited clarity concerning the challenges they face additionally diminishes 
their abilities to challenge the current structure. However, at the same time they are part of 
a discourse in which they already need to fend for their position and for the cooperative 
measures they want to take. Therefore, the limits they are facing are simultaneously linked 
in to the opportunities that transnational cooperation offers them. In sum, while increased 
awareness is likely to enhance their opportunities to address the shortcomings of working 
 For further details on applied research activities, see Annex 2.23
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transnationally, at the same time they have to work with the options that they are provided 
with. 
A non-traditional approach to study foreign and security policy 
Another major aspect discussed in the thesis is the utilisation of a non-traditional 
theoretical approach to study foreign and security policy. The thesis draws from post-
structuralism to shape the analysis and contribute to the extant literature. Focusing 
specifically on interaction and the resultant discourse, post-structuralism links into the 
power of knowledge debate and allows us to discuss the impact of ideas (Agger, 1991, p.
107; Wight, 2006, p.104). It enables a fresh perspective towards understanding foreign 
and security policy integration, in using interaction -the most basic concept of social being- 
as the starting point and the ongoing driver of the analysis. It balances between objective 
and subjective truth, and argues that the difference between idea and reality as are 
constructed by a dominant discourse as is the adopted perception of idea and reality. 
The approach is found to be useful for the thesis at hand based on several inherent 
preconditions that it delivers in harmony with the research. First of all, it does not attribute 
power to one type of actor, but instead sees power as the ability to dominate the dominant 
political discourse (Foucault, 1998, p.93; Wacquant, 2004, p.318). Therefore it enables a 
step away from the previously predominant focus on governmental actors. Instead it 
recognises the strength of re-legitimisation through interaction in constructing governance. 
In addition, by taking the focus away from a specific unit and instead allowing for the 
consideration of a range of units which all have the single humans as agents at their heart, 
it complements IR with thoughts from social theory. 
In this context, post-structuralism with its focus on interaction and discourse facilitates a 
discussion on the impact of ideas (Foucault, 1972, p.283). It highlights that there is no 
purely objective or subjective truth, but that the dialogue among the two generates the 
dominant political discourse that is presented as political consent (Bourdieu, 1984, p.170). 
Therefore the post-structuralist approach is most suitable for this project, which seeks to 
grasp the contribution that non-and quasi-governmental experts can make by using their 
primary tool of knowledge or expertise. 
Moreover, the post-structuralist approach complements the exploratory nature of the 
research. Firstly, by recognising that the dialogue among a range of different actors 
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determines the makeup of the dominant political discourse (Wright, 2006, p.104), this 
approach drives us to investigate the potential relationships in the political environment. 
Secondly by acknowledging a potential role for a variety of actors, the approach facilitates 
an examination of the role and characteristics of non-traditional actors in the field of foreign 
and security policy. 
Drawing from all these inherent factors, post-structuralism is found to pave the way for the 
projects’ contribution to the extant literature. It addresses the broadly formulated goal to 
understand the contribution research institutes can make in order to be able to inform the 
choices that advance from the reordering of power, and to grasp the evolving political 
infrastructure. This shows that the research has been driven by key concepts that involve 
contributions, choices, and politics as in flux. All this is reflected within the post-structuralist 
view. 
A new perspective towards EU/Russia relations 
A final important component of the research is EU-Russia relations. These provide for the 
geographical and empirical context of the study. Representing such an inherent part to the 
set-up of the project, the task now is to consider the implications of the research findings 
for the discussions on EU/Russia relations. This section considers how far the research 
provides a new perspective to understand their (non-) cooperation in the area of foreign 
and security policy. It is questionable how far the focus on public policy research institutes 
provides new insights, or whether it solely reflects the present dialogue in formalised 
governmental interaction (Drent, 2012; Danilov, 2012; Averre, 2009; Fernandes, 2014). 
The study found that both perspectives are applicable and that the research thus provides 
two important insights. On the one hand, governmental interaction still has a clear impact 
on the cooperative activities among research institutes. This shows in two examples, firstly 
in the long-term role of governments in guiding the organic development of the research 
institutes in the foreign and security policy sphere (Parma, 2004, p.19ff; Tuchman 
Mathews, 2004; Interviewee A, 2012). This dependence continues to exist on the basis of 
funding and the institutes’ determination to be involved in the policy world. In this circle, a 
particular range of institutes manage to prevail as preferred partners, as they are 
perceived as resourceful partners by foreign institutes. Secondly, the dynamics of 
governmental interaction among Russia and the EU also show in the prevalence of 
recurring political debates that resurface in the cooperative activities of research institutes. 
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On the other hand, research institutes have clearly grasped the opportunities provided by 
engaging in cross-border cooperation. The research shows that it has developed its own 
dynamics, challenges and debates. Acquaintances, partnerships and networks among 
research institutes have developed to facilitate the exchange of data and expertise, and 
increase the access for diverse funding sources. These partnerships also serve to provide 
environments to engage in trusted and informal interaction that limit the use of diplomatic 
language. Beyond this, the often noted impact of critical junctures should not be 
overestimated. While they might bring about an apparent change of interest towards other 
projects among governments, most public policy research institutes are present in a field 
of interest long-enough to keep their position and partnerships. Though institutes may 
adjust their research topics when the funding is moving to a specific aspect, this is not 
likely to have a research institute and its staff abandon all their affiliations. 
Caution about much optimism is advised in so far as cross-border cooperation still 
primarily takes place in general acts rather than at a project based level (see Chapter 
Five). However, the interviews show a clear interest in strengthening project-based 
interaction. On another note, this study found that truly transnational cooperation among 
research institutes is still limited in its formats and purposes. However, this recognition on 
the one hand reflects the empirical presence within the current dominant discourse, and on 
the other hand it is a valuable step in raising awareness for the range of unexplored 
possibilities that lie in future integration. Current limits are elaborated further in the debate 
on the different perceptions and empirics on cooperation found in the research. 
As mentioned before the Ukraine crisis is omitted in this research, as it started after the 
bulk of the data collection was completed and the development of the conflict needs 
further observation before making premature statements. However some of the aspects 
that the crisis highlight, may become of central concern to the follow-up of this research. 
To be more precise, it will be of interest to investigate the impact of the crisis on cross-
border cooperation between research institutes. The relation between the EU and Russia 
has been seriously affected and a broad range of cooperative activities been stopped. On 
that basis an investigation is needed in how far the relations in high politics are transferred 
to the relations between the research institutes. Thus far, this project has shown on the 
one hand that relations among research institutes primarily result from personal contacts, 
and that research institutes commonly establish themselves in a research sphere for long-
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term which limits the impact of critical junctures. But at the same time this project 
highlights the clear link of research institutes to high politics (see p.189). This link, and to a 
good degree ‘dependence’, exists both in thematic and functional aspects. As the findings 
outline both a level of dependence and independence, it requires an examination of the 
present cases and the socio-political circumstances to determine the nature and 
functionality of cross-border cooperation among research institutes. Thus, it will be of 
interest to review the development of cross-border cooperation by raising a new set of 
data that considers the implications of the Ukraine crisis. 
Linked to that, it is not only the phased down interaction in high politics that may provide 
significant implications for cooperation among research institutes. Importantly the crisis 
also changes the socio-political environment in the domestic spheres. In this regard, it is of 
interest to investigate governments attempts to guide and control the soft-power of 
knowledge. And more specifically, how these attempts may change due to the conflict. As 
established previously in this research, Russia’s neo-authoritarian government takes a bit 
more control in guiding the soft-power of knowledge to consolidate the dominant 
discourse, although it has only shown certain effects on research staff. In comparison, 
while governments in EU MSs also look to promote a specific discourse, research 
institutes are provided with more space and opportunities to circumvent direct implications 
(see p.187). As the Ukraine crisis encompasses a stand-off in terms of power, the conflict 
situation may bring to the forefront governments’ intensified demands for a coherent 
dominant discourse. And at the same time the tense situation may lead criticism to surface 
among the domestic expert community. 
Further research that considers the changed circumstances both in transnational 
cooperation and in the domestic socio-political spheres may have implications for the 
arguments put forward in this thesis. First and foremost, it may provide the research with 
insights how far the findings of transnational research cooperation are tied in with a given 
time and space. Moreover, it may inform us specifically regarding the persistence of the 
findings on dependence and independence of transnational research activities. Meaning 
that it may outline more insights regarding the construction of a dominant discourse and 
its implications for transnational research. Furthermore, it may provide new insights 
concerning the importance that governments assign the soft-power of knowledge under 
changed circumstances.   
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
The intentions and findings outlined above, demonstrate that there are clear opportunities 
for further research. Part of this is driven by the fact that this particular research project 
has its own limitations and boundaries. At a number of points when conducting the 
research project, ideas had to be cut and debates had to be laid to rest, as they diverted 
from the planned core of the study. However, two debates of very different content have 
resurfaced repeatedly, one empirical and one theoretical in nature. The former -
EUinDepth- is set out to extend the current study while staying in the same framework. 
The second debate -towards a transnational civil society- emphasises the links of the 
research to a related debate. These two areas will be discussed below. 
A PROMISING CASE: EUINDEPTH
The first proposition to lead the research further is linked to the choice of case study, as 
the suitability of the selection represents an important pillar of the thesis. Deciding that the 
case study was to concern itself solely with a project-based cross-border interaction 
involving a number of research institutes based in the EU and Russia, diminished the 
sample. A survey of the relevant literature and the discussion with the interviewees helped 
to determine the most suitable case available thus far. However, the question came up 
whether to integrate another case study on a comparative basis, in order to be able to gain 
more insights on the conduction of cross-border cooperation. But the small pool of 
possibilities and the limited access to comprehensive information on the cases restricted 
the choice.  
Taking the research forward to analyse the EUinDepth project would not present a difficult 
conceptual step. The analysis of a similar project in Chapter Five prepares the ground for 
broadening the scope of research. While the structure and measures used in EUinDepth 
are different to those used in IDEAS project, both undertakings follow similar objectives in 
a broad understanding. They both look to establish exchange across boarders for a longer 
period of time, and they both aim to develop an integrative understanding of a 
transnational subject area. Importantly, the examination of EUinDepth adds a number of 
aspects and nuances to the inferences previously drawn from the IDEAS project. 
The creation of a new transnational project called EUinDepth (European Identity, Cultural 
Diversity and Political Change) in early 2014 was therefore of strong interest. The 
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EUinDepth project has been established under the awareness and with the aim to conduct 
a truly transnational undertaking. In that sense it sets an example for other institutes, 
partnerships and networks in the field. It is concerned with the varying perception and the 
degree of transnational applicability of the concept of European identity. 
EUinDepth is a newly established project in the realm of the 7th Framework Programme 
for Research and Technological Development by the European Commission. It falls into 
the scope of the international research staff exchange scheme (European Commission, 
2014c). The project at hand has only been launched in January 2014, and will continue 
until 2018 with consideration of even further development. It is a transnational project that 
involves participants from the wider European region, including actors from EU member 
states, from Russia, and Moldova, which is in the process of signing an association 
agreement with the EU. The actors involved in the project are all higher education 
institutes, each represented by one or several staff members of a relevant department. 
They encompass the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium), Institute of Political Studies 
in Bordeaux (France), University of Göttingen (Germany), Eötvös Loránd University 
(Hungary), University of Siena (Italy), University of Coimbra (Portugal), Centre for Russian 
and East European University of Birmingham (UK), IMEMO (Russia), Institute of Europe 
(Russia), Kuban State University (Russia), Perm National Research University (Russia), 
EU Centre in Siberia (Tomsk State University, Russia), Udmurt State University (Russia) 
and Voronezh State University (Russia). The coordination of the project lies with a further 
partner, the Economics and Finance Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova 
(Voronezh State University, 2014). 
The project aims to examine the transnational phenomenon of European identity from the 
point of view of EU member states and non-EU member states. Therein it considers the 
varying perceptions of Europe’s borders from Russian and EU perspectives, and in that 
context delves into an investigation about cultural security in the highly multi-ethnic wider 
Europe. A strategic but also normative aim behind this is to develop a common 
understanding among the partner countries of what it means to be European (Akulshina, 
2014). This could inform EU partnership strategies and agreements in order to base them 
on a shared understanding and adjusted conceptualisations (RIC, 2013). What makes this 
undertaking particularly interesting as a case study is its strong emphasis of cross-border 
cooperation. Thus it does no only accumulate and discuss the various views from the 
involved multinational researchers. In addition, it specifically promotes cross-border staff 
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exchange in its efforts to gain a fresh understanding of the transnational subject area. The 
project did not yet issue very many outputs as it has only been running for a short period of 
time, but it is still suitable as case study, as discussing the outputs is subordinate to 
understanding the measures and tools for cooperation. There are four identifiable areas of 
research regarding the EUinDepth initiative. Two are driven by identified early challenges, 
two concern the processes involved in conducting the project. 
There are two potential challenges which have been identified by EUinDepth participants, 
which leave space for further research. On the one hand, the practical challenge of 
integrating the different institutes from different political backgrounds into the project. Each 
of them has been established and shaped in their specific national cultural and political 
background. This challenge, on the other hand, is amplified by the national interests that 
each of the institutes have – to varying degrees - to consider or adhere to (Iacto, 2014). 
While this applies to all institutes to some degree, the Russian institutes represent a 
specific case since the ‘foreign agent law’ has been put in place regarding foreign funded 
institutions.  However, having IMEMO and the Institute of Europe as project members , as 24
well as being represented by a similar number of institutes as the EU, are helpful aspects 
in this context.  
On the other hand, there exists potential to investigate the theoretical and conceptual 
approaches used in the EUinDepth study. These include the definition of Europe or 
Europeanness; the conceptualisation of representation; and the power of knowledge and 
appreciation in this context (Popravko & Deriglazova, 2014). These terms are highly 
contested in their definition and conceptualisation, and may easily provide a source of 
disagreement and ambiguity. However, the project already devoted some attention to 
register an awareness of these theoretical and conceptual difficulties. To date, the 
accessible data show that the concepts have been discussed by the lead participants. On 
this basis, guidelines are provided on how to understand these concepts (RIC, 2013). This 
is an interesting aspect showing how the profession of academia works across borders. 
The mindfulness about theoretical considerations and their underlying importance for 
methodological procedures represent an agreement on their significance for the 
undertaking. 
 More detail to the foreign agent law is provided in Chapter Three during the discussion on formalised high 24
political cooperation among the EU and Russia.
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Alongside these early challenges, there exists potential to investigate the form of 
engagement that EUinDepth utilises. In contrast to IDEAS, EUinDepth also provides a 
different means of engagement across institutes, by using a transnational staff exchange 
as a tool in their research. This means that they not only exchange information in 
explaining the views of the countries they come from. Instead they collect data commonly 
and in a cross-border setting. Their project is likely to be pioneering increased recognition 
among foreign and security policy research institutes in wider Europe of the need to take 
the step and delve into project-based cooperation across borders, instead of staying in the 
early stages of interaction. Understanding the challenges and opportunities that this 
engagement provides offers a potential avenue for further research. 
Another area of research is into the impact of the characteristics of participating institutions 
into the objectives, nature and conduction of the project. This thesis has established a 
indicative typology of research institutes (Chapter Four). This typology could be expanded 
to the EUinDepth context. It is notable that the institutes within EUinDepth are relatively 
similar to each other: All are established at nation state level and all are academic 
institutions. While most of them are full-blown university institutes, IMEMO, the Institute of 
Europe, and the Academy of Sciences of Moldova are research institutes that offer space 
for doctoral students. The study of an academic-based project could add a unique 
contribution to debates over the role of academia in policymaking.  
TOWARDS TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY
The second broad area for future research concerns the enhanced participation of non- 
and quasi-governmental actors in foreign and security policy governance. On that basis, 
there exists potential to link this research to a broader debate about the increasing 
integration of civil society beyond state boundaries. While research institutes are not civil 
society actors as such and their link is a contested space, the two share suitable 
characteristics as non-governmental actors in cross-border interaction. This enables 
further research to draw on the literature of transnational civil society. 
The 1990s and early 2000s saw a revival on the debate of civil society and a pursuit to 
reinvent the concept under consideration of the all-embracing process of globalisation. 
Authors in this field discussed the role of an indefinite range of societal actors, which were 
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specifically non-governmental, in constructing global networks and contributing to 
internationally relevant governance processes (for comprehensive discussions see: 
Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003; Kaldor, Moore & Selchow, 2012). On that basis academics and 
practitioners developed a number of concepts of the idea of a global civil society. Such 
concepts are driven by the thought to serve as a means to promote a common 
responsibility across countries and continents. In that sense, the idea of global civil society 
is often associated with the stabilisation of an international continuation of democratic 
processes in an increasingly integrated world, where nation states lack the capacities to 
deal with certain issues (Florini, 2013, p.30). This is particularly directed to raise 
responsibility across borders and address the shortcoming of accountability of politicians 
across borders (for early works see: Lipschitz & Mayer, 1996; Walzer, 1997; Scholte 1999; 
for comprehensive discussions see: Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003; Kaldor, Moore & Selchow, 
2012). Thus the redefinition of the civil society as an entity with global coverage, worked in 
unison with the spreading recognition of the deterritorialisation of many socio-political 
issues.  
In her discussion of the accountability of civil society Mary Kaldor differentiates three types 
of civil societies represented in current redefinitions, the activist, the neoliberal and the 
postmodern version.  
‘In my view, civil society has to include all the groupings that are included in 
the different versions — the relatively passive ‘third sector’ of the neo-liberal 
version, the social movements of the activist version, as well as the neo-
traditional groupings of the post-modern version. It is true that the neo-
traditional formation may not provide a voice for individuals because of their 
communitarian nature and, indeed, may engage in various forms of 
coercion and violence. But actually existing civil society has to contend with 
these troublesome and contradictory issues; if it is to be an inclusive 
concept, it has to include the exclusive (Kaldor, 2003, p.11, Civil Society 
and Accountability). 
John Keane produced a significant contribution discussing and questioning the concept of 
a global civil society. Defining the term, he calls it ‘a society of societies’ that is ‘bigger and 
weightier than any individual actor or organisation or combined sum of its thousands of 
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constituent parts - most of whom […] neither know each other nor have any chance of 
meeting each other face-to-face’ (Keane, 2003, p.12).  
‘[Global civil society] refers to a vast, sprawling non-governmental 
constellation of many institutionalised structures, associations and networks 
within which individual and group actors are interrelated and functionally 
interdependent (Keane, 2003, p.12). 
These definitions provided by senior scholars in the field, provide an abstract and well 
thought out overview of what portrays a global civil society. In fact they are so well 
prepared that they immediately provide insights on a few inherent problems of the concept. 
First and foremost they demonstrate the indefinability of the concept. There is a very broad 
range of actors who are counted or count themselves as part of the global civil society that 
serves as system of checks and balances for the political and economic elites. These 
encompass International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), NGOs, social 
movements, labour unions, political activists, social organisations, nationalist and religious 
groups (Kaldor, 2003, p.12). To add to the complexity, the various types of entities exist at 
local, national and international level. That means each of these entities have their own 
aims and ideas, channels and tools even, if they work on the some issue (Scholte, 1999, 
p.4).  
The above definitions of a global civil society identify it as all-embracing in its nature, 
encompassing a range of actors each of them with a variety of attributes that can be seen 
positive or negative by any other actor. While this may differ from the initial vision of some 
people, indeed it is this diversity that promotes friction, disputes and energetic interaction 
which genuinely represents the nature of civil society. In that sense it is another kind of 
arena in which a range of specifically non-governmental actors interact and promote their 
causes.  
To link the thesis to the debate on global civil society, the follow-up research mobilises the 
particular concept of transnational civil society building. This concept specifically focuses 
on cross-border cooperation among civil society actors and considers their complementary 
qualities to governments’ transnational activities (Florini, 2003 & 2013). Significantly, this 
second proposition for further research has to engage with an in-depth discussion about 
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the attributes of actors. It has to consider how far research institutes can be recognised as 
civil society actors. 
The basic arguments of increased integration and transnational interaction among non-
governmental and civil-society actors have been broadly acknowledged and also build the 
backbone of this thesis. But as already mentioned above, instead of discussing the 
possibility of establishing solidarity and community at a global scale, it is more realistic to 
focus on common ties and common issues to establish a range of consensuses which can 
over time be interconnected in a loose network. This ‘toned down’ concept of a 
transnational civil society has been explored by a smaller range of researchers 
simultaneous to the predominantly discussed global civil society. They recognised a 
growing role of civil society actors cooperating across borders, and their ability to 
complement governments in their limited transnational actions (Florini, 2000, p.260). In her 
latest book chapter (at the time when this theses was completed) Florini argues that there 
is a shortfall of case studies and comparative studies (Florini, 2013). 
This represents exactly the approach that the thesis is built on, and demonstrates the 
contribution of the project to the broader debate concerning the development of a 
transnational civil society. This thesis provides insights regarding the conduction of 
transnational cooperation among a specific range of non- and quasi-governmental actors. 
It explores the channels and tools of research institutes, and considers the interconnection 
to the broader dominant political discourse. The fact that it concerns a field of study in 
which research on non-governmental entities has yet been underdeveloped opens up a 
new original addition. In this regard the thesis contributes its theoretical thoughts on 
structure/agency dispute inherent to governance processes, and the power of knowledge, 
as well as its very specific set of data on research institutes. Thereby it offers new insights 
regarding the role of non- and quasi-governmental actors in the transnational sphere, and 
sets it into the context with the shortcomings of states to act in that sphere. As this thesis 
provides insights regarding the conduction of transnational cooperation among a specific 
range of non- and quasi-governmental actors, it allows the development of a ‘bottom-up’ 
process of gaining detailed insights before opening up to the broader debate. In a further 
step it can now be related to the broader debate on the integration of civil society across-
borders, based on findings regarding the extant cooperation. There are three particular 
areas of future research outlined below. 
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The first avenue for research is to link research undertaken in this thesis to wider debates 
on transnational integration of non-state actors and their alternative value. As this thesis 
concerns foreign and security policy, it analyses an area that drives citizens to affiliate with 
a group and to work together. Previously the position as protector has been taken by the 
nation state. But as this thesis identified (in Chapter Three), the deterritorialisation of 
foreign and security policy means that states lack the comprehensive capacities to 
address transnational challenges. Thus, new measures need to be considered and 
established. Herein, the consideration of the structure agency debate triggers questions of 
how an alternative concept of integration among non-state actors could develop and what 
it would look like. Therein the arguments are predominantly based on a critical review of 
the diminishing significance of statehood and the increasing impact of international 
integration. This restructuring also reflects in the change of the object that is to be secured, 
instead of the nation states it is increasingly the human beings that are considered by 
policies. Although, it must be underlined that this is primarily a phenomenon among the 
Western states on the northern hemisphere, which rationalises a partial move beyond the 
Westphalian system. Nevertheless, the processes identified in this thesis regarding 
integration across borders to respond to particular challenges may have broader utility in 
the debate on transnational civil society. 
The second avenue for further research is to link this research project to wider studies of 
accountability mechanisms in transnational civil society movements. For instance, 
Edward’s and Gaventa’s analysis of global civil society offers a perspective of such 
movements by asking to what extent such actors are ‘democratic'. They argue that 
nationally elected politicians can hardly be held accountable for the decisions in regional 
and global institutes, and at the same time civil society actors with an international voice 
are not elected at all (Edwards & Gaventa, 2001). As this research project has examined 
public policy research institutes, it has analysed bodies which are comprised of non-
elected staff who cooperate with peers across national boundaries, to expand possibilities 
to shape policy. Thus insights from this research can contributes to debates on possible 
democratic deficits in non-state actors activities at a transnational level.  
Finally, there exists a possibility that concepts and underlying frameworks from this 
particular research project can be developed on a wider geographical basis. Here, 
scholarship from the transnational civil society field can provide valuable guidance. In 
particular, the research could develop to incorporate research institutes from the global 
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South. Literature in the transnational civil society field has examined the relationship 
between movements in what has been termed the global North and global South, opening 
up questions of power disparity and adoption of prevalent dominant political discourses 
(Edwards & Gaventa, 2001; Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997). Frameworks 
represented in this thesis are used to analyse cooperation among Russian and EU-based 
research institutes. Arguably this is a North-North interaction. This opens the opportunity to 
develop such frameworks to analyse relations between research institutes in the global 
South, or initiatives that incorporate institutes from North and South. 
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ANNEX
ANNEX 1 - QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
The questions prepared for the semi-structured interviews were directed at gaining insights 
regarding four categories: (1) the role of the interviewee and his/her field of work, the work 
of the respective research institute, (2) the domestic research environment, and (3) their 
cross-border interaction with foreign research institutes. In the briefing before the 
interviews it has been clarified that the research is not about measuring impact (of 
research institutes on policy decisions), but instead about grasping their dynamics, 
identifying their tools and understanding their transnational operations.  
(1) About the Interviewee 
- What is your role here at the institutes and what is the focus of your work? 
- For how long has this institution been existing, and for what reasons?  
- How did the interest in the EU/ EU Studies emerge? 
(2) About the Research Environment 
- What is the role of foreign and security policy experts in Russia/the EU/your country 
from your perspective? (lobbyist/ adviser/translator) 
- What are the tools of experts to promote their research? (government affiliation, 
education, etc.) 
- What are the advantages/disadvantages working in your sphere (academic/think tank/
governmental research institute)? 
- What is the main topical interest currently? And how far did that interest change over 
the last five to ten years? 
(3) About Transnational Cooperation 
- I there a need and a will to cooperate with foreign experts? How does this show? 
- Is there a will for interaction from both sides, or do they just study each other to keep up 
on top of the ongoing processes of the respective other? 
- What are the regions/countries most interaction takes place with? 
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- Is your institute part of any projects that promote the exchange with experts specifically 
from EU countries/ Russia? 
- How do you decide for partners on a project? 
- Can you provide positive examples for initiatives of your institute where transnational 
cooperation lead to output? 
- Can you provide negative examples for initiatives of your institute where transnational 
cooperation slowed down/broke up? 
- What are the main problems in transnational cooperation both internal and external?  
- Is there an increased focus on specific member states of the EU? Or is the EU the focal 
point?  
- What is the main output of projects? (policy reports/ journal articles/ books/ new 
projects?)  
- Are projects about communication and exchange of information and views, or are they 
based on common design and common data collection? 
- How do you perceive projects to enable you to have in-depth discussions with peers? 
How do you ensure in-depth exchange in your projects? 
- Do foreign experts generally expect you to explain the domestic standpoint before 
discussing issue-based specifics? 
- Is there a change in transnational interaction alongside a change of generations? 
(Including a changed approach to new media?) 
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ANNEX 2 - EXAMPLES OF COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PRACTICE
Within this table we distinguish general acts of cooperation and project-based cooperation, 
the latter being highlighted through bold Script. These are the two types of interaction used 
by research institutes in foreign and security policy to conduct cooperation for the 
purposes of research, analysis, and spreading data. The meaning of ‘general acts of 
cooperation’ and ‘project-based cooperation’ are differentiated in this thesis by a distinction 
on the basis of their format. In this sense, general acts of cooperation encompass round-
tables, seminars, conferences and meetings which take place for singular relevance. 
Therein they may be part of a series of activities, but each of the activities does not have a 
causal, preparatory or structural direct impact for further activities. This does by no means 
eliminate the possibility that activities may promote further contacts and further activities 
among the same or new people and institutes, on a similar or a different topic. But it does 
eliminate the option that general acts of cooperation are a planned and operationalised as 
a segment of project-based cooperation.  
In contrast, project-based cooperation represents a commonly planned and 
operationalised process commonly involving a series of consecutive activities designed to 
complement each other. The project has a defined outcome on which basis each 
complementary section is implemented, and which is generally finalised with an output 
agreed upon earlier (i.e. a report). Thus this type of interaction differentiates itself from 
general acts of cooperation by being a commonly planned initiative among an agreed 
range of actors, with defined a timeframe, content and endpoint (possibly output).  
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IMEMO, Institute 
of World 
Economy and 
International 
Affairs (Russia)
Schlangenbader Talks (1998-2013) 
‘series of German-Russian bilateral 
conferences on issues related to foreign 
policy and security’ 
ht tp: / /www.imemo.ru/en/ index.php?
page_id=546 
European Dialogue (2009-2014) 
‘ [ A ] i m s a t f a c i l i t a t i o n … o f t h e 
rapprochement between Russia and the 
EU in various fields of economic, political, 
social life and analyses of the most acute 
problems in Russia- EU relations.’ 
ht tp: / /www.imemo.ru/en/ index.php?
page_id=502&id=1275&p=&ret=741&year
=2014&sem=406 
Scientific seminar of the Center for 
European Studies (2011-2014) 
‘CEI researchers investigate current 
trends in European integration and the 
EU’s role in world economy, analysis of 
actual economic and socio-political issues 
in individual European countries’ 
ht tp: / /www.imemo.ru/en/ index.php?
page_id=853 
Scientific-theoretical seminar(2010-14)  
‘[Di]scusses the political development 
trends of the leading countries of the 
world and Russia, the dynamics of the 
institutional, social, psychological and 
socio-cultural changes, problems of 
methodology analysis of the socio-political 
development of the modern world. 
ht tp: / /www.imemo.ru/en/ index.php?
page_id=625
EASI (2012) 
‘aims to develop proposals on the new 
security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic 
space’ 
ht tp: / /www.imemo.ru/en/ index.php?
page_id=545 
EUinDepth (2014-2017)  
‘The aim of the project is to promote 
cooperation between scientific research 
centres of EU countries and Russia 
th rough academic mob i l i t y, j o in t 
workshops and research.’ 
ht tp: / /www.imemo.ru/en/ index.php?
page_id=920
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Institute of 
Europe of the 
Russian 
Academy of 
Sciences 
(Russia)  
http://
www.ieras.ru/
english/
news.htm 
• June 2, 2010 (Moscow, Russia): Many 
leading and novice experts in British 
studies assembled for the one-day 
roundtable discussion, Great Britain 
2010: New Political Situation. 
• December 19, 2012 - International 
Seminar "What does Russia expect 
from the European Union?”  
• January 9, 2014 scientific conference 
“European Culture in XXI Century”,  
• May 19, 2014 the Center for German 
Studies of IE RAS round table 
discussion on “German Eastern Policy 
and German-Russian Relations”. 
• May 19-21, 2014 in ternat iona l 
conference "Russia and the EU: 
C o o p e r a t i o n i n S c i e n c e a n d 
Education. The EU and Russia in 
Eurasia” 
• May 29-30, 2014 international seminar 
"WTO and Euroasian Integration 
Factors in EU-Russia Relations" 
• June 4, 2014 at IV International 
scientific and practical conference 
“Religion within Framework of Social 
Conflicts: Experience and Geostrategy 
of Russia and Europe" 
• June 18, 2014 Institute of Europe 
hosted international conference 
"Elections to European Parliament 
2014: Results and Prospects" 
• August 29-30, 2014 in Berlin and 
Wuensdorf-Zossen internat ional 
conference "Withdrawal of the 
Western Group of Forces from 
Germany and the European Security 
Policy in the XXI Century"
- EUinDEPTH 2014-2017 
6. Feb. Coordinat ion meet ing on 
“European Identity, Cultural Diversity and 
Political Change” project 
http://www.ric.vsu.ru/en/euindepth 
 - Deep Cuts 2013- ongoing 
‘The task of the Deep Cuts Commission is 
to address the key challenges to 
significantly lowering nuclear weapons 
arsenals. Framework, profi le, and 
purpose of the Commission are unique. 
The trilateral German–Russian–U.S. 
framework offers a chance to discuss and 
analyze a cross section of interests of 
t h ree coun t r i es t ha t a re key to 
international matters of arms control and 
disarmament.’ 
http://www.deepcuts.org/purpose
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Carnegie 
Endowment 
Russia (Russia)
EASI (Euro-Atlantic Security initiative) 
2010 -2012 
former policymakers, diplomats, generals, 
and business leaders from Russia, the 
United States, Canada, Central Europe, 
and European Union nations came 
together to chart a roadmap of practical 
action that would allow the region to leave 
its past behind and to start to build a more 
secure future based on mutual trust and 
cooperation. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/
specialprojects/
EuroAtlanticSecurityInitiativeEASI/?
type=analysis&lang=en&reloadFlag=1 
EASI next generation (ongoing) 
‘to envision a more inclusive, secure, and 
cooperative Euro-Atlantic community’ 
http://carnegieendowment.org/
2014/05/27/perspectives-of-next-
generation-challenges-to-security-in-osce/
hbc4
State University of 
St. Petersburg 
(Russia)
Masters Studies in European Societies 
(Ongoing), alongside Bielefeld University, 
St Petersburg, The German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD) ongoing 
http://www.zdes.spbu.ru/content/2014/
MASES_info_letter_extended_deadline.p
df 
EUSP International Summer School 
ongoing, supported by the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation. 
http://eu.spb.ru/en/research-centers/ces/
ces-profile
Tempus Prego 2008-2010 
“Promotion of European Governance in 
Russian North-Western Regions” 
Petrozavodsk State University 
Tempus projects, summer school 
http://eu.spb.ru/en/research-centers/ces/
ces-profile/tempus-unego  
PhD Exchange Programme: Pomor 
State University, University of Helsinki,  
Genoa University 
‘The project aimed at satisfying academic 
and practical needs in the sphere of 
European studies in Russia. Its major task 
was to introduce new practical skills in 
management sphere in a number of 
regions in Northwestern Russia - the 
region where European problems are 
particularly topical because of the direct 
neighborhood to the European Union.’
http://eu.spb.ru/en/international-programs/
marca/576-research/ces-eu-centre/ces-
profile
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CIRP, The Centre 
of International 
and Regional 
Policy (Russia)
The CIRP School Program  
‘an initiative addressed to educate a 
responsible young generation in Russia 
and neighboring countries, to support 
young policy analysts and public activists’  
http://www.cirp.ru/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=8&I
temid=4&35ab755042543fdb4e52da8799
ac7527=6959e6e1aa0ad48803fc5610c8d
41271 
9 - 13 February 2015  
CIRP Winter School on "Russia and the 
West: Quo Vadis?" Invitees -students and 
postgraduates socio-political and 
economic specialties from Russia, CIS 
and Baltic countries, Poland and 
Germany. 
July 7-11, 2014 
Summer School CIRP on "Limited 
Partnership: Prospects for EU-Russia 
relations.”
2-6 February 
Winter School held CIRP on "Policy of 
Russia and the EU in Eastern Europe: 
general or competitive neighborhood?".
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IFSH (Germany) - Normensozialisation in russland – 
chancen und grenzen europäischer 
menschenrechtspolitik gegenüber der 
russländischen federation 
- Subjecting freedom: analysing 
arguments in favour of restricting 
human and civil rights under the 
pretext of combating terrorism in the 
usa, eu and russia (2010 - 2012) 
- Claiming respect. Tracing the socio-
emotional dimension of russia’s 
relations with the west 
- multilateralism in russian foreign policy: 
genuine search for partners or a 
camouflage for unilateral ambitions? 
- International workshop: ‘the intiative 
for the development of a euro-atlantic 
and eurasian security community 
(ideas)”, Berlin, 20. March 2012 
- Challenges to deep nuclear cuts: 
Reducing the role of tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe. ‘Seeks 
to advance understanding of and 
support for steps to reduce the role 
and number of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe and Russia. 
Activities include roundtables in key 
countries, publications and outreach 
ac t iv i t ies , the organ iza t ion o f 
delegations of former and current 
officials to discuss key policy options, 
as well as work with parliamentarians 
in nato member states.’
- IDEAS 2012 
Track II initiative - IDEAS aims at 
conceptualizing a “free, democratic, 
common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian security community stretching 
from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, as 
envisioned by the OSCE participating 
States in their 2010 Astana 
Commemorative Declaration. 
- Deep Cuts  
Including presentation of work to 
Permanent German Mission to the United 
Nations, April 30 2014,  
http://ifsh.de/en/ifar/news/detail/of/
news-626/ 
http://ifsh.de/en/ifar/news/detail/of/
news-735/ 
SWP (German 
Institute for 
International and 
Security Affairs) 
(Germany)
Russia's Low Carbon Modernisation 
and Climate Politics 
 Amplifying opinion and information 
exchange between Russia and Germany/
the EU, including positions in the 
international climate negotiations. 
Facilitation of expert networks. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/projects/
completed-projects/russias-climate-
politics-compl.html
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DGAP (German 
Council on 
Foreign Relations) 
(Germany)
Grunewald Discussion Group 
The Robert Bosch Stiftung regularly 
organizes a discussion group with public 
figures from various areas such as 
politics, business, culture, and academia 
who are all dedicated to strengthening the 
relationship between the European Union 
and the Russian Federation. The idea is 
for them to act as a kind of early warning 
system, drawing attention to both 
potential opportunities and dangers and 
offering recommendations to policy-
makers. 
09.12.2014 - Roundtable: Russian 
Security Politics: Economic, Military 
and Social Aspects  
( R u s s i s c h e S i c h e r h e i t s p o l i t i k : 
Ö k o n o m i s c h e , m i l i t ä r i s c h e u n d 
gesellschaftliche Aspekte) 
26.06.2014 - The impact of the foreign 
policy of German Unification 1989/90 
for the current relations to Russia (Die 
Folgen der Außenpolitik der deutschen 
Einhei t 1989/90 für d ie heut igen 
Beziehungen zu Russland) 
10.04.2014 - Perspectives of the 
European Economic Integration 
Cooperation with the EU 
( P e r s p e k t i v e n d e r E u r a s i s c h e n 
Wirtschaftsintegration 
Die Zusammenarbeit mit der EU) 
07.02.2014 – Russian Federation, 
Business and Finance (Russische 
Föderation, Wirtschaft & Finanzen)
University of 
Birmingham (UK)
ESRC funded research project 
(Rising Powers and Interdependent 
Futures) 2013-2015 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/
activity/government-society/rising-powers/
index.aspx
- EUinDepth 2014-2017 
European Union Marie Curie Action 
International Research Staff Exchange 
scheme (IRSES) entitled 'EUinDepth— 
European Identity, Cultural Diversity and 
Political Change' 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/
government-society/departments/russian-
east-european-studies/news/2013/08/eu-
funded-staff-exchange-scheme.aspx
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Chatham House 
(UK)
Chatham House projects on Russia and 
Eurasia 
Under Pressure: Media and NGOs in 
Russia 
8 Jan 2015 - 14:00 to 15:30 
Chatham House, London 
Alexander Podrabinek, Journalist, Writer 
and Human Rights Activist
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